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ABSTRACT
This study is motivated by the desire to develop an understanding of 
the manufacturing strategy concept within the Saudi business 
environment. More specifically the objectives of the study are to 
detect the existing type of manufacturing strategies in Saudi plants 
in the last two years (i.e., 1987 and 1988) as well as in the next 
two years (i.e., 1990 and 1991); to use SWOT analysis to find out 
strengths and weaknesses within the plants surveyed as well as 
opportunities and threats in the environment; and finally to test six 
hypotheses of the model of manufacturing strategy. The model consists 
of eight factors: organisational environment, corporate and business 
strategies, manufacturing task statement, manufacturing task, the 
role of the production manager, structural category of decisions, 
infrastructural category of decisions, and finally organisational 
performance.
In order to achieve these objectives, three sets of questionnaires 
were used. They were destined for three managers in each plant; 
general manager, production manager, and sales manager. Data were 
collected from 117 plants (a total of 351 sets of questionnaire) of 
four industries of the Saudi manufacturing private sector. These are 
the food, paper, chemical, and metal industries. Furthermore, 
governmental reports were consulted to obtain primary data for the 
study.
Ill
The results showed that the manufacturing strategies for the Saudi 
plants during 1987 and 1988 were that of "quality” and "on-time 
delivery", and that it is "a low price" strategy for 1990 and 1991. 
The results of SWOT analysis corroborate the detected strategies and 
offer solutions to the problems confronting Saudi industries.
The results of testing the six hypotheses of the manufacturing 
strategy model showed a significant relationship in every hypothesis. 
The results of the hypotheses revealed that: environmental
uncertainty influences the manufacturing task of the plant; the 
plant's manufacturing infrastructure associates with its 
manufacturing task; the higher the congruence between environmental 
uncertainty and manufacturing task, the better the performance; the 
higher the congruence between manufacturing task and manufacturing 
infrastructure, the better the performance; the higher the top 
management and production management task congruence, the better the 
performance; and finally the greater the involvement of production 
managers in strategic decision making, the better the performance.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this Chapter is to acquaint the reader with the 
background to the research, its importance, its objectives, its 
limitations and to present the overall structure of the thesis.
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Top managers in many companies rely heavily on cost and efficiency as 
performance indicators for the manufacturing function. In so doing, 
they are neglecting other indicators of the manufacturing function 
and leading their firms into lack of success. Skinner says:
A ... major cause of companies getting into trouble in 
manufacturing is the tendency for many managements to accept 
simplistic notions in evaluating the performance of their 
manufacturing facilities. By this I am referring to the 
general tendency in most companies to evaluate manufacturing 
primarily on the basis of cost and efficiency (Skinner, 
1985:47).
Top managers also ignore the role of the production manager, as a 
representative of the manufacturing function, in formulating 
corporate strategy. They often if not always allow finance, 
marketing and other functional managers to play a bigger role in 
corporate strategy level meetings, and then expect manufacturing to 
react to the outcomes (Skinner, 1978; Wheelwright, 1978; Hill, 1985).
1
It is surprising that such a situation occurs when the manufacturing 
function controls the major assets in most industrial firms. New and 
Myers have pointed out the responsibilities of the manufacturing 
function.
In most manufacturing companies, the manufacturing function 
itself is responsible for employing around 70% of the labour 
spending some 70-80% of all current cash flow and controlling 
around 80% of the capital assets of the business (New and 
Myers, 1986:v).
Terry Hill has stated clearly the overlooking of the production 
manager role in the corporate strategy process as follows:
In the majority of cases, manufacturing is simply not geared 
to the business's corporate objectives. The result is a 
manufacturing system, good in itself, but not designed to 
meet company needs. Manufacturing left in the wake of 
corporate decisions is often at best a neutral force, and 
even sometimes inadvertently pulls in the opposite direction. 
Seen as being concerned solely with efficiency, the question 
of production's strategic contribution is seldom part of the 
corporate consciousness. What does all this mean for 
production managers? One clear consequence is the need to 
change from a reactive to a proactive stance (Hill, 1985:25).
As a result of increasingly severe competition, companies which rely 
solely on a cost efficiency indicator and or do not allow production 
representation in the formulation of corporate strategy have tended 
to lose their competitive edge.
The introduction of the manufacturing strategy amends this situation. 
It calls for multiple performance criteria for the manufacturing 
function, and for a greater role for production managers in 
strategic decision making (see Chapter Two). Manufacturing strategy 
leads manufacturers to beat their competitors by strengths stemming
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from the manufacturing function. More important, manufacturing 
strategy requests managers to think strategically; i.e., to think in 
terms of "effectiveness” rather than "efficiency". For example, when 
managers decide to buy a piece of equipment; they should ask 
themselves "how can we compete effectively using this piece of 
technology?" rather than "how much this piece of technology improve 
our financial indicators?". In other words, effectiveness may mean 
"doing the right thing", whereas efficiency means "doing things 
right" (Bedeian, 1984).
Manufacturing strategy is an emerging field of study and improving 
the manufacturing operations, as its main aim, is a promising 
concept. Yet more has to be learned about this new field.
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Industrialisation is the main hope in most developing countries to 
diversify their economy, among them Saudi Arabia has moved rapidly 
into industrialisation. Between 1975 and 1986 the number of its 
plants increased sharply from 473 to over 2000 (Ministry of 
Industry and Electricity, 1986a). All these plants, regardless of 
their ownership (i.e., public or private), have to be professional in 
manufacturing in order to face competition, be it national or 
international. Manufacturing strategy, as a valuable tool, paves the 
way towards this end.
The significance of this study lies in its contribution at various 
levels.
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First, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, the study tries to 
verify empirically the validity of the Sandcone model and the 
Japanese cumulative model concerning the competitive priorities for 
the first time.
Second, it is one among three studies that shows how manufacturing 
policies (or programmes variables) are linked statistically to 
competitive priorities.
Third, it is the first empirical study about manufacturing strategy 
to incorporate a SWOT analysis. Other studies have only included 
strengths and problems (e.g., Swamidass, 1986).
Fourth, this study has tested six hypotheses of the manufacturing 
strategy model in more than one industry and has validated two 
hypotheses for the first time. It is hoped that the results of these 
hypotheses will have direct contribution to the literature.
Fifth, research in manufacturing strategy is required in developing 
countries to permit cross-cultural comparison of results. Such 
comparisons would reveal similarities and dissimilarities between 
developed and developing countries. The researcher believes that more 
research is needed in this emerging field to fill the gaps in the 
unsettled issues (e.g., trade-offs notion) or undeveloped issues 
(e.g., measurement).
Sixth, at the methodological level, controlling plants in terms of
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capital and number of employees on the industry level as well as on 
the subindustry is a unique feature of this study, which should make 
the sample more homogeneous.
Finally, the study which is conducted on an individual level provides 
empirical data with a large sample that rarely exist about Saudi 
Arabia. It is expected that manufacturers in Saudi Arabia will 
utilise such data.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The objectives of this study are to develop an understanding of the 
manufacturing strategy concept and to find out the type of 
manufacturing strategies that exist among Saudi enterprises. More 
specifically, the study is aimed at:
1. Detecting the manufacturing strategy for the Saudi plants in
the last two years (i.e., 1987 and 1988).
2. Detecting the manufacturing strategy for the Saudi plants in
the next two years (i.e., 1990 and 1991).
3. Using SWOT analysis to find out strengths and weaknesses
within the surveyed plants as well as opportunities and threats 
in the environment.
4. Testing the following six hypotheses of a model of
manufacturing strategy on the Saudi manufacturing private
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sector:
HI Environmental uncertainty correlates with manufacturing
task.
H2 A plant's manufacturing infrastructure correlates with its
manufacturing task.
H3 The higher the congruence between environmental uncertainty
and manufacturing task, the better the performance.
H4 The higher the congruence between manufacturing task and
manufacturing infrastructure, the better the performance.
H5 The higher the top management and production management task
congruence, the better the performance.
H6 The greater the involvement of production managers in strategic
decision making, the better the performance.
The researcher decided to use the word "Detect" rather than "survey" 
here because the literature suggests that manufacturing strategy is 
not well understood among practitioners (e.g., Schroeder et al., 
1986; Swamidass, 1986). However, the facts speak for themselves that 
they must be practicing it.
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1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The fundamental limitations are:
1. The scarcity of studies in manufacturing strategy especially 
at the first stage of this research was a major limitation. In 
some cases, articles were not published then, thus the 
researcher had to request them directly from the authors.
2. The generalisation of the findings of this study are limited to 
the manufacturing private sector (not including public or 
semi-private).
3. The generalisation of the findings may be limited to large 
plants in terms of capital and number of employees.
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION
Following this introductory Chapter which presents the objectives of 
the study, its importance and limitations, the thesis consists of the 
following Chapters:
Chapter Two reviews the literature of manufacturing strategy, 
theoretically and empirically. It presents major emphasis on the 
attack on the "Trade-offs” notion.
Chapter Three introduces the kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the reader. 
Special emphasis will be given to the Saudi industrial sector since 
it represents the population for the survey of the study.
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Chapter Four informs the reader about the research methodology 
adopted and the selected and the achieved sample of the study.
Chapter Five presents characteristics of the sample.
Chapter Six provides a preliminary data analysis of the whole model 
of manufacturing strategy.
Chapter Seven tests the six hypotheses of the manufacturing strategy 
model.
Chapter Eight develops the components of manufacturing strategy and 
the expected strategy.
Chapter Nine conducts a SWOT analysis.
Chapter Ten, Finally, summarises the main findings of the study and 
addresses implications of the study and suggestions for future 
research.
8
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturing strategy (also known as operations strategy) is a young 
and emerging field. Although the study of manufacturing strategy is 
just over twenty years old, it has only begun to attract researchers 
as well as practitioners in the last decade. In its early stage of 
research, manufacturing strategy was reported to be poorly understood 
among practitioners (Schroeder et al., 1986; Swamidass, 1986). This 
is still the case and in 1990 two major conferences were held in the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America to advance research 
in manufacturing strategy.
The purpose of this Chapter is to review the literature on 
manufacturing strategy. In this review, other disciplines were 
incorporated to promote the manufacturing strategy literature as 
suggested by Adam and Swamidass (1989); Anderson et al. (1989) and 
Leong et al. (1990). In the first section, several definitions of 
manufacturing strategy are considered and a working (adopted) 
definition of manufacturing strategy is specified. The next section, 
discusses briefly the literature development. The third and the 
fourth sections respectively present guidelines for a comprehensive
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strategy to set up a manufacturing strategy model. The final 
section, provides a hypothesised manufacturing strategy model.
2.1 DEFINITIONS OF MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
In studying manufacturing strategy (MS), one can discern easily that 
the area lacks a universal accepted definition. In reviewing 
manufacturing strategy literature, Anderson et al. (1989:136) 
pointed out that it "does not provide a clear or consistent
definition of operations strategy."
The following paragraphs present definitions of manufacturing 
strategy that were classified as either general or less specific.
The criterion for classifying a definition as "general" is its
failure to mention one of the following key words (or their
synonymous): Competitive priority/strategy/advantage/weapon,
strength and pattern of decision. These key words were stated 
because they were used by the manufacturing strategy's contributors 
to symbolise the meaning of manufacturing strategy as it will be 
clear throughout this Chapter.
Accordingly, the following two definitions were classified as general 
definitions.
o M a n u f a c t u r i n g  s t r a t e g y  is c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  the
development and implementation of plans which affect the firm's 
choice of production resources, the deployment of these 
resources, and the design of the infrastructure to control 
operations activities (Cohen and Lee, 1985: 153) .
o Manufacturing strategy involves the development and deployment
of manufacturing capabilities in total alignment with the
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firm's goals and strategies (Swamidass, 1986: 472) .
On the other hand, the next four definitions were classified as "less 
specific" definitions.
o Manufacturing strategy is to guide the business in putting
together the manufacturing capabilities that will enable it to 
pursue its chosen competitive strategy over the long term 
(Ferdows et al. 1986: 8).
o Manufacturing strategy is viewed as the effective use of
manufacturing strengths as a competitive weapon for the 
achievement of business and corporate goals (Swamidass and 
Newell, 1987: 509).
o Manufacturing strategy is defined in four elements: mission,
objectives, policies and distinctive competence (Schroeder et 
al., 1986:409).
The Manufacturing mission : ... specifies what operation must 
be accomplished for the business to succeed.
Manufacturing objectives : ... specific statements of expected 
results - a refinement of the mission (measurable terms). 
Policies : ... support the manufacturing objectives and
mission. The policies should be consistent with each other and 
with what is intended to be accomplished by manufacturing 
(policies are defined by resources).
The distinctive competence : ... what sets manufacturing apart 
from the competition and thus can be defined in terms of 
uniqueness. The distinctive competence gives strength to 
manufacturing in dealing with the competition (the same 
definition is provided by Schroeder, 1984 and Schroeder & Lahr, 
1990).
o Manufacturing strategy consists of a sequence of decisions 
that, over time, enables a business unit to achieve a desired
manufacturing structure, infrastructure, and set of specific
capabilities (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 32) .
As such, the preceding definitions do not represent a clear
comprehensive picture of manufacturing strategy (see Section 2.3). 
The following definition of manufacturing strategy has been
suggested.
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o Manufacturing strategy is a two stage process (Southern and 
Al-Shuaibi, 1990: 797).
First, a statement of tasks which is developed at the 
corporate and business levels with the active participation 
of the manufacturing function which defines strengths and 
weaknesses within the organisation as well as opportunities 
and threats in the environment.
Second, a series of consistent decisions to accomplish the 
objectives of that statement.
Southern and Al-Shuaibi's definition of manufacturing strategy
encompasses many specifications. These are as follows:
1. It emphasises the formulation of objectives (ends) through
using "a statement of tasks", that is, the tasks that the 
manufacturing function must accomplish, as expressed by Skinner
(1985).
2. It implicitly indicates the implementation of plans and
resources allocation (means) through using "a series of 
consistent decisions."
3. It defines strengths and weaknesses (internal environment) as
well as opportunities and threats (external environment) in 
search for a competitive advantage.
4. It involves the participation of all levels of strategies
(corporate, business and functional levels).
5. It indicates that the implementation of a strategy takes the
form of a process (i.e., a series of consistent decisions).
On the basis of the above specifications, this study adopted the 
definition of Southern and Al-Shuaibi (1990) as a working definition 
of manufacturing strategy.
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2.2 MANUFACTURING STRATEGY LITERATURE DEVELOPMENT
Skinner is considered a pioneer in highlighting the issue of 
manufacturing strategy. In his article, Manufacturinq-Missinq 
Link in Corporate Strategy, Skinner (1969) postulated that 
manufacturing considerations were "missing" in the formulation of 
corporate strategy. He stressed the need to link manufacturing into 
business and corporate strategies, so it can be managed from a 
strategic level in order to be used as a competitive weapon in the 
business. Thus, the name manufacturing strategy emerged. It is 
worth noting that Skinner describes the firm's manufacturing 
function as either a competitive weapon or a corporate millstone. A 
major reason for neglecting manufacturing in the formulation of 
corporate strategy is top management's traditional view of 
manufacturing as an engineering's job (Skinner, 1969). Another 
reason in this regard, is the traditional reactive behaviour of the 
Production Manager as a representative of the manufacturing function 
(Hill, 1985) . Such behaviour has developed into a role for the 
production manager.
Following Skinner's pioneering work, several writers as well as 
researchers have enthusiastically endorsed managing manufacturing at 
a strategic level. Writers and researchers in the field of 
manufacturing/operations management have agreed that there are 
essentially two categories of decision leading to manufacturing 
strategy (Skinner, 1969, 1978, 1985; Hayes and Schmenner, 1978;
Wheelwright, 1978; Buffa, 1984; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; 
Wheelwright, 1984; Cohen and Lee, 1985; Fine and Hax, 1985; Hill,
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1985, 1991; Schmenner, 1987; Hayes et al., 1988; Macbeth, 1989).
These two categories are structural and infrastructural decisions; 
the former relate to building and equipment and the latter relate to 
people and systems (see Figure 2-1).
Decisions in these two categories and in particular in the 
infrastructure category should be consistent with each other to 
promote manufacturing in four competitive priorities (known as 
manufacturing task): cost, quality, flexibility and delivery. These 
competitive priorities are called the content of manufacturing 
strategy by the contributors of MS (e.g., Skinner, 1978; Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985; Schroeder et al., 1986). Therefore, 
manufacturers have the opportunities to compete in all these four 
priorities rather than being evaluated on the basis of cost and 
efficiency only (see section 2.4.1). The empirical work of De Meyer
(1986), Schroeder et al. (1986), Swamidass (1986), Roth (1987), 
Miller et al. (1989) and Roth et al. (1989) are examples of 
manufacturing strategy content.
On the other hand, addressing how decisions are reached in the 
organisation in respect of the manufacturing function (e.g., 
selecting a low price strategy) is called the process of 
manufacturing strategy (Leong et al., 1990). The empirical work of 
Schroeder et al. (1986), Anderson et al. (1990) and Voss (1990) are 
examples of manufacturing strategy process.
14
Figure 2-1: Manufacturing strategy decision categories
A - Structural Category
1. Facilities
2. Choice of process
3. Capacity
4. Vertical integration
B - Infrastructural Category
5. Workforce
6. Quality
7, Production planning/materials control
8. Organisation management
9. New products development
10. Performance systems
Sources: Hayes and Wheelwright (1984:31)
: Hayes et al. (1988:351)
To facilitate the process of manufacturing strategy, various models 
were developed. A "top-down” model set up by Skinner (1969), 
consists of 15 steps. A "bottom-up" model was developed by 
Wheelwright (1978). Of these two models, the "top-down" is the 
dominant view (Leong et al., 1990). A "loop-framework" model by Hill 
(1985), consists of 5 steps. These three models illustrate clearly 
that manufacturing strategy implementation is an iterative process 
(Macbeth, 1989; Voss, 1990) .
15
Because manufacturing strategy is in its infancy, research in both 
content and process is still needed (Adam and Swamidass, 1989; 
Anderson et al., 1989; Leong et al., 1990). In fact, this is an 
important missing theme in the literature as reported by Adam and 
Swamidass (1989: 190), which states that "operations strategy
research needs distinct research streams investigating strategy 
content and strategy processes."
While "the frameworks of manufacturing strategy have been well 
developed" (Voss, 1989: 3), the area is not well investigated in 
detail by researchers and practitioners. Measurement of the 
competitive priorities as well as the conflict over the "trade-offs" 
notion, for instance, are among the top issues that need further 
research. The present study prominently highlights the controversy 
over the "trade-offs" notion theoretically and empirically.
2.3 GUIDELINES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
Before presenting some guidelines for a comprehensive strategy, it is 
important to distinguish between strategy and tactics. Strategy, as 
defined by writers in the business policy field, is concerned with 
the development of organisation's objectives as well as the 
allocation of resources (Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1980) . Tactics; 
however, are concerned with the deployment of resources in detail 
(Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987; Schultz et al., 1987). In other words, 
tactics follow the development of strategy (Schroeder, 1989) .
It is worth noting that the word "strategy" emanated from the Greek
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Military term "strategos", meaning literally the general art (Hayes 
and Wheelwright, 1984). From a military point of view, the term 
means defeating the enemy at the lowest cost of your own side 
(Macbeth, 1989). From a management point of view, strategy should 
lead the company to be unique among its competitors in the market 
place.
In a recent work on strategy, Hax and Majluf (1988) , after reviewing 
several definitions of strategy offered by leading scholars in the 
field of business policy, provided what is similar to guidelines for 
a comprehensive strategy. These guidelines indicate that a strategy 
should satisfy five criteria:
1. Define and determine long term objectives, action 
programmes and resources allocation priorities.
This emanates quite explicitly from the definition of Chandler; the 
initiator of the work of strategy (Schendel and Hofer, 1979).
Strategy is the determination of the basic long-term goals 
and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses 
of action and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals (Chandler, 1962: 16).
This definition emphasises the formulation of goals and objectives
(ends) as well as the implementation of courses of action and
resources allocation (means) to accomplish these ends. It is
important to mention that both ends and means were recognised in the
adopted definition of manufacturing strategy (see section 2.1).
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2. Search for a competitive advantage.
Competitive strategy is the search for a favourable 
competitive position in an industry, the fundamental arena in 
which competition occurs. Competitive strategy aims to 
establish a profitable and sustainable position against the 
forces that determine industry competition (Porter, 1985: 1).
Accordingly, the main thrust of strategy is the search for a
competitive advantage. That is, strengths within the organisation,
if utilised, gives the organisation a favourable competitive position
in the industry. In a manufacturing strategy setting, manufacturers
who are able to operated under low cost production, will compete
under a low price strategy in the industry. The adopted definition
of MS has included the search for a competitive advantage in forming
the strategy.
3. Respond to the external and internal environment of the 
organisation.
Strategy formulation and implementation include identifying 
opportunities and threats in the organisation's environment, 
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation, 
designing structures, defining roles, hiring appropriate 
people, and developing appropriate rewards to keep those 
people motivated to make contributions (Argyris, 1985: 1).
This definition explicitly indicates the two stages of process, 
namely formulation and implementation. In the formulation stage, 
strengths and weaknesses as well as opportunities and threats are 
included. In the implementation stage, organisation's structure, 
resources and people are involved, strengths and weaknesses as well 
as opportunities and threats were included in the definition of
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manufacturing strategy of Southern and Al-Shuaibi (1990).
4. Determine the economic and non-economic contributions it 
intends to offer to stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, 
employees, managers, suppliers, customers).
Corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company 
that determines and reveals its objectives, purposes, or 
goals, produces the principal policies and plans for 
achieving those goals, and defines the range of businesses 
the company is to pursue, the kind of economic and human 
organisation it is or intends to be, and the nature of the 
economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to 
its shareholders, employees, customers, and communities 
(Andrews, 1980: 18) .
This is a rich and a popular definition of strategy. It includes
ends, means, range of businesses, and economic and non-economic
contributions. More importantly, it indicates that the process of
strategy takes the form of a pattern of decisions. The adopted
definition of MS has indicated that the process of the strategy
involves a series of consistent decisions to achieve the objectives.
5. Involve participation of all levels of strategy 
(see section 2.4.2).
The purposes of the foregoing definitions of strategy are twofold:
1. To examine in depth the adopted definition of manufacturing
strategy in the light of these strategy definitions that 
collectively form a comprehensive definition of strategy. The 
examination reveals that the adopted definition of
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manufacturing strategy clearly represents a comprehensive 
definition.
2. To synthesise a manufacturing strategy model.
2.4 THE MANUFACTURING STRATEGY MODEL
In this section a manufacturing strategy model which is a synthesis 
of several disciplines is developed. The model is based on 
manufacturing/operations management literature, organisational theory 
literature and business policy literature. Both Anderson et al. 
(1989) and Leong et al. (1990) have recommended integrating well 
established concepts of organisation theory and business policy 
literature into manufacturing strategy to further the level of 
understanding.
Figure 2-2 illustrates a comprehensive model for manufacturing 
strategy. The model consists of organisational environment, corporate 
and business strategies, manufacturing task statement, manufacturing 
task, the role of the production manager, structural and 
infrastructural categories of decision and finally organisational 
performance. Because of the importance of the manufacturing task in 
understanding MS, it will be discussed first.
2.4.1 Manufacturing Task
The concept of "task" links manufacturing with corporate strategy to 
create a competitive weapon of the manufacturing function (Skinner, 
1978, 1985) . Skinner defines the manufacturing task statement as "a
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clear and explicit concept of what the manufacturing function must 
accomplish". In other words, the manufacturing task statement is a 
display of the "manufacturing philosophy that relates ends and means 
and links them together conceptually with a total plan and its 
rationale" (Skinner, 1985: 85) .
According to Skinner and other writers (e.g., Stobaugh and Telesio, 
1983; Fine and Hax, 1985; Schroeder et al., 1986), the manufacturing 
task statement is translated into objectives that are more meaningful 
(measurable) to operations in the business level strategy, 
called the manufacturing task (see Figure 2-2).
It is worth noting that manufacturing task is termed differently by 
writers in the field of manufacturing management. Some of the 
terms used are: "Manufacturing task" (Skinner, 1978, 1985),
"Performance criteria" (Wheelwright, 1978), "Competitive priorities" 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Schmenner, 1987; Krajewski and Ritzman, 
1987), "Manufacturing Mission" (Cohen and Lee, 1985), "Manufacturing 
Objectives" (Fine and Hax, 1985; Schroeder et al., 1986; Schroeder 
and Lahr, 1990), "how do products win orders in the market place" 
(Hill, 1985, 1991), "the Manufacturing deliverables" (Macbeth, 1989). 
Such a use of different terms could lead to confusion (Adam and 
Swamidass, 1989; Anderson et al., 1989). In this study, the terms 
"Manufacturing task" and "Competitive priorities" will be used 
interchangeably.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, there is unanimity
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Figure 2-2 : A Manufacturing Strategy Model
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concerning the major elements of manufacturing task (competitive 
priorities) among contributors to the issue of manufacturing 
strategy. These elements or priorities are cost, quality, flexibility 
and delivery (content of MS). Accordingly, competition among 
manufacturers is based on these elements. Therefore, forming 
manufacturing task is the key to make manufacturing strategy 
operational. In other words, this means that selecting one (or more) 
competitive priority and pursuing it successfully is the 
organisation's manufacturing strategy (this point will be discussed 
further in section 2.4.5.2).
Porter (1980) has identified "overall cost leadership" as one of the 
three generic strategies, the other two are "differentiation" and 
"focus". Product differentiation means uniqueness (Porter, 1980). 
Uniqueness can be accomplished through quality (e.g., Rolls Royce, 
Jaguar, Mercedes Benz), flexibility (e.g., rapid design changes in 
the product) and delivery (e.g., fast delivery time in filling 
customers orders) (see Figure 2-3). The concept of focus means 
concentration on few tasks so as to avoid complexity (Skinner, 1974). 
This concept offers a major contribution to the issue of 
manufacturing strategy and will be discussed in section 2.4.5.1 a.
The content of the generic strategies is somewhat similar to the 
content of manufacturing strategy. The three generic strategies were 
identified to deal with the five competitive forces that determine 
the underlying structure of an industry (Porter, 1980). These 
competitive forces are:
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1. threats of newcomers.
2. bargaining power of buyers.
3. bargaining power of suppliers.
4. threats of substitute products.
5. extreme competition among existing organisations.
As reported by Porter, the structure of an industry influences 
profitability as well as competition and more important the 
formulation of strategy in the industry. One could say that as well 
as providing a competitive advantage for the organisation, 
manufacturing strategy also copes with the five competitive forces 
mentioned above.
Terry Hill (1985) contributes to the discussion on competitive 
priorities by outlining the difference between qualifying and 
order-winning criteria in the market. A qualifier can be one of the 
competitive priorities or a part of one of them (e.g., a product's 
features) over a period of time. It allows the product to enter or 
to stay in a certain market over a period of time in order to be 
ready to compete with other products on the basis of the 
order-winning criteria. For instance, high quality for a specific 
product in a certain market over a period of time could be a 
qualifier, whereas low price is the order-winning criterion. Hill 
adds that while it is advantageous for a qualifier to move forward to 
be an order-winning criterion, manufacturers should be aware of the 
situation when the order-winning criteria move to the opposite 
direction to become order-losing criteria. Managers in some
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Figure 2-3 : Refined list of competitive priorities
Priorities Definition
Cost Low price.
High performance design Superior features, tolerances, 
and long life.
Consistent quality Meeting the design 
specifications.
Product flexibility Offering customised products, 
new products, and rapid design 
changes in the products.
Volume flexibility Offering rapid volume changes in 
the rate of production to handle 
large fluctuations in demand.
On-time delivery Meeting delivery time promises.
Fast delivery The time between receiving the
order and filling it.
Source: Krajewski and Ritzman (1987:43-47)
situations, for example, may be encouraged to increase the price of a 
certain product to qualify it for competition with other foreign 
products which are offered in high prices. This indicates the 
importance of integrating the marketing and the manufacturing 
functions to deal with the issues of qualifying and order-winning 
criteria. These changes on the issues of qualifying and order-winning
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criteria indicate that the content of manufacturing strategy is 
dynamic and several writers have pointed out that strategy is dynamic 
(e.g., Hofer et al., 1984; Macbeth, 1989). Empirical studies are 
needed in this area. The literature overwhelmingly neglects 
highlighting this issue, the work of Macbeth (1989) is an exception. 
However, the review of the literature concerning competitive 
priorities indicates that the "trade-offs” notion is a crucial issue 
that should be considered prior to the qualifying and order-winning 
criteria or at least simultaneously.
The trade-offs notion - proposed by Skinner (1969) - implies that
achieving one competitive priority (e.g., low cost) means trading off 
the advantages of the other priorities (quality, flexibility and 
delivery) . This can be inferred from the following statement made by 
Skinner (1969: 138) :
A lack of awareness among top executives that a production 
system inevitably involves trade-offs and compromises and so 
must be designed to perform a limited task well, with that 
task defined by corporate strategic objectives.
In a more specific statement, Skinner (1969: 140) says:
The variables of cost, time, quality, technological
constraints, and customer satisfaction place limits on what 
management can do, force compromises and demand an explicit 
recognition of multitude of trade-offs and choices.
In other words, Skinner says, it is difficult for manufacturers to
compete in cost, quality, flexibility and delivery simultaneously,
assuming there is no slack in the production system (e.g.,
underutilisation of capacity). The literature suggests that most
contributors to the issue of manufacturing strategy have accepted the
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trade-offs notion, which is depicted in Figure 2-4. The Figure shows 
that competing with quality means at least trading-off cost, while 
competing with flexibility means at least trading-off delivery.
Recently, the trade-offs notion has come under attack. The era has 
witnessed some companies that became able to defy the trade-offs 
notion. To name a few, Yamazaki machine tool plant in the United 
Kingdom manufactures four times more models in the third of the 
industry time average with quality that beats or at least matches 
the high Japanese standard (Jones et al, 1988). Nippon Denso's 
radiator plant in Japan can shift from one model to another without 
jeopardising efficiency. Apple Computer's Cork plant, in Ireland, 
can assemble several models of computers together on the same 
assembly line without "changeover penalty" (Ferdows and De Meyer,
1989). These are examples of many of the excellent manufacturers 
in the world that follow "a distinct sequence of improvement 
programmes which aim at building one capability (competitive 
priority) upon and not instead of another" (Ferdows and De Meyer, 
1989: 3).
Surprisingly, even a recent literature review on manufacturing 
strategy fails to cast doubt upon the trade-offs notion (Adam and 
Swamidass, 1989). The work of Anderson et al. (1989) is an exception 
of this. The authors remark: (p. 138)
Recently, trade-offs have been called into question as 
operations are being designed which have better quality, 
lower cost and faster delivery than the competitors. These 
operations have moved to a new level of performance rather
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Figure 2-4 : The Western Model 
(Adopted from Wheelwright, 1981)
than making trade-offs on an existing level. Because of these 
new insights, the exact nature of trade-offs is no longer 
clearly understood. More research needs to be done to 
clarify the precise nature of trade-offs in operations.
Ferdows and De Meyer (1989) propose that the best view of competitive
priorities (i.e., the trade-offs notion) stems from the Japanese
model. The Japanese view of the competitive priorities model can be
read in the statement of Jinichiro NaKane - a researcher at Waseda
University, Tokyo - (Ferdows and De Meyer, 1989: 7).
In general, if some (Japanese) companies want to offer 
flexibility as a competitive priority, it is necessary that 
at least they have already qualified for a minimum level of 
abilities on quality, dependability (delivery) and cost 
improvement. If they have not such an ability, they get a 
chaos condition and end tragically.
The above observation means that the Japanese model with regard to
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competitive priorities is a "cumulative" model (see Figure 2-5) , 
that is, moving to build another competitive priority when securing 
the previous one. The Japanese cumulative model, starts with
quality; then has quality and delivery; then quality, delivery and 
cost efficiency and finally all the previous three plus flexibility 
(Ferdows and De Meyer, 1989). The western model, in contrast, starts 
with any competitive priority that the plant is capable of at best 
which builds one priority at the expense of the other priorities 
(Skinner, 1985). Considering trade-offs between the competitive 
priorities implies that the operations strategy is not strategic. 
According to Wheelwright (1981:72), "an operations policy becomes 
strategic when it avoids the acceptance of false dichotomies like 
cost versus quality."
Ferdows and De Meyer have slightly modified the Japanese cumulative 
model in the sense that they consider cost efficiency to be the last 
competitive priority to be achieved (flexibility comes before cost). 
They justify their modification by saying because "cost improvements 
remain the ultimate goal of most manufacturers, (they) see these cost 
improvements also as an ultimate consequence of resources and 
management efforts invested in the improvement of quality, 
dependability and reaction speed of the company" (Ferdows and De 
Meyer, 1989:7). Although their justification is tenuous, the model 
itself as building up priorities is highly needed. The model, which 
Ferdows and De Meyer (1989) have called the "Sandcone" model as seen 
in Figure 2-6, is derived from the process of building up priorities. 
Ferdows and De Meyer's work (1989) is supported by several writers
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Figure 2-5 : The Japanese Model 
(Adopted from "Wheelwright, 1981)
and researchers who suggest making analogies between the Japanese and 
western philosophies in order to gain a better understanding of 
manufacturing strategy (Bolwijn and Brinkman, 1987; Pendlebury, 1987; 
Schmenner, 1987). Wheelwright (1981), also, offers a comparison 
between the Japanese and the western approaches regarding 
competitive priorities.
Ferdows and De Meyer (1989) investigated the Sandcone model 
empirically. Their investigation resulted mostly in questioning the 
trade-offs notion besides validating the model to a certain degree. 
Thus, one could say that the relationship between/among competitive 
priorities should be based on a linkages notion rather than the 
trade-offs notion.
Quality 
as a means
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Cost efficiency
Figure 2- 6 : Sandcone Model 
(Adopted from Ferdows & De Meyer, 1989)
The researcher takes both the Japanese cumulative model and the 
Sandcone model one step further to support their validity. The 
validity of these two models can be better understood in light of 
the product life cycles concept. As it is well known, the product 
life cycles consists of four stages: introduction, growth, maturity
and decline (e.g., Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985). It is 
at the beginning of the growth stage that manufacturers emphasise 
quality and delivery to keep up with demand, and it is towards the 
end of the maturity stage that manufacturers stress low cost and 
flexibility so as to ease the pressure from the competitors. This 
again means that competitive priorities are built on each other, 
rather than replacing each other.
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It must be mentioned that both the Japanese and the Sandcone models 
neglect the capabilities of the production function because of the 
sequential order in achieving competitive priorities.
As mentioned earlier, because Ferdows and De Meyer's justification 
for modifying the Japanese cumulative model (i.e., cost is the last 
competitive priority) is weak, the researcher believes that the 
perspective regarding competitive priorities should be on the basis 
of the Japanese cumulative model (i.e., flexibility is the last 
competitive priority). For it is costly to switch to different types 
of flexibility. In other words, when production cost is down, 
manufacturers can achieve flexibility. This involves:
1. offering customised products.
2. introducing new products.
3. offering rapid changes in the product.
4. offering rapid volume changes in the rate of the 
production (see Figure 2-3).
To sum up the arguments about the Japanese cumulative model and the 
Sandcone model, one should point out that both models are far better 
than the trade-offs notion. Furthermore, the difference between these 
two models in their second part should be settled in the light of the 
benchmarking concept (see section 2.4.6). In other words, it is time 
for academicians to discuss the two models with those world class 
companies that have shown successful records in accomplishing all 
competitive priorities simultaneously.
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Working independently of the above two models, Roth (1987) 
empirically identified three types of strategies; product focus, 
delivery / flexibility, and price, that could be achieved over a 
period of time (five years) through several programmes (activities). 
She failed to mention whether there is a slack in the system or not. 
As pointed out in the discussion earlier, if there is slack in the 
system it would be easier for these companies to accomplish all 
these strategies simultaneously. On the other hand, assuming there 
is no slack in the system, if these companies (and others) became 
able to achieve these strategies simultaneously, this would support 
the Japanese cumulative model as well as the Sandcone model.
Several researchers and writers have expanded and refined the four 
competitive priorities, though these refined priorities can still be 
classified within the original competitive priorities (De Meyer, 
1986; Roth, 1987; Krajewski and Ritzman,1987). Each competitive 
priority with the exception of cost is split into two dimensions as 
shown in Figure 2-3 (some writers refer to fast and on-time delivery 
as speed and reliability delivery respectively (Hill, 1985)) . The 
purpose of having these competitive priorities in this form is to 
ensure accuracy in measurement (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987) . 
Accordingly, each competitive priority is viewed by management as a 
continuum of low and high function. For example, managers make their 
company's objective with regard to fast delivery to be one of the 
shortest or one of the longest in the industry.
The list of competitive priorities was investigated empirically by
33
several researchers. In a survey of three regions - Europe, North 
America, Japan - conducted in 1983 and replicated in the subsequent 
year, managers of each region were asked to rank the seven 
competitive priorities depicted in Figure 2-3, plus "after-sales 
service" in order of importance (Ferdows et al., 1986) (the same 
survey for 1983 alone is reported by Krajewski and Ritzman (1987), 
and McClenahen (1987)). Ferdows et al.'s study revealed some 
differences in terms of priorities ranking between the Japanese on 
one side and the Europeans with the Americans on the other. The 
Japanese ranked low price first in the list then rapid design changes 
in the product for 1983 and 1984. The Europeans and the Americans, on 
the other hand, ranked consistent quality first in the list then high 
performance design for both years. This means that while the Japanese 
relatively had already won a quality and delivery and are now aiming 
at competing in low price and product flexibility, the Europeans and 
the Americans are now aiming at winning a quality and delivery 
(Ferdows et al., 1986).
The result of the above study is confirmed by a manufacturing 
futures survey (De Meyer et al., 1989) which found that the Japanese 
still postulate low price at the top of their list of important 
priorities, followed by flexibility. The Europeans and the Americans, 
on the other hand, are still working on quality and delivery. In 
view of the time elapsed between the two studies (Ferdows et al., 
1986; and De Meyer et al., 1989) one can conclude that it takes time 
to accomplish a certain competitive priority. Interestingly enough, 
De Meyer et al. (1989) reported that the Europeans and the Americans
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had come to agree with the Japanese that quality is the first 
priority to be achieved.
The above two empirical studies (Ferdows et al., 1986; and De Meyer 
et al., 1989) support the Japanese cumulative model and lend some 
support to the Sandcone model.
The continuous development of manufacturing strategy provides new 
perceptions of competitive priorities. From 1988 several writers 
begin to highlight "timew as a Major Asset for competitive priorities 
(Bower and Hout, 1988; Istvan, 1988; Stalk, 1988). They present many 
examples of Japanese and western companies which reduced timescales 
in almost all the production and related functions. These companies, 
for example, became able to develop new products faster and to 
deliver existing products in shorter time than they used to. So, is 
the concept of time-based competition just concerned with performing 
tasks faster? The chief executive of a major Italian company, 
Olivetti, expresses the essence of the concept in the following 
statements (Azzone et al., 1990: 428).
Getting competitive advantage through time does not really 
mean doing faster the same things with the same organisation.
The result would be just chaos and worse products. Managing 
time effectively means rethinking the structure of 
organisations in a new way.
This means reorganising the company in a way that will lead to a
competitive time advantage in every aspect of it, and more important
having an instant information system to allow managers to make
decisions faster. Empirical evidences, however, are required in this
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area.
The concept of "time-based competition" has something in common with 
the qualifying and order-winning criteria which are suggested by Hill
(1985) . Both use time as a tool for competition. In the former 
(i.e., the qualifier), time is employed as an external competitive 
advantage, while, in the latter (i.e., time-based competition), time 
is used as an internal competitive advantage.
2.4.1.1 Measurement Of Competitive Priorities
Manufacturing strategy is still at its early stage of development and 
measurement of competitive priorities is at the same stage. 
Practitioners and academicians alike need to know what variables 
represent each competitive priority. Practitioners, in particular, 
need to know these measures in order to devote time, effort and 
resources to gain these competitive priorities. In the literature 
some measures are proposed for competitive priorities, but they lack 
empirical support (Leong et al., 1990). Recently, in an intensive 
study of measurement, Sharma (1987) was able to verify measures for 
only three of the competitive priorities listed in Figure 2-3. The 
following are discussions of these measures.
(i) Cost is measured by the unit cost of production, labour, 
material; inventory turnover (raw materials, work-in-process, 
finished goods); capacity utilisation; and capital productivity (Fine 
and Hax, 1985). Sharma (1987), using a sample of 121 firms, 
confirmed that production cost, labour productivity, capacity
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utilisation and productivity are measures of cost. Wheelwright 
(1978) has proposed return on investment and return on sales in 
addition to inventory turnover as measures of cost.
(ii) Quality is measured by internal failure cost (percentage of 
scrap/rework & percentage of defective/rejected products); external 
failure cost (frequency of failure in the field) ; and mean time 
between failure (Garvin, 1983; Fine and Hax, 1985) . Furthermore, 
supplier quality was found to be a measure of quality (Leong et al.,
1990). In a recent study, Sharma (1987) found that product 
performance, product durability and product technology are measures 
of high-performance design. Sharma also found that product 
reliability, conformance to design, improving manufacturing quality, 
percentage of scrap and rework are measures of quality consistency.
(iii) Flexibility is measured by new products, product mix, product 
customisation and adjusting volume fluctuations (Slack, 1983; Fine 
and Hax, 1985).
(iv) On-time delivery (dependability) is measured by the percentage 
of on time delivery promises (Wheelwright, 1978; Hayes and Schmenner, 
1978; Slack, 1983; Fine and Hax, 1985). Fast delivery (speed), on the 
other hand, is measured by delivery lead time (Krajewski and Ritzman, 
1987; De Meyer et al., 1989).
2.4.2 Corporate And Business Strategies
In order to put manufacturing strategy in perspective, it is
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important to recognise its position in the various levels of 
organisational strategies.
A three level hierarchy of organisational strategy has gained 
widespread acceptance among the writers in business policy 
(Christenson et al., 1982; Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Hofer et al.,
1984). The three levels of strategies are summarised as follows:
a) Corporate Level Strategy is concerned with two questions; (1)
What business(es) should an organisation be in ? and (2) How 
should it designate resources among those businesses ?
Much attention has recently been given to the second question due to 
its importance, especially when the organisation operates in more 
than one business. Chandler (1962) was the first to include
"allocation of resources" in his definition of strategy. The first 
question received a great deal of attention when the trend was to add 
new businesses in the early 1960s (Hofer et al., 1984).
b) Business Level Strategy deals with the question ; How should
an organisation compete in its selected businesses ?
c) Functional Level Strategy is concerned with two questions; (1)
How should an organisation incorporate its subfunctional 
activities such as manufacturing, marketing, finance and human 
resources ? and (2) how should it relate the policies of these 
functional areas to the changes occuring in the external 
environment of the organisation? (e.g., product flexibility).
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From this description of the levels of strategies it is obvious that 
manufacturing strategy is viewed as part of the functional level 
strategy, and therefore as one of the components of corporate and 
business strategies. In a successful organisation, functional 
strategy should support business strategy which in turn support 
corporate strategy. If manufacturing strategy (MS) is one of the 
components of corporate and business strategies, there must be an 
influence and interaction of these two levels on it.
2.4.2.1 Corporate Strategy And MS
Few writers and researchers in the field of manufacturing management 
have suggested how corporate strategy influences manufacturing 
strategy. Hayes and Schmenner (1978) suggest that corporate strategy 
influences manufacturing strategy through three factors: dominant
orientation (e.g., market, product); pattern of diversification 
(e.g., market-geographic or consumer); and perspective on growth 
(e.g., product or market).
From the comprehensive definition of strategy (guideline no. 3), a 
fourth factor could be added to those suggested by Hayes and 
Schmenner. Corporate strategy influences manufacturing strategy 
through industry environment. As can be seen from the model (Figure 
2-2) , corporate strategy affects and is effected by the external 
environment of the organisation which, in turn, affects manufacturing 
decisions. Sharma (1987) noticed that dominant orientation, growth 
and industry environment are three factors which influence 
manufacturing strategy through corporate strategy.
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The three previous factors suggested by Hayes and Schmenner (1978) 
and the competitive priorities form the "organisation's philosophy" 
(Wheelwright, 1984; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984).
The diversification pattern represents strategic directions at the 
corporate level. Huete and Roth (1987) empirically linked corporate 
strategic directions with manufacturing strategy. In a survey of 213 
managers, they identified four corporate strategic directions; 
integration, market selection, product innovation and market share. 
Using regression analysis, they found that integration and market 
selection relate to flexibility. Moreover, product innovation 
relates positively with quality and flexibility and negatively with 
low price. Their study failed to relate market share to any 
competitive priority.
2.4.2.2 Business Strategy And MS
The link between business strategy and manufacturing strategy was 
first proposed by Skinner (1978). Skinner introduced the notion of 
manufacturing task statement as a means of translating business 
strategy into objectives that are more meaningful to operations (see 
section 2.4.1). Other researchers have advocated that business 
strategy defines the primary objectives and task of the manufacturing 
function (Stobaugh and Telesio, 1983; Fine and Hax, 1985; Schroeder 
et al., 1986; Schroeder and Lahr, 1990).
More specifically, business strategy interacts with manufacturing 
strategy through competitive priorities (see section 2.4.2). That
40
is, by defining how the organisation is planning to compete in its 
selected industry the business strategy guides the manufacturing 
function to achieve the desired competitive priority. For instance, 
if an organisation is planning to compete on a low price strategy, 
the business strategy guides the manufacturing function to support 
all the channels that lead to cost reduction. In Figure 2-2 
business strategy is linked with the manufacturing task statement and 
the latter, in turn, is connected with the competitive priorities 
(manufacturing task).
In an empirical study of 39 companies Schroeder et al. (1986) found 
that product, price, delivery and operations are elements of business 
strategy. Although this sample is somewhat small, the results have 
strong implications for manufacturing strategy. This study clearly 
supports earlier studies concerning elements of business strategy.
In a study of 64 companies in eight industries, Hall (1980) found 
that low costs and quality are two indicators of success in 
competitive industries.
Schoeffler et al. (1974), in an extensive empirical study on "the 
Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS)" involving 57 corporations 
with 620 diversified businesses, found several major determinants of 
profitability. The study found that market share, quality, investment 
intensity (total investment to sales) and company factors (e.g., size 
& diversity) are significant determinants of profitability (ROI).
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The above three empirical studies reported that low cost, quality and 
delivery are elements or competitive weapons of business strategies. 
Since "business strategy is usually evaluated in terms of its impact 
upon sales and profitability objectives" (Aaker, 1984: 175), these 
elements or competitive weapons are accomplishable only through 
manufacturing.
2.4.3 Organisational Environment
Writers on organisation theory have taken two approaches to the study 
of organisations: a "closed system" and an "open system" approach. 
As closed systems (a classical approach), organisations are closed to 
external environment forces (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1974) . In 
contrast, as open systems organisations are "greatly influenced by 
the properties of their associated surroundings" (Bedeian, 1984: 
176). That is, organisations do not function in vacuum. Of these 
two theories, the open system is the most relevant to the study of 
strategy, because it affects the strategic level of the organisation 
(Kast and Rosenzweig, 1974) . The consequences of the "open system" 
theory have led to the development of the "contingency" theory 
(Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969). The contingency theory 
"seeks to understand the interrelationships within and among 
subsystems (of the organisation) as well as between the organisation 
and its environment and to define patterns of relationships or
tl
configurations of variables (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1974: 21). Both 
theories established a link between the organisation and its external 
environment.
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The significance of these theories to managers is expressed by the 
organisational theorists who emphasised that "organisations must 
adapt to their environment if they are to remain viable" (Duncan, 
1972: 313). Further support to this claim came from Hall (1977: 62) 
when he noted that "strategic decisions are made as a response to the 
environment." In fact, the contingency theory, in particular, 
"emphasises the role of managers as a diagnostician, pragmatist and 
artist" (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1974: 21).
Several empirical studies found that environment is a primitive 
influence on strategic decision making in the organisations (Jamison, 
1981) . Other investigations came to the conclusion that the 
consistency between environment and strategy does influence 
performance (Bourgeois, 1980a; Prescott, 1986; Venkatraman and 
Prescot, 1990).
It is worth mentioning that opportunities and threats exist in the 
external environment of the organisation (Bedeian, 1984; Glueck and 
Jauch, 1984). Therefore, organisations that adapt to their external 
environment derive the advantage of the opportunities and / or 
decrease the threats of the environment or turned them into 
opportunities.
Organisational environment is a large and complex study area. Dill 
(1958) proposed the term "task environment" to refer to those parts 
of the organisation's external environment that are potentially 
relevant to organisations' goal. Bedeian (1984) provided a helpful
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distinction between general and task environment. The value of task
environment as expressed by Bedeian (1984: 177) rests
... in the distinction between the general environment in 
which all organisations function and the more immediate 
environment of customers, suppliers, employees, competitors 
and government regulatory agencies in which individual 
organisations operate.
In studying the effect of task environment on strategy, researchers
have focused on environmental uncertainty (Bourgeois, 1980b; Jamison,
1981). Swamidass (1983) incorporated environmental uncertainty in
his study of manufacturing strategy.
In the literature, uncertainty is defined in a number of 
perspectives. According to the information theory, "the uncertainty 
of an event is the logarithm of the number of possible outcomes the 
event can have ..." (Garner, 1962: 19). In decision theory,
uncertainty is defined as "those situations where the probability of 
the outcome of events is unknown as opposed to risk situations where 
each outcome has a known probability" (Duncan, 1972: 317). In
organisation theory, uncertainty is caused by: lack of clarity of
information concerning environmental factors; long time span for 
feedback; and general uncertainty of causal relationships (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967). Of these three definitions of uncertainty, the 
most appropriate to the present study is that of Lawrence and Lorsch. 
The first two definitions are too complex for managers in 
manufacturing sectors.
Lawrence and Lorsch's definition means that environmental uncertainty 
is very important to strategy studies because it is the focal point
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for a company to adapt to its environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967; Duncan, 1972). The model in Figure 2-2 illustrates 
that environmental uncertainty affects corporate and business 
strategies.
The study of environmental uncertainty has been furthered by the 
incorporation of the dimensions of organisational environment. Two 
main dimensions of organisational environment can be distinguished 
from the work of organisational theorists: the simple-complex
dimension, and the static-dynamic dimension (Emery and Trist, 1965; 
Thompson, 1967; Terreberry, 1968). In the simple environment, the 
decision maker deals with few homogeneous factors (e.g., a lower 
level of production unit), whereas in the complex environment he 
copes with many heterogeneous factors (e.g., a planning department). 
On the other hand, the static-dynamic dimension refers to factors 
that remain constant in the environment or to those that are in a 
continuous change respectively (e.g., production, materials and 
marketing departments). Accordingly, organisations that operate in 
dynamic-complex environments encounter high uncertainty, while those 
that operate in static-simple environments face the lowest perceived 
uncertainty (Duncan, 1972). In the model, environment stretches from 
one end of low uncertainty to another of high uncertainty (see Figure 
2-2) .
2.4.3.1 Measurements Of Environmental Uncertainty
In the literature there is a controvesy concerning the appropriate 
measure for environmental uncertainty (Bedeian, 1984) . Lawrence and
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Lorsch (1969) as well as Duncan (1972) employed a measure for 
environmental uncertainty based on the perceptions of top managers. 
Their work was questioned by Tosi et al. (1973), Downey and Slocum 
(1975) and Downey et al. (1975) because they failed to replicate 
Lawrence and Lorsch's results using objective measures. Aldrich 
(1979: 128) summarised the essence of the controversy in the 
following observations:
The central issue is the extent to which organisational 
structures and activities respond to the types of objective 
environmental uncertainties that are partially captured in 
the measures of Tosi et al. or to the cognitive environment 
that decision makers spin for themselves out of information 
brought into the organisation.
Miles et al. (1974), Starbuck (1976), Weick (1977), and Manning
(1982) have strongly advocated perceived measures over objective
measures. The reason for this according to Starbuck, is that an
organisation (via its managers) responds only to what it perceives
and that perceptions may or may not reveal the objective reality of
the environment. Many empirical studies continue to use perceived
measures (Bourgeois, 1980b; Jamison, 1981; Boulton et al., 1982;
Swamidass, 1983).
2.4.4 The Role Of The Production Manager
Skinner (1978), Wheelwright (1978), and Hill (1985) have indicated 
that the role played by production managers in corporate strategy is 
"passive or less than desirable". Their observations imply that top 
management often, if not always allow finance, marketing and other 
functional managers to play a bigger role in corporate strategy level
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meetings, and they expect manufacturing by itself to react to the 
outcomes. Hill (1985: 35) describes this situation as "can't say no" 
syndrome. He then points out "at this time, the production manager 
accepts the current and future demands placed upon the systems and 
capacities he controls and then goes away to resolve them". 
Accordingly, the role of the production manager is a reactive role 
(Skinner, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985). This is 
why, as mentioned earlier, one of the probable causes of 
manufacturing neglect in the formulation of corporate strategy is the 
type of role played by the production manager. It has been reported 
that evidence of negative consequences exists for not involving 
production managers in the strategic planning process (Swamidass and 
Newell, 1987).
Skinner (1978, 1985), Hayes and Wheelwright (1984), Hill (1985) and
others argue strongly that the role of the production manager should 
be proactive rather than reactive in the formulation of corporate 
strategy. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 41) clearly describe this 
role in the following statements.
Common sense suggests that manufacturing should play an equal 
role with other functions in defining the competitive 
strategy for the business. That is, top management should 
consult manufacturing to get its perspective on the major 
issues facing the business, the strategies being proposed by 
other functional heads, and the options open to 
manufacturing.
Thus, the proactive role for the production manager is strongly 
needed for two main reasons. First, the production manager (as a 
representative of the manufacturing function) has more knowledge of
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the capabilities of the manufacturing function. Second, the 
production managers' knowledge of the virtues of manufacturing 
function could strengthen the competitive advantage of the company. 
(The second reason is also noted by Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). On 
the basis of these two reasons and others, the MS definition by 
Southern and Al-Shuaibi (1990) was adopted. The model in Figure 2-2 
shows that the production manager should participate in the 
development of the manufacturing task statement. Researchers have 
found that, in successful companies, production managers are active 
participants in the strategic planning process (Anderson et al., 
1989). Adam and Swamidass (1989) have identified the "role of 
manufacturing managers" as one of the manufacturing strategy process 
variables. It can be concluded from the writings of Hayes & 
Wheelwright, Hill and Skinner that failure to include production 
managers in strategic planning process would weaken the strategic 
value of the manufacturing function. However, a proactive role for 
production managers requires a re-evaluation of several criteria such 
as their levels of education, training programmes and performance 
measures in order to strengthen their position against their peers 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985).
2.4.5 Structural And Infrastructural Categories Of Decision
At the beginning of this Chapter it was stated that structural and 
infrastructural decisions lead to the formation of manufacturing 
strategy (see Figure 2-1). Structural decisions relate to building 
and equipment, whilst infrastructural decisions refer to people and 
systems. It is worth noting that, once installed, it is difficult to
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alter structural decisions because of the huge capital investment 
(Buffa, 1984; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985; Skinner, 
1985). Decisions in these two categories should be consistent with 
each other for a better implementation of manufacturing strategy. 
Hayes et al.'s view (1988) of the distinction between structural and 
infrastructural categories is similar to the distinction made between 
hardware and the software in computing.
Manufacturing strategy highlights the view of these two categories of 
decision as being strategic or non-strategic (operational). Prior to 
the introduction of manufacturing strategy, western managers treated 
the first four areas of decision (i.e., structural category) as 
being the only strategic, and the remaining areas of decision (i.e., 
infrastructural category) as being operational (Wheelwright,1981; 
Williamson, 1984). Manufacturing strategy calls for the treatment of 
both categories as strategic.
By treating both categories as strategic (as the Japanese do) , 
managers, for example, will be able to "avoid a false choice between 
quality and cost in production operation and yet acknowledge a link, 
not a conflict, between short-term and long-term goals" (Williamson, 
1984:18). Interestingly enough, treating both categories as 
strategic results in establishing a link, among competitive 
priorities, which supports both the Japanese cumulative model as well 
as the Sandcone model (see section 2.4.1).
Ward et al. (1988) empirically investigated these two categories of
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decision. Using factor analysis, they report nine areas of strategic 
concern existing in the literature that match these two categories of 
decision. In the next subsections both categories of decision will 
be discussed.
2.4.5.1 Structural Decision Category
Structural decision category includes decisions related to 
facilities, choice of process, capacity and vertical integration. In 
the next subsection, these four areas will be discussed.
a) Facilities
Facilities decisions are related to size, location and specialisation 
(focus).
In a major empirical study, Scherer et al. (1975) found that scale of 
economies, tradeoffs between production costs, transportation costs 
and capital costs are determinants of plant size and location. 
Moreover, they reported that the characteristics of the 
organisation's market structure (size, share, concentration) as well 
as the regulatory environment are important considerations in making 
decisions related to location and size of the plant.
In a more recent survey, using cluster analysis, Schmenner (1982a) 
found that location decisions are influenced by five factors. These 
factors are: appropriate labour climate (e.g., low labour costs,
small effect of unionism); proximity to markets; attractive living 
style; proximity to suppliers and resources; and proximity to
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organisation's entire/main facilities.
The findings of both studies support each other in some factors, such 
as production and transportation costs, and offer a comprehensive 
view for dominant factors to be considered in making facilities 
decisions. Actually these factors are not new in the area of 
production/ manufacturing management. What should be new for 
manufacturers is a reconsideration of these factors within the 
perspective of manufacturing strategy. A major contribution of the 
perspective of manufacturing strategy to the facilities decisions 
came from the concept of focused factory.
Skinner (1974) was the first to introduce the concept of "focused 
factory" or "focused manufacturing". The concept means: (p.114)
o Learning to focus each plant on a limited, concise, 
manageable set of products, technologies, volumes, and markets.
o Learning to structure basic manufacturing policies and 
supporting services so that they focus on one explicit 
manufacturing task instead of on many inconsistent, 
conflicting, implicit tasks.
The concept of focused manufacturing contributes greatly to
manufacturing strategy because it involves "simplicity, repetition,
experience and homogeneity of tasks" which lead to competence
(Skinner, 1974).
An example of reconsideration of dominant factors in making 
facilities decisions within the focused manufacturing concept are 
economies of scale. Some writers argue that economies of scale [ a
51
historical concept that says that increasing a plant size reduces the 
average unit cost (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987)] is not advantageous 
within the concept of focused manufacturing (Cohen and Lee, 1985). 
Such an argument is based on the face value of the definition of 
economies of scale. Economies of scale can be utilised by building 
"plants within plants" which yields focused manufacturing (Skinner, 
1978; Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987) . Many large firms have changed 
their large facilities into smaller ones. For instance, General 
Electric Aircraft Engine Group has modified its two large complexes 
into eight smaller plants (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987).
But economies of scale, as reported by Scherer et al. (1975) and 
Schmenner (1982a), is not the only factor that dominates facilities 
decisions; it is one of a host of factors. Facilities could be 
focused in a number of ways. In an empirical study drawn from over 
300 plants, Schmenner (1982b) identified four multiplant 
manufacturing strategies that can be taken to partition 
responsibilities among plants. These are: A Product Plant Strategy,
A Market Area Plant Strategy, A Process Plant Strategy, and A 
General Purpose Plant Strategy.
In conclusion, consideration of facilities decisions within the 
perspective of manufacturing strategy could assist the manufacturing 
function to be a competitive weapon.
b) Choice Of Process
Process decisions are associated with the choice of manufacturing
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technology, and this involves the selection of one or more than one 
(hybrid) of the types of processes. The well known types of 
processes are: job shop, large batch, project, assembly line and
continuous process (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill 1985; 
Schmenner, 1987). The criteria of selection of these processes 
depend largely on the activities of the plant. For example, 
continuous process - as the term implies - suits plants in the food 
and petrochemical industries.
The relationship between process and product has been discussed by 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a and 1979b) and is best captured by the 
product-process matrix. They suggest that the type of process must 
match the characteristics of the product. Hayes and Wheelwright 
argue that as products are standardised, production volumes increase 
and organisations shift towards assembly line and continuous 
processes. Using the product-process matrix, they identify four 
entrance-exit strategies for the businesses.
Top management has been criticised for leaving process decisions to 
engineers and process specialists. Top management's act is based on 
the assumption that engineers and process specialists are the 
"custodians" of technology (Hill, 1985). In so doing, top management 
waives an important decision that can strengthen the manufacturing 
function.
In a famous article, Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argue that the 
decline of the American economy is the result of poor technology and
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management leadership. They accuse management of failing to use 
aggressive new technologies to beat competition; therefore, they 
managed their way to economic decline. In the same article, Hayes 
and Abernathy remark that the European and Japanese managers have 
gained competitive success through technological superiority.
To gain competitive advantage over competitors, the layout of the 
manufacturing technology (positioning strategy) should be either on 
product or process (Hill, 1985; Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987). Much 
research has been done on the relationship between strategy and 
product (Schmenner, 1982b; Stobaugh and Telesio, 1983; Meyer and 
Roberts, 1986). In contrast, little research has been undertaken on 
making the process of technology an integral part of strategy 
(Anderson et al., 1989).
Voss (1985) outlines eight propositions concerning the impact of new 
manufacturing technology on organisations. One proposition alleges 
that full advantage of technology will be possible if there is a 
match between the manufacturing priorities of the organisation and 
the capabilities of the technology. Another proposition says that 
the aim of employing new technology should be to make the 
organisation more competitive rather than simply more productive. 
Thus, technology in this aspect reflects what manufacturing strategy 
calls for.
Skinner (1985) points out that investment in manufacturing equipment 
and process technology can benefit the organisation in many areas
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apart from achieving low costs. Some of these benefits are superior 
quality, fast delivery, lower inventories, shorter new product 
development cycles and new production economies.
Goldhar and Jelinek (1983) point out that economies of scope, sharing 
resources among production lines to decrease costs, can be gained by 
using new technologies [e.g., computer-aided design (CAD), 
computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), Robotics] . In subsequent 
articles, Goldhar and Jelinek (1985) and Goldhar et al. (1990) 
provide more support to this concept and suggest that new 
technologies should be included in the strategy. Macbeth (1989), 
Paul and Suresh (1990) and Tranfield et al. (1990) have also 
indicated that such technologies can lead to cost reduction as well 
as better quality design in addition to reduction in lead time.
However, the adaptation of new technologies has been moving slowly 
due to several factors; implementation problems, capital investment, 
and the anticipated improvements in productivity (Cohen and Lee,
1985). Concerning "anticipated improvements in productivity", it is 
worth noting that the introduction of manufacturing strategy requires 
managers to think strategically; i.e., to think in terms of 
"effectiveness” rather than "efficiency" (see section 1.1).
In a survey of 30 organisations, Voss (1986) reports that a conflict 
of objectives frequently occurs in the implementation of advanced 
manufacturing technology. He states that in a few organisations the 
selection and the design of the systems were made in respect of
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business objectives such as quality and responsiveness to the market, 
but were managed with regard to technical objectives. In the 
majority of the cases, however, the technical control criteria were 
in direct conflict with the business objectives.
Swamidass (1987) stresses the need for planning technology. Planning 
for manufacturing technology involves evaluation of deterioration in 
technology over time. Swamidass argues that there are two cases for 
modernising technology to sustain the competitive advantage. In the 
first , case, it is required when technology becomes too old to give a 
competitive edge. In the second case, technology must be modernised 
when product or market undergoes major changes. Both cases, 
especially the first, can be noticed by management, but capital 
investment in technology is a serious commitment. Swamidass suggests 
using technology characteristics curves to compute when technology is 
due for modernisation, but he fails to specify how technology should 
be modernised in the second case.
c) Capacity
Capacity decisions are highly related and determined by facilities, 
technologies and human resources decisions (Fine and Hax, 1985). 
Capacity is defined as "the maximum rate of output for a facility" 
(Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987:250).
Many writers in the area of production management have pointed out 
that in any plant capacity takes one of three states over a period of 
time: to be increase, stabilisation or decrease. Krajewski and
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Ritzman (1987) have stressed only internal reasons for these states 
such as ineffective maintenance programmes and ineffective systems in 
replacement of parts and equipment. An important external reason for 
the three states of capacity is the demand in the market.
Significant capacity decisions involve planning for long term 
underlying trends in demands, and also retaining flexibility in 
capacity to cope with short term fluctuations in demand (Wheelwright, 
1978; Fine and Hax, 1985). Several writers (e.g., Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984; Fine and Hax, 1985) mention that capacity 
decisions should be used to affect the competitors' capacity 
decisions, but none of them had suggested how to achieve this.
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984:46) distinguish between a capacity 
decision and a capacity strategy. A capacity decision involves "a 
capital authorisation request for an expansion of capacity", whereas 
a capacity strategy "places each capacity decision in the context of 
a longer-term sequence of such decisions". Krajewski and Ritzman 
(1987) note three dimensions for capacity strategy: capacity cushions 
(low and high rate of utilisation); timing and sizing of expansion; 
and linkages with various decision areas. This indicates that 
capacity strategy is an important element of manufacturing strategy.
Roth (1987), empirically found that capacity expansion correlates 
positively with delivery/flexibility priority and negatively with low 
price priority. More empirical studies are needed to show how 
capacity decisions should be used to lead to an effective
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manufacturing strategy.
d) Vertical Integration
Vertical integration decisions are concerned with increased control 
over distributors (forward integration) or over suppliers (backward 
integration or "make versus buy"), or both (Hayes and Wheelwright, 
1984).
For organisations to decide to integrate in either direction (forward 
or backward) is a major decision. Furthermore, the extent as well as 
the balance of the integration are important decisions. Several 
writers point out the advantages and disadvantages of vertical 
integration (Porter, 1980; Buffa, 1984) . The advantages include: 
economic benefits of combined operations, technology's impact on 
other areas, assurance of supply, management's coordination & 
control, and high barriers of entry for vertically integrated 
businesses. In contrast, the disadvantages of vertical integration 
are summed up as follows: capital requirements, costly adjustment to 
new technology, loss of focusing concept and large volume of output. 
Therefore, it is the responsibility of managers to optimise the 
advantages and disadvantages when making vertical integration 
decision.
Buzzell (1983) makes a major contribution to the issue of vertical 
integration. In an extensive study of 164 9 manufacturing processing 
businesses, Buzzell provides some guidelines for vertical 
integration. These can be summarised as follows:
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1. Heed increased investment intensity: it was empirically found 
that increasing integration with huge investment leads to low 
profitability, and increasing integration without huge 
investment leads to high profitability.
2. Consider alternate to ownership: Buzzell (1983) suggests that
the essence of integration (i.e., economic benefits) can be 
captured through long-term contracts with suppliers, This is an 
approach highly favored by the Japanese (cooperative approach). 
Hayes and Abernathy (1980:73) point out that "long-term 
contracts and long-term relationships with suppliers can 
achieve many of the same cost benefits as backward integration 
without calling into question a company's ability to innovate 
or respond to innovation".
3. Favour large scale units: it was empirically found that
vertical integration is more suitable to firms with large 
market share than those with small market share.
4. Avoid Partial Integration: the evidence showed that firms with 
low or high level of integration generate more profit than 
those in the middle level of integration. The implication is 
that firms with a clear defined position are more likely to 
succeed (Buzzell, 1983).
5. Be in doubt of the claims that integration reduces the costs of
raw materials: economists have for long questioned the claim
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that vertically integrated businesses are less vulnerable to 
fluctuations of raw materials costs. (Earlier contributions to 
the issue of vertical integration are credited to the 
economists as reported by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984)). 
Buzzell's findings support the economists in this regard. He 
found that return on investment was high when vertical 
integration was low, and vice versa. This could also be the 
result of capital intensity.
It is worth noting that both distributors and suppliers are major 
factors in environmental uncertainty (see Chapter 6) , and that 
manufacturing is moving towards less vertical integration and towards 
external sources of parts for the advantages of lower costs, and 
higher flexibility and productivity (Gunn, 1987).
2.4.5.2 Infrastructural Decision Category
Infrastructural decision category includes decisions related to 
elements such as workforce, quality, production planning/materials 
control and organisation management (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; 
Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1985). Other writers have added new product 
development and organisation's performance to the preceding areas 
(Buffa, 1984; Fine and Hax, 1985; Hayes et al., 1988). Decisions in 
these areas have been traditionally known as the function of 
production/operations management.
The major factor of manufacturing infrastructure as identified by 
several writers is the workforce. Management has to make consistent
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decisions on a myriad of choices related to "day-to-day" operations. 
In describing this situation, Wheelwright (1978:57) states that 
"while operating decisions may make sense individually, they may not 
work cumulatively to reinforce the corporate strategy." This means 
that consistency in decisions which result in congruence between and 
among the manufacturing areas is the key for implementing
manufacturing strategy.
It was stated earlier that manufacturing task is the key to making 
manufacturing strategy operational (see section 2.4.1), So
accomplishing a certain manufacturing strategy, such as low price, 
means making all the decisions that lead, in this case, to cost
reduction. Accordingly, manufacturing strategy is formulated in the 
manufacturing task and implemented in the infrastructure category 
(through the structure category). Figure 2-7 depicts the linkages 
between competitive priorities and the infrastructure decisions.
A close examination of the literature shows that almost all writers 
and researchers fail to point out how manufacturing strategy decision 
variables, in particular the infrastructure variables, should be 
coupled in support of the competitive priorities. The work of Roth 
(1987) and Roth, De Meyer and Amano (1989) are exceptions in this
respect. In an empirical study of 228 business units, Roth (1987) 
used canonical correlation to relate manufacturing strategy decision 
variables to competitive priorities. Roth found several decisions or 
policies (some overlapped) to support each competitive priority (see 
Chapter 8). In a similar work but with a different statistical
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Competitive Priorities
Delivery Flexibility Quality Cost
Policies 
leading to 
cost
Policies 
leading to 
f le x ib ili ty
Policies 
leading to 
delivery
Policies 
leading to 
quality
Figure 2-7 : Linkages between competitive priorities and
the infrastructure policies (programmes)
technique, Roth et al. (1989) employed regression analysis to detect
the manufacturing policies that should be pursued under each 
competitive priority. The validity of Roth et al.'s study (1989) is 
weak, because the percentage of variance explained for each policy is 
very small. These two studies (Roth, 1987; Roth et al., 1989) 
constitute the major work in this area (i.e., relating manufacturing 
strategy decisions variables to competitive priorities). Further 
research is needed to find out as well as to verify the manufacturing 
policies under each competitive priority.
Quality has also emerged as an important area in manufacturing 
strategy. According to the Japanese cumulative model and the
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Sandcone model, quality is considered the first stone in building up 
all the competitive priorities. The contributions of the most 
influential writers about quality (e.g., Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1985; 
Juran, 1982) should be utilised in manufacturing strategy. Fine
(1986), using an analytical model, argues that improvement in quality 
results in induced learning in the company which leads to improvement 
in productivity. In an empirical study of 12 plants, Hayes and Clark 
(1985) also found a relationship between quality (waste) and total 
plant productivity. Thus, the previous two studies indicate clearly 
that improvement in quality, as the first competitive priority to be 
achieved, leads to improvement in productivity. De Meyer and Ferdows
(1987) have identified quality as one of eight managerial focal 
points in manufacturing strategy.
The relationship between the production planning system and 
competitive priorities was investigated by Van Dierdonock and Miller 
(1980), using a small sample. They described the production tasks in 
terms of three factors: complexity, uncertainty and slackness. These 
factors are related to the production system in respect of 
information processing system involvement (IPSI), and 
integrativeness. The authors pointed out that the characteristics of 
the production tasks rely on competitive priorities. Thus, they 
postulated that there are relationships between the production system 
and competitive priorities.
Materials management and purchasing, offer a source of competitive 
advantage for all the competitive priorities. Roth (1987), using
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canonical correlation, found a relationship between materials 
management and each of the following competitive priorities: product 
focus, delivery/flexibility, and price. Krajewski et al. (1987) 
found that influence of vendor and inventory decisions have a 
significant influence on performance measures.
As a closing remark, it is worth noting that Gunn (1987) believes 
that the first eight areas of the structural and infrastructural 
categories of decision (see Figure 2-1) are "no longer a sufficient 
basis" for creating manufacturing strategy. (He calls these eight 
areas with the exception of vertical integration "Classical
Manufacturing Strategy Factors".) Instead, Gunn proposes eight 
objectives and entitles them "Today's Manufacturing Strategy 
Objectives." These are (Gunn, 1987:92):
1. shorter new product lead time.
2. more inventory turnovers.
3. shorter manufacturing lead time.
4. highest quality.
5. more flexibility.
6. better customer service.
7. less waste.
8. higher return on assets.
As such, these objectives represent, directly or indirectly, the 
competitive priorities. Surprisingly, Gunn (1987) did not mention 
competitive priorities in his discussion of "today's manufacturing 
strategy objectives". It is worth mentioning that these objectives
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cannot be achieved without making consistent decisions about the 
manufacturing strategy factors.
2.4.6 Performance
The ultimate test of a strategy is the performance of the 
organisation: the purpose of the strategy is to acquire a distinctive 
competence that sets the organisation apart from its competitors. 
Good performance demonstrates that strategy is implemented as 
intended. Several studies have related strategy to organisational 
performance (Schoeffler et al., 1974; White and Hammermesh, 1981; 
Hitt and Ireland, 1985).
In literature on Organisational Behavioural there exists two 
underlying models to the study of organisational performance 
(effectiveness), namely the goal and the system models. These are 
considered by many writers and researchers in the field to be the 
dominant models for measuring organisational performance (e.g., 
Etzioni, 1960; Price, 1972; Bedeian, 1984). While the goal model 
advocates comparing achieved goal against stated goal, the system 
model advocates the relationship between the organisation and its 
environment in the form of input-output acquisition. Nevertheless, 
both models suffer from several shortcomings.
One drawback of the goal model is the existence of a gap between 
the stated goal and the accomplished goal. When stated goal is too 
ideal, it can lead to disappointment in investigation, and the 
opposite occurs when stated goal is too simple or ill-defined
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(Etzioni, 1960). This is true, because in actual situations 
organisations tend to be less perfect than they anticipate in their 
performance. A second drawback is that the accomplishment of one goal 
may inhibit effectiveness in the achievement of another, or in the 
case of pursuing multiple goals (Bedeian, 1984). A third drawback is 
the absence of measures for some goals, or the shortage of full 
measures for new developed areas as it is the case in the 
manufacturing strategy;
Shortcomings of the system model include a focus on an ambiguous 
futuristic goal because the organisational survival is based on the 
acquisition of resources; a failure to offer guidance for selecting 
the scarce resources to be used in evaluating performance (Bedeian, 
1984); and a neglect in emphasising resource use and resource 
acquisition in evaluating performance (Bedeian, 1984).
In spite of these shortcomings, a reconciliation between the goal and 
the system models is likely to improve the organisation's performance 
(Bedeian, 1984). Both models are directly or indirectly concerned 
with the goal of the organisation. Thus, the acquisition of 
resources is undoubtedly a prerequisite for the accomplishment of 
organisational goals.
Another approach for judging the organisation's performance is to 
compare it against the best performance in the industry (Tucker, 
Zivan and Camp, 1987). This approach is called "benchmarking" and 
is extremely useful in improving the capabilities of the
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manufacturing function which in turn improve the financial measures 
(will be discussed in the next section) . The practicality of 
benchmarking is to get a team of the plant to discuss, witness and 
learn from its counterpart at the target site. Hayes et al. (1988) 
advocate this approach to improve manufacturing performance, and 
they cite several examples of successful companies using the 
benchmarking approach. It is important to note that the controversy 
over the "trade-offs" notion on the one hand and the Sandcone model 
as well as the Japanese cumulative model on the other should be 
settled in the light of the benchmarking approach. However, the 
problem with benchmarking is that it is difficult to get some 
information regarding competitors (Tucker et■al.,1987).
2.4.6.1 Measurement Of Organisational Performance
The previous section discussed the two approaches for studying 
organisational performance; the goal and the system models as well as 
benchmarking. In this section, financial measures for organisational 
performance are explored.
There is substantial disagreement in the literature regarding the 
measurement of the two following models; the Univariate and the 
Multivariate models (Steers, 1975; Lenz, 1980; Bedeian, 1984) . The 
Univariate model recommends the usage of a single measure (e.g., 
productivity or profit) as an indicator of organisational 
performance. This model has been criticized for the difficulty in 
selecting one measure to represent the overall performance of the 
organisation (Bedeian, 1984). The Multivariate model, on the other
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hand, suggests the use of multiple measures as indicators of 
organisational performance. Thus, the multivariate model avoids the 
dilemma of a single measure. As a result, recent research on 
organisational performance has shifted away from focusing on a single 
measure and has concentrated on multiple measures (Bedeian, 1984).
It is worth noting that manufacturing strategy represents multiple 
measures of the manufacturing function, and that prior to the 
development of manufacturing strategy, the manufacturing function was 
evaluated on the basis of cost efficiency only (Skinner, 1978; 
Wheelwright, 1978; Hill, 1985).
Although recent research has adopted the multiple measures model, 
Lenz (1980) has suggested a two point approach to research in 
performance measures; pinpoint the measure (s) that is relevant to the 
companies under considerations, and be able to compare the results 
from companies under consideration with previous studies.
2.5 A HYPOTHESISED MANUFACTURING STRATEGY MODEL
From the manufacturing strategy model presented earlier in this 
chapter (see section 2.4), a hypothesised model can now be developed. 
This model advocates investigating the relationship between 
variables of the manufacturing strategy model. Such a hypothesised 
model will accelerate the development of the literature in this 
area.
Six hypotheses, which were originally developed by Swamidass (1983),
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will be presented and investigated more deeply in this study (see 
Chapter 7). They constitute the major contribution of Swamidass's 
study (1983) and are depicted in Figure 2-8.
2.5.1 Hypothesis One
Environmental uncertainty correlates with manufacturing task.
This hypothesis tests whether manufacturing task is influenced by 
environmental uncertainty. In other words, is manufacturing task 
closely related to the external environment in which the plant 
operates. The hypothesis is developed in the light of the open 
system theory and the contingency theory (see section 2.4.3). Both 
theories indicate that an organisation is affected by its 
environment. Since manufacturing task statement is defined as a set 
of goals and means (Skinner, 1985), the formulation of this statement 
is influenced by the environment. The adopted definition of 
manufacturing strategy explicitly acknowledges considering 
environment in formulating manufacturing strategy (see section 2.1).
2.5.2 Hypothesis Two
A plant's manufacturing infrastructure correlates with its 
manufacturing task.
This hypothesis means that the plant's manufacturing task should be 
closely related to its manufacturing infrastructure (e.g., 
activities) . It is developed in the light of the contingency theory 
(i.e., relationships within and among the subsystems of the
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organisation). It investigates the relationship between manufacturing 
task and the infrastructure of the plant as theoretically indicated 
by Wheelwright (1978), Hill (1985) and Skinner (1985) as well as 
other writers in the field of operations management. Skinner is a 
strong supporter and the promoter of congruence between manufacturing 
task and infrastructure. Skinner (1985:95) points out that "the 
manufacturing organisation should explicitly identify its 
manufacturing task to be consistent with and supportive of the 
corporation's competitive strategy and then organise manufacturing 
structure to accomplish a sharp focus for that task". Furthermore, 
Skinner aserts that "troubleness" in manufacturing is the result of 
"mismatch" between manufacturing task and its structure.
2.5.3 Hypothesis Three
The higher the congruence between environmental uncertainty
and manufacturing task, the better the performance.
This hypothesis means that the better the "fit" between the 
manufacturing task of the plant and its external environment (i.e., 
uncertainty considerations), the better the performance of the plant. 
It is in a way a corollary of hypothesis one. The hypothesis is also 
motivated by the contingency theory. Bedeian (1984:223) points out 
that "a considerable body of research suggests that an appropriate 
fit between an organisation's structure and its external environment 
does affect its operational effectiveness (performance)." Since 
manufacturing task influences the infrastructure of the organisation, 
one can say that the congruence between environmental uncertainty and
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manufacturing task could influence the performance.
In a similar piece of work, Richardson et al. (1985) found that the 
"fit" between corporate mission and manufacturing task relates 
positively to performance. Also, several empirical studies have 
reported that environment-strategy coalignment does influence 
performance (Prescott, 1986; Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990).
2.5.4 Hypothesis Four
The higher the congruence between manufacturing task and 
manufacturing infrastructure, the better the performance.
This hypothesis means that the better the "match" between the 
manufacturing task of the plant and its manufacturing infrastructure, 
the better the performance. It is in a way a corollary of hypothesis 
two. As mentioned in hypothesis two, writers such as Wheelwright
(1984), Hill (1985) and Skinner (1985) have stressed the need for 
congruence between manufacturing task and the infrastructure (see 
section 2.5.2). In other words, this hypothesis tests the effect on 
performance when manufacturing strategy formulation and 
implementation are congruent.
2.5.5 Hypothesis Five
The higher the top management and production management task 
congruence, the better the performance.
This hypothesis means that the higher the agreement on "task" between
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top management and production management, the better the performance. 
Several studies have investigated congruence between managerial 
functions. In an empirical study, Bourgeois (1980b) found that top 
management congruence on goals and means is associated with economic 
performance. Yaghmour (1985), in his study of three subsectors of the 
Saudi metal industry (32 plants) concluded that firms whose 
manufacturing activities were linked strategically were likely to 
perform better than those whose manufacturing activities were 
isolated from the strategic level. In a survey of 19 manufacturing 
firms, not directly related to manufacturing strategy issues per se, 
Dess (1987) found that top management congruence (Chief executive 
officer and representatives of functional areas) on business 
objectives as well as competitive methods are positively related to 
performance. In a recent study, Lindman and Callarman (1990) found 
that congruence on general strategic direction and manufacturing task 
between strategic planners and manufacturing managers influences 
manufacturing performance.
The works o f rSkinner (1978), Wheelwright (1978), Buffa (1984) and 
Hill (1985) indicate that top management and production management 
task congruence lead to better performance. Since it was mentioned 
earlier that manufacturing task is a set of goals and means, task 
congruence is the degree of consensus on goals and means between top 
management and production management (see section 2.4.1).
It was stated earlier that production managers play a less than 
desirable role in strategic decision making (see section 2.4.4).
73
Skinner (1985:56) also noticed that ”... top executives delegating 
excessive amounts of manufacturing policy to subordinates, avoiding 
involvement in most production matters . . . until their companies are 
in obvious trouble". This attitude from both top executives and 
production managers will lead to low task congruence which result in 
poor performance. Improving this situation will lead to high task 
congruence which result in better performance.
2.5.4 Hypothesis Six
The greater the involvement of production managers in 
strategic decision making, the better the performance.
As suggested by Skinner (1978) , Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) and Hill
(1985) as well as other writers in the field, this hypothesis tests 
the involvement of production management in strategic decision 
making. This involvement would entail the exploitation of 
manufacturing strengths which could lead to better performance (see 
section 2.4.4).
SUMMARY
From the discussions about manufacturing strategy in this Chapter, 
it becomes clear that manufacturing strategy research is still in its 
infancy. In some areas of manufacturing strategy, the effort of 
academicians as well as practitioners is needed to clarify some of 
the controversial issues.
Basically, manufacturing strategy means competing in cost, quality,
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flexibility and delivery (these areas are referred to as competitive 
priorities). In this regard, manufacturing strategy aims at 
correcting the conception according to which cost and efficiency are 
the adequate goals for manufacturing.
To transform the manufacturing function into a competitive weapon, 
its strategy must be linked with the business and corporate 
strategies. Essentially there are two categories of decision that 
lead to forming manufacturing strategy; namely structural and
infrastructural decisions; the former relate to building and 
equipment and the latter refer to people and systems.
In the first section of this Chapter, several definitions of
manufacturing strategy were highlighted, then a working (adopted) 
definition of manufacturing strategy was provided.
The second section, provides a concise account of the manufacturing 
strategy development. It is Skinner, in his pioneering article 
(1969) who postulated that manufacturing considerations were 
"missing" in the formulation of corporate strategy. This section 
covered also the most important areas that need high attention from 
contributors in the field (e.g., trade-offs notion and measurement of 
competitive priorities).
In the third section, guidelines for a comprehensive strategy were 
presented. These suggested that a strategy should: define and
determine long term objectives, action programmes and resources
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allocation priorities; search for a competitive advantage; respond 
to the external and internal environment of the organisation; 
determine the economic and non-economic contributions to 
stakeholders; and involve participation of all strategy levels.
In the fourth section, a manufacturing strategy model was developed 
on the basis of synthesised guidelines for a comprehensive strategy 
presented in the previous section. The model consists of eight 
factors: Organisational environment; Corporate and business
strategies; Manufacturing task statement; Manufacturing task; The 
role of the production manager; Structural decision category; 
Infrastructural decision category; and Organisational performance 
(see Figure 2-2).
Finally, the last section of this Chapter, presented a hypothesised 
manufacturing strategy model, from which, six hypotheses were 
discussed.
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CHAPTER THREE 
SAUDI ARABIA AND INDUSTRIALISATION
INTRODUCTION
Organisations do not exist in vacuum, and external environmental 
factors impinge directly or indirectly with their function. 
Organisations, especially in the private sector, expect to be 
affected by various opportunities and constraints, and by the 
general economic conditions prevailing in the country. Hence, it is 
essential to examine the various environmental parameters of the 
country in which this study is conducted. This Chapter aims to 
examine the most salient environmental conditions that prevail in 
Saudi Arabia and with which the reader needs to be acquainted.
The Chapter is composed of eight sections: general background,
location and geographical aspects, demographic features, educational 
milieu, development plans, manpower, economic context and the 
industrial sector. These features will be referred to later in the 
analysis and interpretation of the research results.
3.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded by the late KING ABDULAZIZ 
IBN ABDUL RAHMAN AL-SAUD in 1932. Since then, Saudi Arabia has been
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ruled by Al-Saud family. The government consists of the King, 
currently FAHD IBN ABDULAZIZ, who also acts as Prime Minister; the 
crown Prince, currently ABDULLAH IBN ABDULAZIZ, is the First Deputy 
Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard ; the second 
Deputy Prime Minister, currently Prince SULTAN IBN ABDULAZIZ is also 
Minister of Defence and Civil Aviation; and a host of Ministers 
appointed by the King.
The religion of the country is Islam. The judicial system is 
administered by "Sharia" (i.e., Islamic law) and supplemented by 
decree law. Officially, the country uses the Hijra Calendar which is 
based on the lunar year. The first year of the Hijra Calendar is the 
year in which the prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, emigrated from 
Makkah to Madinah and corresponds to 622 A.D. In parallel to the 
Hijra Calendar, the country, also uses the Gregorian Calendar.
All the national population is Arab, and the main language is 
Arabic. The currency is the Saudi Riyal [UK 1 =6.73 Saudi Riyals; 
US $1 = 3.75 Saudi Riyals (exchange rates of April 12th ,1991, AL 
HAYAT ,1991)]. As the U.S. dollar is the first international 
currency, all financial figures in this thesis were presented in 
dollars. Therefore, the exchange rates from 1975 to 1986 are: 3.52, 
3.53, 3.53, 3.40, 3.36, 3.33, 3.42, 3.44, 3.50, 3.58, 3.65 and 3.75 
respectively (Ministry of Planning, 1986). The average of these 
exchange rates is 3.50, the highest exchange rate is 3.75 in 1986 and 
the lowest is 3.33 in 1980.
78
3.2 LOCATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia which is situated in the south western 
part of Asia occupies about four-fifths of the Arabian peninsula. The 
kingdom covers an area of 2,240,000 square kilometers which is 
equivalent to nine times the area of the United Kingdom. The country 
has been famous for its deserts. A large part of the southern 
portion of the kingdom is known as the "Empty Quarter". It covers 
230,000 square miles and its one of the world's largest desert. 
Saudi Arabia is bordered by the Arabian Gulf, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar and Oman to the east; by the Red Sea to the west; by 
North and South Yemen (currently united) to the south and by Jordan, 
Iraq and Kuwait to the north (Kurian, 1987; The Europa Year Book, 
1988).
The climate in Saudi Arabia is characterised by its very hot summers 
(38 C to 49 C) and mild winters (quite cool in the north). Humidity 
is high in the two coastal regions and rainfall is scanty overall in 
the country (4 inch/year), except for the south-west region where it 
annually exceeds 12 inch. In addition, Saudi Arabia does not have a 
single river; therefore, the kingdom suffers from a severe shortage 
of water which seriously affects agricultural industries and some 
manufacturing industries (e.g., dairy products). However, as it is 
being bordered by the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, the presence of 
desalination plants ease the kingdom problems in terms of water 
shortages.
Saudi Arabia is divided into five distinct regions: central,
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western, eastern, southern and northern regions. Principal cities in 
the kingdom are Riyadh (the capital), Jeddah and Dammam, which are 
respectively located in the central, western and eastern regions.
3.3 DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES
The population of Saudi Arabia was estimated to be 11,152,000 in 1985
as compared to 7,012,592 in the 1974 Census (Kurian, 1987). Of the
population in 1985, 3.5 million are expatriates (Saudi Consulting
House, 1986). The figures above show that the population has 
increased one and a half times from 1974 to 1985. Based on the
birthrate, the kingdom's growth rate was 3.94% per annum during the
period 1980-1985. The population is expected to reach 18.9 million 
by the year 2000, and 30.6 million by the year 2020 (Kurian, 1987). 
The gradual increase of population will increase the density of the 
population which is presently low. The high rate of the Saudi 
population growth can be attributed to several factors. Foremost of 
them are the high birth rate; the drop in the death rate as a result 
of the enhancement and expansion of the health service as well as the 
increased degree of awareness among people with regard to this type 
of service; and finally the improvement of economic and social 
conditions in the kingdom.
Further analysis of the 1985 census shows that people under working 
age (14 years) constitute 43.1 per cent, the working age (15-64) 
represents 54.1 per cent, and people over the working age (65 and 
over) stand for 2.7 per cent. The male-female ratio is 1.023:1, and 
almost 73 per cent of the population live in urban areas.
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3.4 THE EDUCATIONAL MILIEU
Education - in its various type - plays a vital role in the economic 
and social development of the society. Nowadays, a society must be 
"educated" in order to progress, to grow, and even to survive. Saudi 
Arabia has been devoting a lot of attention to the educational 
milieu. In a short time, the kingdom has taken the lead among the 
developing countries in terms of quality and quantity of the 
educational institutions. The educational budget was 18.6 billion 
Saudi Riyals (or 5 billion U.S. dollars) which constituted 9.3 per
cent of the national budget in 1986-87 (Central Department of
Statistics, 1987).
The educational system in Saudi Arabia is of three types:
1. General education (Kindergartens-secondary stage).
2. Higher education (post secondary stage).
3. Technical education and Vocational training.
All these types of education are free and run by the government 
except for a very tiny portion (less than half a per cent in 1986-87) 
in the general education which is run by the private sector. In all 
types of the Saudi educational system, females and males are 
segregated according to the islamic law.
General education consists of elementary, preparatory, and secondary 
schooling (Kindergartens are provided on a small scale). The duration 
of the first cycle is six years, while each of the preparatory and
81
the secondary cycles lasts three years. Education in these cycles is 
not compulsory. From Table 3-1, one can see the high increase in the 
number of schools and students in all cycles.
Also, the "Teachers Training Institutes and centres" are classified 
in the general education type. The duration of these Institutes and 
centres is two years post-secondary cycle (including community 
colleges).
The ratios of male-female students for the year 1986-87 in the 
elementary, preparatory, secondary schooling and the above 
institutions were 1.2:1, 1.7:1, 1.3:1 and 1.1:1 respectively. The 
female ratios for the same cycles were lower in 1982-83. The 
teacher-pupil ratios for 198 6-87 in the elementary, preparatory, 
secondary schooling and institutions were 1:16, 1:14, 1:15 and 1:10
respectively (Central Department of Statistics, 1987).
The higher education system in Saudi Arabia resembles that of any 
other countries in that it consists of two stages: the under
graduate and the post graduate stages. Presently there are seven 
state-run universities in the kingdom: King Saud University, the 
Islamic University, King Fahd University for Petroleum and Minerals, 
King Abdulaziz University, Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, 
King Faisal University and Umm Al-Qura University. The oldest 
university opened its doors 34 years ago (King Saud university) and 
the newest university was inaugurated 10 years ago (Umm Al-Qura). 
Although the majority of the universities offer education for girls,
82
Table 3-1: Distribution of number of schools, institutions,
universities and students (male and female) in Saudi Arabia.
Educational level 1982-83 1986-87 % increase
Elementary (schools) 6792 8012 18
(students) 1073528 1460283 36
Preparatory (schools) 1922 2456 27.8
(students) 301498 437157 45
Secondary (schools) 717 990 38.1
(students) 130281 198449 52.3
Institutions (numbers) 179 193 7.8
(students) 18451 22352 21.1
Universities (numbers) 7 7 -
(students) 75118 113939 51.7
Source: Central Department of Statistics (1987 :159-162), The
Statistical Indicator, Saudi Arabia.
a "General Secretariat for Girls' Colleges" is mainly responsible 
for girls' higher education as well as general education. Table 3-1 
shows that the, number of graduate and under .graduate students in all 
the Saudi universities besides the General Secretariate for girls'
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colleges has increased by almost 52 per cent from 1982-83 to 1986-87. 
The ratio of male-female graduate and under graduate students is 
1.5:1, and the teacher-students ratio for both stages in the 
universities is 1:13. The number of students who were studying 
abroad in 1983-84 was 10092, and 9559 in 1984-85.
All these figures in the general and higher education types point to 
the increasing awareness by the students and all the attention 
devoted by the government as regards the importance of education.
Technical education and vocational training include programmes for 
both government and private sectors in the commercial, industrial and 
agricultural fields. These programmes are supervised by the "General 
Organisation for Technical Education and Vocational Training" which 
was established in 1980. Previously these programmes were the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education.
By 1986-87, there were two community colleges for each of the 
commercial and industrial fields with a total number of 439 and 364 
students respectively (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1988). Two more 
colleges in the industrial field were opened by 1987-88. As for the 
number of secondary institutes during the same period, there were 11 
commercial, 8 industrial and 1 agricultural institutes counting a 
total of 7383, 5362 and 266 students respectively.
As for the vocational training centres, ten months duration, by 
1986-87, their number reached 28 with a total number of 8379
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students, of which 5545 graduated (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
1988).
The low level of enrollment in the industrial field, in particular, 
is attributed to the attitude towards industrialisation - Saudis tend 
to view the jobs in this field as low class and thus culturally 
shameful, which is a common view among Arabs. In order to progress 
industrially, Saudi Arabia should open more colleges as well as 
centres and offer more incentives to attract Saudis to industrial 
field.
3.5 DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Since 1970 the development of the Saudi economy has been guided by a 
sequence of five year development plans:
The First Development Plan (1970-1975), with a total investment of 
$23.1 billion, emphasised on the development of adequate 
infrastructure, health and education (Ministry of Planning, 1985).
The Second Development Plan (1975-1980) as well as the Third 
Development Plan (1980-1985), with a total investment of $142 billion 
and $235 billion respectively, aimed at achieving a major industrial 
development in order to shift the economy from its dependence on oil 
(The Europa Year Book, 1988; The Middle East and North Africa, 1991) .
The Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990), which totalled an 
investment of $266.7 billion, aimed principally to encourage the
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involvement of the private sector, reduce reliance on foreign labour, 
and encourage further economic and social integration among the 
countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (The Europa Year Book, 
1988; The Middle East and North Africa, 1991).
The Fifth Development Plan (1990-1995), which is characterised as 
flexible and comprehensive, aims at ensuring the continuity of real 
change in the economic structure via diversification of the 
productive sectors, namely manufacturing, agriculture and mineral 
resources (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1988) .
3.6 THE MANPOWER
Manpower is a problem area in Saudi Arabia, the kingdom has a clear 
shortage of home based manpower. However, this situation did not 
prevent or delay the development of the kingdom. In fact, it may 
have accelerated the development. Saudi Arabia has been offering 
enormous opportunities to foreigners to work in the country financed 
by its oil based wealth. Afterwards, Saudi Arabia became heavily 
dependent upon foreign workforce in almost every sector. In 1985, the 
proportion of non-Saudis in the total employment was almost 60 per 
cent (see Table 3-2) .
The Saudi employment in 1985 was 40.2 per cent, of which the Saudi 
female workforce constituted only 3.1 per cent which indicates 
clearly that the participation of the Saudi female in the workforce 
is very small. This is because the Saudi system (i.e., according to 
the islamic law) segregates women and men in all aspects of work and
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thus restricts the female participation to female fields only such as 
girls education. In addition, the very low level of female 
participation in the workforce is associated with cultural values, 
marital status, fertility rate, level of education, and husband's 
education. Generally, the shortage of the Saudi manpower in the 
workforce is attributed to several factors. Amongst them are: the
small size of the population, the youthfulness of the population 
(although this is a common characteristic among developing countries 
(El Mallakh, 1982)), the literacy rate, the attitudes of Saudis 
toward some low level jobs and especially blue collar ones, and the 
gigantic development plans which call for fast pace development.
In 1985, the percentage of the economically active population 
(including expatriates) amounted to 39.9. As for the Saudis only, it 
amounted to 16 for the same period.
Due to the completion of the kingdom's infrastructure on the one hand 
(Ministry of Planning, 1985), and the gradual increase in number of 
educated Saudis, and the population increase on the other, Saudi 
Arabia is planning to reduce its reliance on non-Saudi manpower. In 
1990 the proportion of the non-Saudis in the total employment is 
projected to decline by 11 per cent (see Table 3-2). As a result of 
this, the proportion of the Saudi male and female in the total 
employment will increase by 9.9 per cent and 1.1 per cent 
respectively. In other words, the Fourth Development plan expects 
the entry of 374,700 Saudis into the labour market from 1985 to 1990, 
with an exit of 600200 foreigners. This is considered a major
87
Table 3-2: Estimated and projected civilian manpower in Saudi
Arabia (in thousands)
Type of labour 1985 (%) 1990* (%)
Saudi male 1649.2 (37.1) 1984.1(47.0)
Saudi female 136.8 ( 3.1) 176.6 ( 4.2)
Subtotal 1786.0 (40.2) 2160.7 (51.2)
Non-Saudis 2660.0 (59.8) 2059.8 (48.8)
Total 4446.0 100 4220.5 100
* projected
Source: Ministry of Planning (1985: 84), Fourth Development plan
(1985-1990), Saudi Arabia
feature of the Fourth Development Plan. During this plan, the 
annual growth rates for the Saudi workforce were expected to be 3.8 
per cent for males and 5.2 per cent for females. These figures are 
considered encouraging.
The distribution of employment by economic activity in Saudi Arabia 
is presented in Table 3-3. The inspection of the Table reveals that 
the services sectors employed more manpower (52 per cent) than the 
producing sectors (46.5 per cent) in 1985 and this trend is expected 
to continue up to 1990. At the industrial level, one can observe that
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all industries with the exception of construction, trade, real 
estate, social services and public industry (government) expect a 
growth in employment. The above five mentioned industries expect a 
decline in employment. The construction as well as the trade 
industries were expected to have a significant decline in employment 
from 1985 up to 1990 resulting from the completion of the kingdom's 
infrastructure. As for the last three industries, a slight decline 
in employment was to be experienced during the same period. The 
manufacturing industry was the fifth largest employer and accounted 
for 9.25 per cent of the total workforce in 1984-85. The same 
industry was expected to be the fourth largest employer (12.6 per 
cent) in terms of workforce between 1985 and 1990 indicating a 
broadening of the manufacturing base in Saudi Arabia.
3.7 THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT
The economy of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is best described in 
terms of a single-commodity which is oil. Thus, the Saudi economy 
is not well diversified. Since the discovery of oil in 1938, Saudi 
Arabia has taken a higher and richer position among the oil producing 
countries. Currently, the kingdom is the second largest producer 
of crude oil to the Soviet Union and possesses the world's largest 
reserves of crude oil (Johany et al., 1986; The Europa Year Book, 
1988). By the end of 1987, ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) 
reported that the kingdom's proven reserves of crude oil amounted to 
170 billion barrels. As a result of the new discoveries, these proven 
reserves of crude oil were almost doubled by the end of 1989 to reach 
315 billion barrels (ARAMCO, 1989). By the end of 1987, Saudi Arabia
89
Table 3-3: Distribution of employment by economic activity in Saudi
Arabia (in thousands)
Economic activity 1985 (%) 1990* (%)
Producing sectors
Agriculture 617.4 (13.9) 663.0 (15.7)
Mining 5.1 (.115) 5.2 (.123)
Manufacturing:
Non-Petrochemicals 411.4 (9.25) 531.2 (12.6)
Petrochemicals - (-) 7.0 (.166)
Utilities 147.4 (3.32) 147.4 (3.49)
Construction 885.9 (19.9) 580.9 (13.8)
Sub-total 2067.2 (46.5) 1934.7 (45.8)
Services sectors
Trade 556.1 (12.5) 493.0 (11.7)
Transport 303.4 (6.82) 310.7 (7.36)
Real Estate 12.0 (.270) 10.5 (.249)
Finance 124.3 (2.80) 130.2 (3.08)
Community and
Social Services 848.8 (19.1) 829.1 (19.6)
Gove rnment * * 469.1 (10.6) 446.3 (10.6)
Sub-total 2313.7 (52.0) 2219.8 (52.6)
Non-oil sectors 4380.9 (98.5) 4154.5 (98.4)
Oil Sectors 65.1 (1.5) 66.0 (1.6)
Total 4446.0 100 4220.5 100
* projected 
** Civilian workers
Source: Ministry of Planning (1985:86), Fourth Development Plan
(1985-1990), Saudi Arabia.
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had depleted 59.6 billion barrels or 35.1 per cent of the 1987's 
reserves (ARAMCO, 1987). If one assumes that the yearly oil 
production will be around 1.64 billion barrels (based on a daily 
average of 4.5 million barrels, the average production since 1985), 
this indicates that, starting from 1988, Saudi petroleum reserves 
will last for over 150 years. This figure is higher than that 
forecasted by Al-shuaibi's study (1985).
In spite of this satisfactory future estimation, the government's 
dependence upon oil could be a problem in the future. In 
particular, the slump in oil prices from time to time has direct 
impact on the country's revenue and causes some panic. The Saudi 
government has realised this problem, and has started to maximise the 
domestic non-oil investment by converting oil wealth into other forms 
of productive investment in the non-oil sector. Manufacturing and 
agriculture are notable examples of industries gradually contributing 
to the total revenues. Financial figures have shown a gradual 
decrease on the reliance of oil. Between 1974 and 1984, the 
contribution from crude oil totalled to nearly 85 per cent of the 
kingdom total revenues (The Europa Year Book, 1988), but by 1987 the 
reliance on the oil sector had been reduced to almost 70 per cent 
(Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1988). It is of interest to note, 
that the oil sector is not a significant source of employment in 
spite of its huge contribution to the economy due to the continuous 
nature of the process and the use of high technology (see Table 3-3).
Table 3-4 displays the distribution of the Gross Domestic Product
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(GDP) by economic activity at real rates (constant prices - 1970). 
The Table shows the growth rate average during each of the first 
three development plans as well as the growth rate during each of the 
first three years of the Fourth Development Plan (See section 3.5). 
From 1970 until the end of 1987 there were significant structural 
changes in the Saudi economy. The oil sector, has shown significant 
real growth during the First and Second Plans, then a fall (-14.5 
per cent) in the Third Development Plan due to decline in oil demand 
as a result of world recession which started in 1982 (The Europa Year 
Book, 1988). The negative growth further continued in 1985 and 1987 
but a positive high growth occurred in 1986 despite sharp decreases 
in oil prices ($9 per barrel). The non-oil sector, on the other hand, 
has witnessed a positive growth rate in the three development plans 
ranging from 6.2 to 14.8 per cent, and continue up to 1987 with the 
exception of 1986. All the figures revealed that the non-oil sector 
has increasingly offered more positive growth than the oil sector.
At the sectorial level of the Saudi economy, the continued positive 
growth of GDP in agriculture and manufacturing as envisaged 
participators in the total revenues is noticeable. The growth rate 
in the agriculture industry went from 3.6 per cent during the First 
Development Plan (1970-1975) to 9.5 per cent during the Third 
Development Plan (1980-1985), and then rose to 16.4 per cent by the 
end of 1987 (see Table 3-4). This robust rise was ascribed to 
encouragement from the government in the forms of interest-free 
loans, free land, and subsidies besides the construction of dams to 
conserve surface and underground water (Al-Shuaibi, 1985; Johany et
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Table 3-4: Distribution of GDP by economic activity at constant
prices (per cent)
Activity I Plan II Plan III Plan 1985* 1986* 1987
Oil sector 15.1 4.8 -14.5 -18.9 40.3 -9.9
Non-oil sector 10.1 14.8 6.2 0.7 -3.3 0.7
Government 20.1 14.6 2.8 -0.4 -2.5 0.5
Agriculture 3.6 6.9 9.5 18.0 15.0 16.4
Manufacturing 3.9 9.8 7.3 12.2 0.2 1.9
Refining 0.9 6.1 3.0 22.1 4.1 4.9
Other 10.8 15.4 11.7 5.5 -2.8 -0.5
Construction 21.4 15.8 -2.4 -16.9 -12.4 6.4
Elect./Water 3.4 21.9 21.2 6.9 5.5 5.8
Trans. & Comm. 0.7 19.3 7.1 -0.2 -2.7 -2.4
Trade 13.8 22.7 8.7 0.1 -3.8 -1.7 / -
Finance 7.9 23.7 2.5 -8.8 -15.5 -4.0
Comm. & Social 7.1 10.6 4.4 13.7 -4.0 -4.1
*: Revised data
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1988:12), Annual Report, Saudi 
Arabia.
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al., 1986; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1988). Saudi Arabia is now 
self-sufficient and an exporter in several agricultural products. The 
country's main agricultural products are wheat, dates, milk, eggs and 
broiler chickens (Kurian, 1987; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1988) . 
In manufacturing, the growth rate went from 3.9 per cent during the 
First Development Plan to 7.3 per cent during the Third Development 
Plan, and then after a slight increase in 1986 it edged to 1.9 per 
cent in 1987. Again, this growth is due to the government's 
encouragement with the aim of broadening the manufacturing base in 
Saudi Arabia (see section 3.8).
The remaining industries, with the exception of the Electricity and 
Water industry, have shown negative growth after the Third 
Development Plan as a result of the completion of the infrastructure 
in the kingdom. In fact, some of these industries notably the 
construction industry have been reduced in their employment.
The structure of the Saudi economy in 1987 is depicted in Figure 3-1.
It should be noted that mineral resources are expected to participate 
in the Saudi economy in the less far future. The kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia has been endowed with vast material deposits (Montagu, 1987; 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1988). However, these mineral deposits 
require transportation systems as well as high capital extraction 
costs. Principal among these minerals are phosphates with 310 million 
tons (announced in July 1986 to be the world's largest deposits), 
Bauxite, Iron ore, lead, zinc, silver, copper, gold and small amounts
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Figure 3-1: Gross Domestic Product in 1987 (constant prices 1970)
of uranium. In addition, a coal field was discovered in the central 
region in 1984. Other minerals such as gypsum, limestone, marble, 
clay and sulphur are in production. These minerals are expected to 
form a good base for the manufacturing sector.
Because the application of manufacturing strategy lends itself more 
to the industrial sector, the next section will discuss 
industrialisation in Saudi Arabia within the available data.
3.8 AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
The industrial sectors (excluding oil extraction) in Saudi Arabia 
can be partitioned into three main sectors according to ownership.
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These are Petromin, SABIC, and the private manufacturing sector (see 
Figure 3-2). The development of these manufacturing sectors is 
almost entirely of recent origin and the exploitation of oil reserves 
has shown steady growth since 1960. The real boom in these sectors 
started in 1974 when oil prices jumped from $2.75 per barrel in 1973 
to $10.84 per barrel (British Petroleum, 1989). The increase in oil 
prices allowed the government of Saudi Arabia to set up giant 
industrial projects and offer incentives to encourage Saudi 
businessmen and foreigners to invest in the manufacturing sectors.
In 1975, there were only 473 industrial plants in Saudi Arabia, but 
the number rose to 1401 plants in 1980 and 2022 plants by 1986. This 
indicates a compound growth rate of almost 20 per cent and 5.4 per 
cent respectively. As for the workforce in these plants, Table 3-5 
shows that there were 38625 in 1975, 96023 in 1980 and 130494
workers by 1986, indicating a compound growth rate of 16.3 per cent 
and 4.5 per cent respectively. The total capital invested in these 
plants amounted to $2812.5 million in 1975, increased to $12242.5 
million in 1980 and doubled that in 1986 as seen in Table 3-5. 
This huge investment indicates a compound growth rate of almost 2 8 
per cent and 10 per cent respectively.
These high growth rates came as a result of gigantic 
Development Plans which involved an attractive industrial policy with 
huge incentives. The industrial policy was established on the basis 
of attainable manufacturing objectives.
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Figure 3-2 : Industrial Structure according to
ownership in Saudi Arabia
Table 3-5: Development of plants, workforce and capital in Saudi 
Arabia
Category 1975 1980 1986
Number of plants 473 1401 2022
Workforce 38625 96023 130494
Capital Invested($) 2812.5 12242.5 24447.7
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1984:5), Industry and 
Electricity Progress and Achievements, Saudi Arabia; Ministry of 
Industry and Electricity (1986a:18, 23 &26), Industrial Statistical
Report, Saudi Arabia.
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3.8.1 Manufacturing Objectives And The Industrial Policy ,
The following two subsections are to review the manufacturing 
objectives and the industrial policy in Saudi Arabia.
3 .8.1 .1 Manufacturing Objectives
The main objective of Saudi Arabia is to diversify the economy. The 
objectives for the manufacturing sector are to:
1. Increase the economy's capacity to produce at competitive costs 
with the widest range of products for domestic as well as for 
export markets.
2. Exploit the substantial comparative advantages arising out of 
low cost energy and raw materials from the hydrocarbon related 
industry, minerals, agricultural and fishery resources.
3. Expand the kingdom's access to modern technology.
4. Encourage a fuller utilisation of capacity in the manufacturing 
sector.
5. Secure a regionally balanced development of industry.
6. Increase productivity by optimising plant capacity.
7. Reduce dependency on expatriate workers by national skill 
creation, through the development of general and technical 
education and on-the-job training schemes for national workers.
8. Promote industrial interrelationship (Saudi Consulting House, 
1986: 21).
3.8.1.2 Industrial Policy And Incentives
The industrial policy guidelines were first announced in 1974 to 
attract the business community within and outside the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (Saudi Consulting House, 1986:22-29). These are:
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1. ... encourage and expand the manufacturing industries including
agricultural industries ...
2. ... the economy of the kingdom is based on competition among
private, commercial and industrial enterprises, . . . businessmen . . . 
will enjoy the full support of the government during all stages of 
the preparation, establishment and operation of industrial projects 
which are beneficial to the kingdom. The government is also ready to 
supplement the efforts of businessmen in the private sector by 
establishing, financing and participating in the management of those 
large industrial projects, requiring wide technical experience which 
the private sector can not undertake alone.
3. The government considers that competition which serves the
interests of local consumers is the best means of influencing
industry towards beneficial manufacturing and market-oriented
projects. ... However, the government will not permit harmful 
foreign competition, such as dumping.
4. To ensure that businessmen who are ready to participate in the 
industrial development of the kingdom are acquainted with the 
information required for the identification, implementation and 
successful operation of feasible projects, the government shall, from 
time to time, familiarise them with such industrial and feasibility 
studies and other useful information as may become available ...
5. In order to encourage businessmen to invest in projects of 
prospective benefit to the national economy, the government is 
prepared to offer encouragement and financial incentives to all 
industrial sectors, ... these are:
(a) provision of loans (via Saudi Industrial Development Fund, to 
be paid back in a maximum period of 15 years);
(b) exemption from customs duties of imported equipment and primary 
materials;
(c) exemption from taxes on the profit share to the foreign 
partners of the company as provided in the Foreign Capital
Investment Statute (i.e., ten years);
(d) preference given to local producers in government purchase;
(e) imposition of protective customs tariffs on competing imports;
(f) provision of accommodation in industrial cities (nominal fee 
and discounts on utilities);
(g) granting of subsidies for training Saudi employees; and
(h) provision of assistance for the exportation of products.
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6. ... adopting the principle of licensing industrial projects 
which exceed a specified size of invested capital, employment 
or production capacity . . . (for organisation purposes and 
security).
7. When the government establishes large and important industrial 
projects on its own initiative, it will encourage as much 
participation as possible from the private sector. In such 
cases and in cases where the government participates in the 
capital of private projects to supplement an investment from 
the private sector, in respect of industries other than those 
relating to national security, it is the policy of the 
government to sell its share to the public in due course, if 
this serves the public interest.
8. In implementing its industrial policy the government shall do 
its utmost to avoid the imposition of quantitative restriction 
or price control. The government shall not impose restrictions 
except in cases where competition can not have an effective 
role, as in the case of commodities which, by their nature, are 
characterised by monopoly.
9. The government recognises the right of the business community 
in the industrial field to select, utilise and manage the 
economic resources, including industrial workers, in order to 
raise the productivity of industry to its maximum.
10. The government welcomes foreign capital as well as foreign 
expertise and participation in industrial development projects 
on cooperation with Saudi businessmen. ... it will always 
avoid imposing any restrictions on the entry and exit of money 
to and from the kingdom and that it shall continue its policy 
based on the respect of private ownership in the Islamic law.
11. The government shall provide public utilities and make any such 
basic arrangements as are necessary for the setting up of 
economically feasible industries.
3.8.2 Petromin
Petromin, established in 1962, controls the refinery of petroleum.
It is administered by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
and is wholly owned by the government. By 1986, there were six
refineries in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Jeddah Petroleum Refinery,
Petromin Refinery Riyadh, Petromin Refinery Yanbu, Petromin Mobil
Refinery, Petrolube and Lube oil Refinery (General Petroleum and
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Mineral Organisation, 1987). Most of the production of these 
refineries is consumed locally and a small portion is destined for 
exporting.
3.8.3 SABIC
The Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) was founded in 1976 
to develop the basic industries using local hydrocarbon 
(comparative advantage in oil) and mineral resources as well as to 
form other supporting industries (Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity, 1984). In early 1984 SABIC sold off 30 per cent of its 
shares to Saudis and Gulf Countries Citizens, after being wholly 
owned by the government and supervised by the Ministry of Industry 
and Electricity (The Europa Year Book, 1988) . In the near future, the 
government is planning to sell another part of its share in SABIC 
under the industrial policy guidelines (see section 3.8.1.2, no.7). 
SABIC has a total of 15 giant industrial companies and 2 marketing 
and service companies. Between 1981 and 1985, 12 of these companies 
went on-stream and the remaining were in operation by 1988 (SABIC, 
1985). Thirteen of these companies are sited in the two newly 
industrialised cities (Jubail and Yanbu) and the other two are in 
Jeddah and Dammam. The city of Jubail is located in the eastern 
province whereas Yanbu city is located in the western province.
SABIC's first generation industries are partitioned into three 
sectors that form the industrialisation nucleus in Saudi Arabia 
(SABIC, 1985). These are:
(a) Petrochemicals: Saudi Methanol Company (AR-RAZI), National
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Methanol Company (IBN SINA), Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF), 
Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company (KEMYA), Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical 
Company (YANPET), Arabian Petrochemical Company (PETROKEMYA), and 
Eastern Petrochemical Company (SHARQ).
(b) Fertilisers: Saudi Arabian Fertiliser Company (SAFCO), and 
Al-Jubail Fertiliser Company (SAMAD).
(c) Metal: Saudi Iron and Steel Company (HADEED), and Jeddah Steel
Rolling Mill Company (SULB).
SABIC's second generation industries are to support its basic 
industries- These are: National Industrial Gases Company (GAS),
National Plastic Company (IBN HAYYAN), Saudi European Petrochemical 
Company (IBN ZAHR), and National Chemical Fertiliser Company (IBN 
AL-BAYTAR).
The two SABIC marketing companies are SABIC Marketing Ltd. and 
SABIC Marketing Services Ltd. The first company is in charge of 
selling SABIC's products, whereas the second company provides 
technical support, product research, and customer service (SABIC, 
1985).
Most of SABIC projects are 50-50 joint ventures with leading 
international manufacturing corporations. Currently, SABIC's 
companies produce annually 9 million tons of over 20 different top 
quality products to meet the needs of more than 2000 customers in 65 
countries (SABIC, 1986). In 1986, SABIC's sales worldwide amounted to 
$984.8 million.
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3.8.4 The Private Manufacturing Sector
The private manufacturing sector in Saudi Arabia is given enormous 
number of incentives in order to participate effectively in the 
economy (see section 3.8.1.2). From the previous descriptions of the 
limited activities of -Petromin and SABIC, it can be concluded that 
the private manufacturing sector covers all types of industries.
The following subsections describe the aforementioned three sectors 
in greater detail.
3.8.5 Description Of The Saudi Industrial Sectors
The Saudi industrial sectors use the International Standard 
Industrial Classification system (ISIC). According to this system, 
there are eight principal•producing industries (sectors) and the 
ninth is the storage industry (see Table 3-6). First, these 
industries will be described in terms of number of plants, number of 
workers, and the total capital invested. Then, the development of 
these plants by region will be presented.
3.8.5.1 Industrial Sectors In Terms Of Number Of Plants
Table 3-6 presents the number of licensed plants by industrial sector 
up to September 5th, 1986. All plants in this Table and subsequent 
Tables are classified, on the basis of ownership, as either national 
or joint venture plants. The total number of plants on September 
5th, 1986 is 2022. This represents an increase of 158 plants or 8.5 
per cent of the total number of plants as compared to 1985 (Ministry 
of Industry and Electricity, 1985). Of the 2022 plants 1631, or 80.7
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per cent, are wholly national and 391, or 19.3 per cent, are joint 
venture. This indicates that the majority of the plants are wholly 
owned by the Saudis.
As seen from Table 3-6, the highest four industries in terms of 
number of plants in decreasing order are:
1. The Metal Industry has 28.3 per cent of the total plants of all
sectors. It is worth mentioning that 2 joint venture plants 
which belong to SABIC are included in the 161 plants.
2. The Building Materials Industry has 26.2 per cent of the total
plants in all sectors.
3. The Food Industry has 15.9 per cent of the total plants of all
sectors.
4. The Chemical Industry has 14.4 per cent of the total plants of
all sectors. Of the 81 plants, 8 belong to SABIC. Also, 2 of 
SABIC plants and 6 of Petromin refineries are included with the 
national plants in this industry.
The seven remaining industries have low percentages in terms of 
number of plants as compared to the previous four industries. The 
total percentage for the plants in these seven industries is 15.2.
3.8.5.2 Industrial Sectors In Terms Of Number Of Workers
Table 3-7 displays the number of workers employed by plants according 
to industrial sector. The total number of workers (including 
management) on September 5th, 1986 is 130494. This represents an
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Table 3-6: Distribution of plants by industrial sector up to
September 5th, 1986*
Class .Industrial Sector Total % N. Plants J. Plants
31 Food 321 15.9 285 36
32 Textile 39 1.9 31 8
32 Leather products 10 0.5 10 -
33 Wood 68 3.4 56 12
34 Paper & Printing 122 6.0 106 16
35 Chemical 291 14.4 210 81
36 Non Const. mat. 6 0.3 . 5 1
36 Building mat. 530 26.2 461 69
37&38 Metal 572 28.3 411 161
39 Other industries 34 1.7 28 6
71 Storage 29 1-4 28 1
Total 2022 100 1631 391
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1986a:14), Industrial 
Statistical Report, Saudi Arabia.
*: The end of the year 1406 according to the Hijra calendar.
N. Plants: national plants.
J. Plants: joint venture plants.
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increase of 3.4 per cent as compared to 1985 (Ministry of Industry 
and Electricity, 1985) . Of the 130494 workers employed in the 2022 
plants 95315, or 73 per cent, are employed by the national plants and 
35179, or 27 per cent, are employed by the joint venture plants.
As seen from Table 3-7, the highest four industries in terms of 
number of workers in decreasing order are:
1. The Building Materials industry employs 30.7 per cent of the
total workforce of all industries.
2. The Metal Industry employs 25.5 per cent of the total labour
force of all industries. Of the 11360 workers, 1450 workers are 
employed by SABIC companies.
3. The Chemical industry employs 16.8 per cent of the total
workforce of all sectors. Of the 14112 workers, 2939 are
employed by SABIC and Petromin companies. Also, of the 777 6
workers, 4369 are employed by SABIC companies.
4. The Food industry employs 13.3 per cent of total employment of
all sectors.
The rest of the industries (seven) employs 13.7 per cent of the total 
workforce of all sectors.
3.8.5.3 Industrial Sector In Terms Of Total Capital Invested
Table 3-8 exhibits the total capital invested in plants in each
industrial sector. The total Capital invested on September 5th, 1986 
amounted to $24447.7 million (U.S. dollars). This represents an
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Table 3-7: Distribution of manpower by industrial sector up to
September 5th, 1986*
Class .Industrial Sector Total % N.Plants J.Plants
31 Food 17388 13.3 14633 2755
32 Textile 3534 2.7 2675 859
32 Leather products 535 0.4 535 -
33 Wood 4183 3.2 3087 1096
34 Paper & Printing 6188 4.7 4319 1869
35 Chemical 21888 16.8 14112 7776
36 Non Const. mat. 1505 1.2 1416 89
36 Building mat. 40080 30.7 31027 9053
37&38 Metal 33277 25.5 21917 11360
39 Other industries 1064 0.8 768 296
71 Storage 852 0.7 826 26
Total 130494 100 95315 35179
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1986a:14), Industrial 
Statistical Report, Saudi Arabia.
*: The end of the year 1406 according to the Hijra calendar.
N. Plants: national plants.
J. Plants: joint venture plants.
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increase of 7 billion dollars with comparison to the previous year 
(Ministry of Industry and Electricity, 1985). Of the total capital 
invested in all sectors $13310.7 million, or 54.4 per cent, are 
invested in the national plants and $11137 million, or 45.6 per cent, 
are invested in the joint venture plants. This indicates that the 
majority of the joint venture plants are capital intensive. It is 
worth mentioning that the joint venture projects are the result of 
the government encouragement to foreign investment as pointed out by 
the industrial policy (see section 3.8.1.2, no. 10).
As seen from Table 3-8, the highest four industries in terms of total 
capital invested in decreasing order are:
1. The Chemical industry consumes 52.3 per cent of the total
capital invested in all sectors. Of the $7436.3 million, 
$6292.3 million are invested in SABIC companies. Also, of the 
$5347 million, $4573.9 million are invested in petromin 
refineries and SABIC companies.
2. The Building materials industry consumes 23.2 per cent of the
total capital invested in all sectors.
3. The Metal industry consumes 12.7 per cent of the whole capital
invested in all industries. Of the $1799 million, $977.9 
million are invested in SABIC companies.
4. The Food industry consumes 7 per cent of the total capital
invested in all sectors.
The seven remaining industries consume only 4.8 per cent of the
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Table 3-8: Distribution of total Capital invested by industrial
sector up to September 5th, 1986* (million U .S. dollars)
Class Industrial Sector Total % N.Plants J. Plants
31 Food 1701.7 7.0 1329.3 372.4
32 Textile 186.8 0.7 113.8 73.0
32 Leather products 24.0 0.1 24.0 -
33 Wood 171.5 0.7 145.3 26.2
34 Paper & Printing 471.0 1.9 306.4 164.6
35 Chemical 12783.3 52.3 5347.0 7436.3
36 Non Const. mat. 117.0 0.5 111.0 6.0
36 Building mat. 5667.2 23.2 4458.0 1209.2
37&38 Metal 3110.6 12.7 1311.6 1799.0
39 Other industries 96.2 0.4 51.9 44.3
71 Storage 118.4 0.5 112.4 6.0
Total 24447.7 100 13310.7 11137.0
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1986a: 14), Industrial
Statistical Report, Saudi Arabia.
*: The end of the year 1406 according to the Hijra calendar. 
N. Plants: national plants.
J. Plants: joint venture plants.
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total capital invested of the whole industries.
The huge capital investment in the previous industries results from 
the participation of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), 
established in 1974, which finances up to 50 per cent of the total 
costs of a project (Saudi Consulting House, 1986). In a case of a 
joint venture project, the Saudi equity must not be less than 25 per 
cent of the total costs of the project in order to qualify investors 
for a loan. By 1986, the SIDF spent $3.76 billion to finance 938 
projects (Saudi Industrial Development Fund, 1986). Most of these 
projects are in the industry of building materials (220), metal (151) 
and food (142).
This description of the Saudi industrial sectors indicates that there 
are four industries with potential for growth and study. These are 
the chemical, metal, building materials and food industries. The 
first three out of the four mentioned industries, ranked first in 
terms of total invested capital, number of plants and number of 
workers respectively. The remaining seven industries could be 
classified as weak or not well developed industries as indicated by 
the three dimensions (i.e., capital, number of plants and number of 
workers). The weaknesses in these six industries, excluding storage, 
may be due to following factors: lack of materials (e.g., leather,
forest); labour intensive industry; and low demand industries. On the 
other hand, the strengths in the four potential industries are 
mainly attributed to the following: availability of raw materials
(e.g., oil); unrisky businesses; and high demand for products of
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these industries. Furthermore, it becomes clear from above 
descriptions that the highest number of joint venture projects are 
in the metal and chemical industries.
Table 3-9 displays the average industry capital as well as the 
capital per worker for all the Saudi sectors. The chemical industry 
has the highest average industry capital ($43.9 million), and the 
leather industry has the lowest average industry capital ($2.4 
million). Also, the Table shows that the chemical industry has the 
highest capital per worker ($0.58 million) followed by the building 
materials industry ($0.14 million).
3.8.5.4 Development Of Plants By Region
One of the Saudi manufacturing objectives is to "secure a regionally 
balanced development of industry" (see section 3.8.1.1, no.5). The 
distribution of plants by region shows that the government of Saudi 
Arabia through the Ministry of Industry and Electricity has been 
successful in balancing the development of plants in three out of 
five regions. As Table 3-10 displays, the three roughly balanced 
regions are the central, western and eastern. The percentage for each 
region to the total of the five regions is 38.8, 31.2 and
23.1 respectively. In contrast, the unbalanced regions in terms of 
development of plants are the West southern and the northern. It is 
worth noting that the development of plants in each region is 
concentrated in one or two major cities as it will be seen in 
Chapter Four. Thus, the unbalanced regions in terms of 
industrialisation is attributed to the following factors (ELMALLAKH,
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Table 3-9: Average industry capital and capital per worker by
industrial sector (Million U.S. dollars)
Class. Industrial Sector A v e .Ind.Capt.* Capit. /worker* *
31 Food 5.3 0.10
32 Textile 4.8 0.05
32 Leather products 2.4 0.04
33 Wood 2.5 0.04
34 Paper & Printing 3.9 0.08
35 Chemical 43.9 0.58
36 Non Const. mat. 19.5 0.08
36 Building mat. 10.7 0.14
37&38 Metal 5.4 0.09
39 Other industries 2.8 0.09
71 Storage 4.1 0.14
Total 12.1 0.19
* Total capital invested over number of plants from Tables 3-6 and
3-8.
** Total capital invested over number of workers from Tables 3-7 and 
3-8.
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1982) : the pattern of population; the short history of
manufacturing; the long distance between cities; the high 
transportation costs; and the remote of country's ports.
The distribution of the workforce by region shows that the Central 
region also has almost the highest number in this area. However, in 
terms of total capital invested, the eastern region was ranked the 
highest due to SABIC's investments. The percentage, in terms of 
number of workers, for each region: central, western, eastern, west 
southern and northern to total is 34.6, 34, 27.5, 3.4 and 0.5
respectively. Similarly, the percentage, in terms of total capital 
invested, for each of the above regions to total is 15.6, 36.6, 
43.9, 3.7 and 0.20 respectively.
The development of new plants in the kingdom has grown slowly after
1986. As on August 24th, 1987 (i.e., the end of the 1407 Hijra
year), the number of plants rose to only 2061 (Ministry of Industry 
and Electricity, 1987). This represents an increase of 39 plants or
1.9 per cent as compared to last year. This increase is prominent in 
the industry of metal (1.6 per cent), food (2.5 per cent), paper and 
printing (2.5 per cent), and Chemical (3.8 per cent). Generally, the 
slow growth in all industrial sectors is attributed to several 
factors. The most important among them are: the completion of the
kingdom's infrastructure (it mostly affects the building and metal 
industries); the saturation of some subsectors (e.g., dairy and 
plastic products, soft drinks industries); the small markets as a 
result of small population (affects the capacity of the industry);
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Table 3-10: Distribution of plants by region up to September 5th,
1986
Ind. Sector Cent.R West R East R W.S.R North.R
31 Food 100 130 61 21 9
32 Textile 13 22 3 1 -
32 Leather 4 3 3 - -
33 Wood 35 18 14 1 -
34 Paper 50 43 23 5 1
35 Chemical 79 111 90 5 6
36 Non Const. 4 1 1 - -
36 Building 226 116 121 58 9
37&38 Metal 246 164 141 15 6
39 Other 17 14 2 1 -
71 Storage 10 9 7 1 2
Total 784 631 466 108 33
% of each region
to total 38.8 31.2 23.1 5.3 1.6
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1986a:16), Industrial 
Statistical Report, Saudi Arabia.
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the open markets to foreign products; and the risky industries as a 
result of lack of materials (e.g., leather, forest).
As indicated by the small growth rate of plants in 1987, issuing 
licenses for new plants will be restricted to new projects in the 
well developed industries / subindustries to ensure security to 
industrial investors as pointed out by the industrial policy 
(discussions with the Deputy Minister of Industrial Affairs in 1989).
SUMMARY
The purpose of this Chapter was to provide a background to several 
features of the Saudi Context in which the research was undertaken. 
The factors discussed in the Chapter were demographic characteristics 
of the population, educational system, development plans, 
workforce, economic context and the industrial sector.
Among the main demographic features of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
were the domination of the working age group (54.1 per cent) followed 
by the under age group (43.1 per cent) and that the male population 
outnumbered that of the female. The high growth of population is 
expected to overcome the kingdom's problem concerning small size of 
population in the near future. In education, Saudi Arabia has shown 
significant achievements in both the general education (up to 
secondary stage) and in the higher education (post secondary stage). 
However, significant improvements in technical education and 
vocational training are required. The above factors (i.e., 
education and vocational training) are expected to have a positive
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effect on the labour force in the near future. Currently, the 
kingdom is highly dependent on non-Saudi workforce which accounted 
for almost 60 per cent of the total labour force in 1985. This 
percentage is expected to be reduced to nearly 50 per cent in 1990, 
which is a major feature of the Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990) . 
Due to cultural values, the contribution of females in the Saudi 
workforce is very small (3.1 per cent in 1985). Slightly above fifty 
per cent of the labour force was employed by the services sectors. 
The manufacturing sector employed 9.3 per cent of the workforce in 
1985 and it is expected to rise to almost 13 per cent by 1990.
Although the economy of Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on one 
single-commodity, oil, other producing sectors have shown high 
growth. In real rates of GDP, the oil sector has shown positive high 
growth, on the average, in the First and Second Development Plans, 
then a negative growth (-14.5 per cent) was witnessed in the Third 
Development Plan due to slump in oil demand. Furthermore, the 
negative growth continued in 1985 and 1987; however, a positive high 
growth was observed in 1986 in spite of sharp decline in oil prices. 
In contrast, the non-oil sector has witnessed positive growth during 
the three development plans, which stopped in 1986 to continue up to
1987. Prominent industries with positive growth in the non-oil 
sector are agriculture and manufacturing.
The industrial sector has experienced a high level of development due 
to huge investments generated from oil revenues. The number of 
plants had risen from 473, in 1975, to 2022 in 1986. By 1986, the
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total workforce (including management) employed in these plants 
amounted to 130494 with a total capital invested of $24447.7 
million. On the basis of the above three dimensions (i.e., number of 
plants, number of workers and capital) four potential industries 
have been pointed out; Chemical, metal, building materials and food. 
The first three industries ranked first in terms of total capital 
invested, number of plants, and number of workers respectively. These 
four industries, in particular, have begun to contribute positively 
to the national economy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this research is to investigate the manufacturing 
strategy issue within the Saudi business environment. Without proper 
methodology, a research can not achieve its objectives. Thus, this 
Chapter explains how this study was carried out.
In the first two sections of this Chapter, types of research design 
and research methods are reviewed from a theoretical point of view. 
Then, a research design for the study is described. In the fourth 
section the population and the achieved sample are discussed, this 
is followed by a presentation of the variables and instruments of 
the study. The last two sections introduce the statistical methods 
used in the analysis and discuss the validity as well as the 
reliability of the study.
4.1 TYPES OF RESEARCH DESIGN
Prior to presenting the types of research design, it is necessary to 
define the term "research design". Zikmund (1984:40) defines 
research design as "a master plan specifying the methods and 
procedures for collecting and analysing the needed information, and
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a framework of the research plan of action". Research design is 
further defined as "the plan and structure of investigation so 
conceived as to obtain answers to research questions" (Kerlinger, 
1986:279). It is very clear that the foregoing definitions have 
certain common ground in representing research design as a master 
plan or a programme for collecting, analysing, and interpreting data. 
On the basis of these definitions, the key differences among the 
types of design must be briefly considered in order to understand the 
reasons lying behind choices and practicalities of the design of the 
present study, which will be discussed later in this Chapter.
Research design can be classified into three major types: 
Experimental, Quasi-experimental, and Non-experimental (Stone, 1978; 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981) . In the following subsections each one 
of these types of design will be examined.
4.1.1 Experimental Design
This type of design is mainly used by researchers in the natural 
sciences. Its most significant feature is the ability to control and 
manipulate variables. Experimental design allows " the manipulation 
of a study's independent variable and the subsequent assessment of 
the impact, if any, such manipulation has had on the study's 
dependent variable" (Stone, 1978:92). Therefore, experimental design 
is strong on control (internal validity).
The major advantages of the experimental design as stated by Stone 
(1978:119) are: measurement is generally more precise ... than with
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other research strategies because . .. (it) takes place under highly 
controlled conditions; causality can be inferred from the results ... 
since threats to internal validity can be reduced or eliminated 
through the use of control groups; the independent variable(s) of a 
study can be precisely and unambiguously defined by the experimenter 
through the manipulations used to produce them; and laboratory 
experiments can be replicated.
However, this design has its own drawbacks (Stone, 1978:119). Some 
of them are: some phenomena can not be studied in the laboratory
(e.g., studies of social sciences); the generality (i.e., external 
validity) of results produced ... may be restricted; a number of 
variables can not be manipulated by experimenters; and Laboratory 
settings may lack "realism" in that conditions of laboratory 
experiments may not reflect the realities of the case under 
investigation.
4.1.2 Quasi-Experixnental Design
This type of design is conducted in real world organisational 
settings. An example of a quasi-experimental design is the one-shot 
case study. The main advantages of the case study are summarised as 
follows (Stone, 1978; Zikmund, 1984): the researcher thoroughly
investigates one or more units of analysis (e.g., person, group or 
company) ; data are collected by a variety of unstructured means 
(e.g., observations, interviews, documents and records); no attempt 
is made to exercise experimental or statistical controls; and the 
case study is suited more to the generation of the hypotheses than
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their testing.
In contrast, the major disadvantages for the case study (Stone, 1978; 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981) are: causal inferences are impossible 
because there is no control over confounding variables; hypothesis 
testing is not possible; results are expected to have ample amounts 
of bias due to nonsystematic collection of data; generalisation from 
case study results is not possible; and the case study is 
time-consuming than other type of design. Thus, the above 
disadvantages indicate that the case study is weak in both internal 
and external validities.
4.1.3 Non-Experixnental Design
In the non-experimental design (a survey) the investigator has 
practically no control over the independent variables of the study. 
This is due to two factors. First, "the independent variable (s) may 
act upon a study's subjects before the investigator is in a position 
to determine who will get the treatment and when they will get it. 
Second, the study's independent variable may not be manipulable" 
(Stone, 1978:104). In the social sciences studies, survey is the 
most commonly used design. A survey can be defined as:
A form of planned collection of data for the purpose of 
description or prediction as a guide to action or for the 
purpose of analysing the relationships between certain 
variables (Oppenheim, 1966:1).
In line with the above definition surveys are of two types;
descriptive and analytical. The descriptive survey focuses upon
describing the phenomenon rather than explaining relationships
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between variables. Conversely, the analytical survey focuses upon 
finding and explaining relationships between variables.
The major advantages of the survey design (Stone, 1978; McNeill, 
1985) are: results allow for generalisations because the sample is
representative of the population; results are accurate because of 
large sample size as well as "generally" low sampling error; 
personal influence is minimised; the survey design produces a large 
amount of standardised data that can be easily utilised via 
statistical techniques, which allow testing the hypothesis (i.e., 
answering research questions) ; and the survey design has various 
methods of systematic data collection (e.g., questionnaire). 
Consequently, these advantages indicate that the survey study has 
strong external validity.
However, the survey design also has its own disadvantages. These 
are: the data tend to be superficial (breadth of information is 
typically obtained at the expense of the depth); and the answers that 
respondents provide to a sensitive question may not reflect their 
views.
4.2 RESEARCH METHODS
In the previous section, three types of design were presented. In 
this section, research methods will be introduced as techniques for 
collecting data. The most common methods in the social sciences for 
collecting data are observation, questionnaire, interview and 
archival records.
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4.2.1 Observation
Observation means watching a case very carefully (people or things) 
to record what can be observed.
There are some advantages and disadvantages for the observation
technique as a method of data collection (Stone, 1978; Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1981) . Among the advantages are: the ability to obtain 
data concerning behaviour that the observees (subjects) may be either 
unable or unwilling to report themselves; and the ability to make 
inferences (with varying degrees of accuracy) to explain the
behaviour. In contrast, the disadvantages for the observation
include: observers may produce incomplete reports of what they
observe; observers may be subjected to fatigue during the progress 
of the study which affects the reliability and validity of the data; 
observers often need considerable training; and the observation
technique is costly because the observers must be present all times 
(if audio -visual means are not used).
4.2.2 Questionnaire
Questionnaire is another technique for collecting data. It is the 
most frequent method in the social sciences fields (Stone, 1978). 
Questionnaire is simply a list of questions that take the form of 
"closed" (fixed alternative) and "open-ended". Usually the "closed" 
questions are dominant.
Like any other technique for data collection, the questionnaire has 
its advantages and disadvantages (Selltiz et al., 1959). Among the
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advantages are: it is somewhat inexpensive; it can be administered by 
a relatively unskilled person; it can be distributed in person or by 
mail; it provides uniformity of stimulus to all subjects; and it 
generally coexists with anonymity that may lead subjects to be more 
open and truthful. As for the disadvantages, the following ones are 
noteworthy: missing data may be a problem especially if many subjects 
did not respond as a result of unclear questions; low rate of 
response in the case of mailed questionnaire; inapplicability of the 
questionnaire to illiterates or individuals who have difficulties in 
reading; and inflexibility of the questionnaire because subjects are 
to respond to relatively structured formats.
4.2.3 Interview
The interview is a third method of collecting data. An interview is a 
face-to-face meeting between the interviewee and interviewer where 
the latter asks questions to the former and records his responses. 
The interview may range from the most informal chat to the most well 
structured sets of questions and answers.
Among the advantages or benefits associated with this technique are 
(Selltiz et al., 1959): a higher rate of response as compared to 
mailed questionnaire; applicability to illiterates as well as 
individuals who have reading difficulties; and flexibility 
especially in the case of unstructured interview. However, the 
disadvantages of the interview include (Stone, 1978) : it is generally 
costly especially in terms of time for both the interviewee and the 
interviewer; it has the potential of being a "reactive” technique due
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to the interpersonal nature which affects responses; it requires 
training of interviewer; and it affects the validity and the 
reliability, if the interviewer, subjected to fatigue, alters the 
manner of questioning.
4.2.4 Archival Records
This final method of collecting data for research is through 
documents and records. As pointed out by Nachmias and Nachmias
(1981), documents and records are two forms: public and private
records. Public records include political and judicial records, 
governmental documents, and the mass media reports. On the other 
hand, private records subsume organisational records. It is worth 
mentioning in this section that governmental documents as a form of 
annual reports were heavily utilised in this study as a primary 
research data (see Chapter 3).
The major advantages of using records are the low cost incurred as 
well as the accessibility to the data in most cases (e.g., 
governmental reports). As for the limitations involved in this 
method, it must be pointed out that the researcher should be aware of 
the possibility that the data may be unavailable.
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE PRESENT STUDY
The first two sections of this Chapter examined, from a theoretical 
point of view, the different types of research design as well as the 
various research methods available to the researcher. Moreover, the 
advantages and disadvantages of each type and method of research were
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examined. In this section, the research design for the present study
and the data collecting techniques will be discussed.
In the literature of research methodology, it is argued that there is
no one single best research design that can be used to treat a
research problem. An eminent researcher in the social sciences has 
stated this viewpoint quite eloquently:
There is never a single, standard, correct method of carrying
out a piece of research. Do not wait to start your research
until you find out the proper approach, because there are 
many ways to tackle a problem - some good, some bad, but 
probably several good ways. There is no single perfect 
design. A research method for a given problem is not like 
the solution to a problem in algebra. It is more like a 
recipe for beef stroganoff; there is no one best recipe 
(Simon, 1969:4).
According to the objectives of this study (see Chapter one), a 
decision has been made to use a survey design for the following 
considerations:
1. This study attempts to find out the manufacturing strategy
for Saudi plants in the last two years (i.e., 1987 and 1988) 
as well as for the next two years (i.e., 1990 and 1991).
Therefore, a research survey design investigating a large 
number of plants is preferred to a case study bearing on a 
small number of plants.
2. The study intends to detect the manufacturing strategy
for the Saudi plants by examining the influence of a wide range 
of variables. Therefore, survey is the most appropriate design.
3. In the literature of manufacturing management, there exists
126
quite a few empirical studies on manufacturing strategy (as it 
is a new field) which are based on this type of research 
design (Roth, 1987; Ferdows and De Meyer, 1989; Roth et al., 
1989) . Using the survey approach would allow the researcher to 
compare, to a certain extent, the results of the present study 
with the those of previous studies.
4. The non-experimental study (survey) is highly heuristic 
(Kerlinger, 1986). It is understandable by the researcher that 
one of the difficulties in research is to distance oneself of
the problem under investigation. Therefore, this kind of design
has investigation potential.
Similarly a decision has been made to use questionnaire as a method
of data collection although interviews also will be used, if
required, based on the structured questionnaire. The following are 
considerations for using the questionnaire:
1. The most common method of data collection in survey approach is 
the questionnaire. Using questionnaire as a main data 
collection technique assures the anonymity of respondents.
2. The questionnaire as a technique for collecting data is 
suitable for an individual researcher who is limited in terms 
of time, effort, and money.
3. Most of the objectives of this study (detecting strategies and 
testing hypotheses) will be accomplished through the 
utilisation of several statistical techniques. Thus, 
questionnaire is the most appropriate technique.
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4. Self-administered questionnaire instead of mail questionnaire 
will be used to avoid a low rate of response.
5. Open-ended questions in addition to closed ones will be used 
to overcome the weaknesses of the latter. Furthermore, informal 
chat with the respondents will be sought as a source to 
complement and support the survey data.
4.4 POPULATION AND THE ACHIEVED SAMPLE
Sampling is very important for researchers engaged in field work. 
Zikmund (1984:44) defines sampling as "any procedure that uses a 
small number of items or that uses parts of the population to make a 
conclusion regarding the whole population." To achieve proper 
sampling, three dimensions must be addressed: the definition of the 
population, the size of the sample, and the representativeness of the 
sample (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981). These three dimensions were 
highly considered in selecting the sample of this study.
The population for this study is the Saudi industrial sector. It was 
chosen for two principal reasons: its importance to the national
economy as a means of diversification (see Chapter Three); and its 
potential for investigating the issue of manufacturing strategy 
(e.g., tangible products).
Within the industrial sectors, the manufacturing private sector was 
chosen (see Figure 3-2) on the basis of the following criteria:
1. The examination of the literature indicates that the
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manufacturing private sector lacks studies of this kind with 
the exception of one study by Yaghmour (1985) on the metal 
industry only.
2. The existence of a variety of industries. As mentioned in
Chapter Three, SABIC and Petromin have limited industrial 
activities; the former concentrates on the chemical and metal 
industries whilst the latter focuses only on the chemical 
industry.
3. The existence of similar capabilities among plants. SABIC
Companies are giant projects, highly supported by the 
government. Similarly, Petromin refineries are large but 
totally supported by the government.
4. The existence of a large number of plants in most of the
private industries, which allows for wider range of selection. 
In SABIC and Petromin, there are respectively 15 and 6 
companies only (see sections 3.8.2 and 3.8.3).
Since the Saudi manufacturing private sector consists mainly of eight 
producing industries (excluding storage), a decision was made to 
select four industries (see Table 3-6) for two reasons: to minimise 
time and effort for the researcher; and to examine the manufacturing 
strategy dimensions in more than one industry (e.g., quality, cost). 
The selection criteria concerning the four industries is based on the 
following factors as priorities in decreasing order:
1. The highest total invested capital.
2. The highest number of employees.
3. The highest amount of sales.
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The previous are three important factors to the national economy. 
Thus, the first four industries that met these criteria are: 
chemical, metal, building materials, and food industries (see Tables
3-7, 3-8 and 4-1; for more details, see sections 3.8.5.2 and
3.8.5.3). It is also worth mentioning that these four industries 
count the highest number of plants (see Table 3-6 and section 
3.8.5.1), which means that they are industries with good potential.
However, after consulting a guide of "A List of Licensed Factories" 
provided by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1986b), and 
after visiting some of the operating plants in these four industries 
during the pre-field work trip, it was concluded that plants in the 
building materials industry do not lend themselves well to the 
application of the manufacturing strategy survey. This is because the 
highest percentage of the plants in this industry represents brick 
manufacturers, while the rest are concrete manufacturers. In the 
case of brick manufacture, the majority of the plants is labour 
intensive (i.e., using simple tools, a group of workers perform 
repeated manual work) and the remainder of the plants is mechanically 
operated. Furthermore, the Kingdom's infrastructure is now completed 
therefore, the building materials industry is likely to remain stable 
or decline. For the reasons mentioned above, the building materials 
industry was excluded from the sampling industry selection. Thus, the 
next industry that met the selection criteria is the paper and 
printing industry (see Tables 3-7, 3-8 and 4-1). Therefore, plants 
for this study will be selected from the following industries: 
Chemical, Metal, Food, and Paper.
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Before starting to select plants of these four industries, two 
important points were addressed: the targeted subjects in the plants, 
and the total number of plants that should be selected of all 
industries. Since manufacturing strategy is formed in the corporate 
level strategy with the active participation of the manufacturing 
function (e.g., Skinner, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 
1985; Southern and Al-Shuaibi, 1990), two types of managers were 
targeted from each plant; general manager and production manager. 
Moreover, another functional manager of each plant (e.g., marketing 
or sales) was sought to participate in order to support or disagree 
with the general manager's view regarding the position of the 
production manager. Since there were only three targeted subjects in 
each plant, the researcher preferred to survey a large sample of 
plants because of the relationship between the sample size and the 
error as suggested by Kerlinger (1986) (e.g., the larger the sample,
the smaller the error is). Accordingly, a decision was made to survey 
a total of 160 plants of the four industries, because distributing 
questionnaire in person is time demanding. The 160 plants represent
12.4 per cent of the total number of plants in the four industries.
Selecting 160 plants of four industries requires choosing one of two 
approaches; either equal or unequal quota of plants of each industry. 
The second approach was taken in order to select plants according to 
their actual existence (disproportional stratified sampling). This 
approach allows presenting the influence of each industry in this 
study as in the practical situation. Based on the total number of 
plants in these four industries (see Table 3-6), Figure 4-1 shows the
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Table 4-1: Sales by industrial sector (1986)
(million U.S dollars)
Sector Amount
31 Food 1147.0
32 Textile 53.9
32 Leather products 8.5
33 Wood 74.4
34 Paper and Printing 330.4
35 Chemical* 5206.1
36 Non Const. Mat. 20.3
36 Building Mat. 1171.7
37&38 Metal* 1361.0
39 Other industries 246.5
71 Storage 101.0
Sales for SABIC and Petromin were included 
Source: The Consulting Center for Finance and Investment (1988:4), 
Survey Industries - 1987, (Saudi Arabia).
percentage of plants that should be selected out of each industry. 
Thus, the number of food, paper, chemical, and metal plants selected 
in the sample are 40, 15, 35 and 70 respectively.
Since each of the selected industries consists of several 
subindustries, strata, (see Tables 4.1.1 to 4.1.4 in Appendix A), the
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43.70%
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Figure 4-1: Planned Sample by Industrial Sector
best sampling procedure for selecting plants of each industry is 
disproportional stratified sampling. This procedure (i.e., unequal 
quota of plants of each subindustry) allows the presentation of 
plants according to their actual existence. The major advantages of 
stratified sampling are (Zikmund, 1984): that it saves time and
cost; it reduces sampling error because the categories are internally 
homogeneous; it produces a smaller standard error because the groups 
are adequately represented when strata are combined; it is very 
helpful in comparative studies; and it gives a reasonable degree of 
accuracy, which allows generalisation.
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The following criteria were established to select plants of each
subindustry:
1. Plants must be included in the guide of "A List of Licensed 
Factories" provided by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity 
(1986b) which ensures industrial license (see section 3.8.1.2, 
no. 6). By the time this survey is carried out, selected plants 
from this guide will have a minimum of three years experience 
in terms of operation, which is considered reasonable.
2. Plants were selected of each subsector through the above 
mentioned guide according to the following factors as 
priorities in decreasing order:
(i) highest in paid up capital.
(ii) highest in both paid up capital and number of employees.
(iii) highest in number of employees.
This in fact represents consistency with the criteria used for 
selecting the four industries in spite of the following two 
exceptions: total invested capital was replaced by total
paid-up capital as it was not available for all plants; and 
the amount of sales for individual industries was not published 
since all plants were privately owned. The researcher was 
compelled to select plants according to capital and number of 
employees because plants were not classified in terms of size 
by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. Selecting large 
plants in terms of paid up capital and number of employees is 
based on the researcher's assumption that manufacturing
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strategy or professionalism in businesses would be well 
searched in any firm except very small ones where one person is 
in charge of every task.
3. Plants in the private sector were selected without any
consideration of the type of ownership (i.e., national or joint 
venture plants, see Table 3-6), as comparison between entirely 
Saudi and joint venture plants is not the objective of this 
study.
4. Plants must be located in any of the following regions:
central, western and eastern, because they represent almost 
well balanced regions in terms of industrialisation (see 
section 3.8.5.4),
Following the above sampling procedures a field work survey was 
carried out in Saudi Arabia, for a period of three months, i.e., 
May-July, 1989. A total of 160 plants was approached in three major 
cities (Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam), 121 plants returned the
questionnaires (3 sets of questionnaires by each plant). After 
careful examination, the sets of questionnaires of 117 plants were 
accepted (a total of 351 questionnaires) (due to missing data and 
unanswered questions), which constituted 73 per cent in terms of rate 
of response (see Table 4-2) . Almost 30 per cent of the respondents 
were interviewed.
It is worth mentioning that the high rate of response was prompted as
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a result of three important letters: a letter from the supervisor, a 
letter from the Dean of the School of Economics and Administration 
at King Abdulaziz University (Saudi Arabia), and a letter from the 
Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. In 
addition to the above letters, the researcher phoned the majority of 
the selected plants to ask for permission to conduct the survey.
Figure 4-2 depicts the achieved sample in the major cities in the 
three regions. As seen from the Figure, the highest number of the 
plants surveyed were first in Riyadh then in Jeddah and finally in 
Dammam. This exactly represents the actual plants distribution in 
these regions (see section 3.8.5.4), which proves that the 
majority of the plants in each region were concentrated in the 
largest city.
The achieved sample by subsector in the food, paper, chemical and 
metal industries are shown in detail in Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6 
respectively. In some subsectors of the food and paper industries the 
"required number of plants that should be included in the sample" was 
not taken as it is, it was either decreased or increased. In the food 
industry, for instance, (see Table 4-3), the number of plants 
that should be included in the sample of the subsector 3117 is 8. 
However, only 3 plants of that subsector were selected in the 
sample because the manufacturing strategy is not much applicable to 
the activities of these plants (e.g., bakeries with modern equipments 
and blue-collar workers, see Table 4.1.1 in Appendix A). This figure 
(i.e., the extra 5 plants of the subsector 3117) was added to the
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Table 4-2: Distribution of planned and achieved sample by industrial
sector
Industry
No.
Planned
of plants
Achieved
Rate of 
response
Food 40 26 65.0
Paper 15 11 73.3
Chemical 35 32 91.4
Metal 70 48 68.6
Total 160 117 73.0
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Figure 4-2 : Distribution of Plants by City
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Table 4-3: Distribution of planned and achieved sample in the food
industry by subsector
Subsector*
%
Actual
No. of 
Planned
plants
Achieved
3111 3.8 1 1
3112 17.4 8 (+1) 7
3113 12.8 7 (+2) 2
3114 0.6 0 -
3115 0.6 1 1
3117 20.6 3 (-5) 1
3118 0.6 1 (+1) 1
3119 5.0 3 (+1) 3
3121 18.7 3 (-5) 3
3122 8.4 1 (-2) 0
3134 11.5 12 (+7) 7
Total 100 40 26
For description see Table 4.1.1 in Appendix A.
Table 4-4: Distribution of planned and achieved sample in the paper 
industry by subsector
Subsector
%
Actual
No. of 
Planned
plants
Achieved
3411 4.1 2 (+2) 2
3412 17.2 3 2
3419 18.9 3 2
3421 59.8 7 (-2) 5
Total 100 15 11
For description see Table 4.1.2 in Appendix A.
138
Table 4-5: Distribution of planned and achieved sample in the
chemical industry by subsector
Subsector*
%
Actual
No. of 
Planned
plants
Achieved
3511 13.4 5 3
3512 4.5 2 2
3513 2.4 0 -
3521 10.7 4 4
3522 1.0 1 1
3523 5.8 2 2
3529 3.4 2 2
3530 0 1.7 0 -
3540 0 5.2 0 -
3551 1.4 1 1
3559 1.4 1 1
3560 49.1 17 16
Total 100 35 32
0 : Belong to SABIC and Petromin companies.
For description see Table 4.1.3 in Appendix A.
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Table 4-6: Distribution of planned and achieved sample in the metal
industry by subsector
Subsector*
%
Actual
No. of plants 
Planned Achieved
3710 6 0.7 0 -
3720 0.7 1 1
3811 4.5 3 1
3812 10.8 8 2
3813 44.1 31 24
3819 9.1 7 7
3822 2.6 2 1
3824 1.7 1 1
3826 5.1 4 3
3827 2.1 2 1
3829 1.0 0 -
3831 4.9 3 0
3832 0.2 0 -
3839 3.8 3 3
3841 0.5 0 -
3843 7.0 5 4
3844 0.2 0 -
3852 1.0 0 -
Total 100 70 48
6 : Belongs to 
For description
SABIC companies. 
see Table 4.1.4 in Appendix A.
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subsector 3134 with 2 more plants taken from the subsector 3122. Such 
manipulations are marked in these Tables by (-) and (+) which 
indicate taking a certain number of plants and adding them to other 
subsectors, according to the size of the subsector. In fact, this 
decrease and increase of plants in these subsectors were compensated 
in the achieved sample. In the same example mentioned above (i.e., 
subsector 3117), only one plant responded successfully (see Table
4-3) .
4.5 VARIABLES AND INSTRUMENTS
As indicated in the previous section three types of managers were 
targeted from each plant. Therefore, questionnaires were designed 
for general managers (GMs), production managers (PMs), and sales 
managers (SMs) . These were coded A, B, and C respectively (see 
Appendix A).
This study has six major variables (see Chapter Two). These are:
1. Manufacturing Task
2. Perceived Environmental uncertainty
3. Production Manager's role in Strategic Decision making
4. Competitive priorities
5. Performance
6. Manufacturing Infrastructure
Of the above variables, questionnaire A (general managers) measured 
items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; questionnaire B (production managers)
measured items 1, 3, and 6; and questionnaire C (sales managers)
141
measured item 3 only. In addition, questionnaire A covered five 
open-ended questions and several short questions as well as 15 
questions related to "Type of business and products". Questionnaire 
B, similarly, covered some short questions.
The following are discussions of the instruments used to measure 
these variables. The expressions "Instrument" and "measure" will be 
used interchangeably in this study.
4.5.1 Manufacturing Task
Skinner and Associates (1982) measured manufacturing task (MT) by 
asking respondents to rank five items (low cost, quality, new 
products, flexibility, and delivery) according to their importance. 
Other researchers have used Likert scales to measure manufacturing 
task (e.g., Swamidass, 1983; De Meyer, 1986; Ferdows et al., 1986).
In this study, manufacturing task was measured using a Likert scale. 
The respondents (i.e., GMs & PMs) were asked to rate a 14-item 
instrument about cost, quality, flexibility, and delivery on a five 
point scale according to their plant's goals over the last two years 
(1987 and 1988) (Appendix A: questionnaire A, section II-A;
questionnaire B, section I-A) . Time (i.e., 1987 and 1988) was used
in this and other questions because it represents one of the 
characteristics of strategy (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). In the 
five point scale used, a higher rating indicates high importance and 
a lower rating means low importance (exception made for items 1 and 
12) .
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The instrument used in the present study is similar to the one used 
by Swamidass (1983), but with some modifications. Firstly, there are 
14 task items in this study whereas Swamidass's study had 11 tasks. 
The new tasks (high performance design, volume flexibility, and fast 
delivery) were included according to the refined list of competitive 
priorities (see Figure 2-3). It should be noted that Kerlinger (1986) 
and Churchill (1979) recommended the use of a large number of items 
in an instrument to improve the reliability of the measure. Secondly, 
this study used a five point scale while Swamidass's study employed a 
ten point scale. In the opinion of the researcher such a long scale 
is not appropriate for the present study as it is too difficult for 
instance to tell the difference between number 6 and 7 on the scale.
4.5.2 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
The controversies surrounding environmental uncertainty and its 
measures have been discussed in Chapter Two. The perceived measure 
has been strongly advocated over the objective measure by various 
researchers (e.g., Miles et al., 1974; Weick, 1977; Manning, 1982). 
The perceived measure of environmental uncertainty by Duncan (1972) 
has been replicated in several studies (e.g., Bourgeois, 1978; 
Jamison, 1981; Boulton et al., 1982; and Swamidass, 1983).
This study uses Duncan's approach for measuring environmental 
uncertainty with some modifications made to adopt to the Saudi 
environment. Duncan's approach consists of 13 items; one of them 
linked to "unionism" was dropped and replaced by an item related to 
"supervising Ministeries and Chambers of Commerce and Industry",
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which is more applicable to the Saudi business environment. 
Moreover, three items borrowed from Hill's (1983) external 
environment dimensions were added to the thirteen items; two of them 
are related to the economy and the third is linked to the "source of 
financial resources".
As a result, general managers were asked to rate a 16-item instrument 
on a five point scale in two questions; in the first question (A) , 
according to the importance of the items when making decisions; and 
in the second question (B), according to general managers' ability in 
predicting these items when making decisions (Appendix A: 
questionnaire A, sections III-A and B). According to the scale in the 
first question, the higher the score the greater the importance of 
the item. As for the scale in the second question, a lower score 
indicates higher uncertainty and a higher score means lower 
uncertainty .
4.5.3 Production Manager's Role in Strategic Decision Making
In the "Manufacturing Management Survey", Skinner and Associates
(1982) developed an instrument consisting of 4 statements in order to 
assess the manufacturing managers perception of their role in 
strategic decision making. The same instrument was adopted by 
Swamidass (1983) . In addition to this instrument, Swamidass 
developed a corresponding instrument to measure the chief executives 
perception of the role of manufacturing managers in strategic 
decision making.
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The present study adopted both instruments with some modifications. 
It accepted the four statements of each instrument and added a new 
statement to both instruments. This new statement: which is
"whether the production manager is given an equivalent role among the 
functional managers in the formulation of corporate strategy or not" 
represents the critical issue in manufacturing strategy (see section 
2.4.4). Also, another statement was added to the general managers' 
instrument only (i.e., questionnaire A). It is concerned with "the 
attendance of the production managers to top management meetings". 
Both statements were' meant to verify if the manufacturing function as 
represented by the production manager is still separated from the 
corporate level strategy. In other words, the new statements were 
meant to investigate if the missing link between the corporate level 
and the manufacturing function still exists as reported by Skinner 
(1969).
Furthermore, a third corresponding instrument to measure the sales 
managers' perception of the role of the production manager was 
developed in this study. It contained the same five statements that 
were used with the general and production managers. As mentioned in 
the previous section, the purpose of developing the sales managers' 
instrument is to support or disagree with the general managers' view 
regarding the role of the production manager in strategic decision 
making.
All managers were asked to rate the statements (i.e., GMs a 6-item 
instrument, while PMs and SMs each a 5-item instrument) on a five
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point scale (Appendix A: questionnaire A, section IV-A; questionnaire 
B, section II-A; questionnaire C). In the scale used/ a higher 
rating means a greater role for the production manager in strategic 
decision making.
4.5.4 Competitive Priorities
Competitive priorities were measured in several studies by the 
refined list of competitive priorities (e.g., De Meyer, 1986; Roth, 
1987).
In this study, the competitive priorities variable was measured,
also, by the refined list of competitive priorities (see Figure 2-3).
Only general managers were asked to participate in this question. 
This is because the researcher anticipated that GMs are the most
knowledgeable about competitive priorities as a result of their
access to information inside and outside the organisation. This 
turned to be right as it will be seen in section 6.4. Thus, general 
managers were asked to rate a 8-item instrument on a five point scale 
according to their importance at that time (i.e., towards the end of 
1989) and for the next two years (1990 and 1991) (Appendix A: 
questionnaire A, section IV-B). In the scale used, the higher the 
score, the greater the importance of the priority.
4.5.5 Performance
The performance approaches as well as their measures were discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2. It was mentioned that researchers on 
organisational performance are currently shifting away from focusing
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on a single measure and are concentrating on multiple measures. This 
is due to the difficulty in selecting one measure to represent the 
overall performance of the company (Bedeian, 1984). Accordingly, this 
study adopted the multiple measures approach to performance.
Growth in profitability and sales are usually used to measure 
organisational performance (Dess and Beard, 1984). In this study, 
growth in return on investment (GROI), growth in sales (GS), and 
growth in return on sales (GROS) during the last three years 
(1986-1988) were used to measure the financial performance of the 
Saudi plants (Appendix A: questionnaire A, section V-D Q4) . For the 
purpose of this study, the researcher believed that a three-year span 
is appropriate because of the short history of the Saudi plants in 
manufacturing (see Chapter 3).
Because the selected plants in this survey are privately owned, the 
researcher anticipated that a large number of general managers will 
refuse to supply "objective data" for the aforementioned measures. 
Therefore, the approach of using "subjective data" for these three 
measures was employed as a precautionary step. This approach has been 
used successfully by several researchers. After comparing objective 
and subjective performance measures, Bourgeois (1980b) reported that 
a reasonable degree of similarity between the two approaches exists.
General managers were asked to rate a three-item instrument on a 
three point likert scale (i.e., below industry average, industry 
average, and above industry average) (Appendix A: questionnaire A,
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section V-B). For the purpose of this study, it was suggested by the 
researcher and advocated by his supervisor as well as those who 
examined the questionnaire (i.e., pilot study) that the industry 
average on the scale be considered slightly above the "break-even 
point". This step was taken in order to avoid confusion among 
respondents as such data was not published by the Ministry of 
Industry and Electricity. Similarly, to avoid confusion, all 
respondents were asked to report financial data according to the 
Gregorian calendar (see Chapter 3) .
In addition to the above three subjective measures of performance, 
general managers were asked to respond to a question rating their 
plants chances of survival. The idea of this question was borrowed 
from Yaghmour (1985), but with a different scale of measure. Hence, 
GMs were asked to rate on a three point likert scale the chances of 
their plants survival today (i.e., refers to the period of the 
survey, May-July, 1989) as compared to three years ago. The purpose 
of this question was to find out the effect of oil prices decline as 
well as the completion of the kingdom infrastructure on the movement 
of industrialisation in Saudi Arabia.
Finally, two new questions related to benchmarking were incorporated 
in the study (Appendix A: questionnaire A, section V-A Q1 & 2). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the idea of benchmarking was to measure the 
plant's performance against the best in the industry.
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4.5.6 Manufacturing Infrastructure
The manufacturing infrastructure variable was measured by enormous 
number of programmes (i.e., activities) in several studies (De Meyer, 
1986; De Meyer and Ferdows, 1987; Roth, 1987; Roth et al., 1989). In 
these studies, the manufacturing infrastructure variable was measured 
by 37 programmes, all related to the activities in the manufacturing 
function. Manufacturing Managers were asked to rate these 37 
programmes on a five point scale according to the degree of emphasis 
on each programmme over the next five years (or 2 years for some 
studies).
In this study, the manufacturing infrastructure variable was measured 
by 57 programmes. These programmes were adopted from a 64-item list 
from Swamidass (1983) with some modifications. Of the 57 programmes, 
8 of them were added to this study to improve the instrument. The 
new 8 programmes are: 11, 12, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46 and 48 (see Appendix 
A: questionnaire B, section III-BQ3). These 57 programmes were 
grouped under eight major infrastructure areas: Inventory,
Planning, Scheduling and control, Purchasing, Process and product 
design, Labour and quality, Miscellaneous, and Foreign production. 
In this question, Production Managers were asked to rate a 57-item 
instrument on a five point scale according to time, effort, and 
resources devoted to each programme currently (i.e., towards the end 
of 1989) and for the next two years (1990 and 1991) . A two year 
period (rather than a five year period) was selected to provide more 
accuracy in planning since the Saudi industries have limited 
experience. In the scale used, the higher the rating, the greater
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the time, effort, and resources devoted to the programme is.
The next paragraphs will discuss briefly the other questions that 
were covered by both types of the questionnaires; A and B.
Questionnaire A
The first section of this questionnaire covered 15 short questions, 
aiming at providing a good background about the Saudi manufacturing 
industries. These questions are mainly related to type of plant, 
number of employees, years of operation, product and its major 
technological change, foreign and Saudi competition, and exporting 
obstacles.
Five open-ended questions were formed for this study to overcome the 
weaknesses of the fixed format (Appendix A: questionnaire A, sections
II-Q15; IV-D Q 1 & 2; V-C Q 1&2) . Four of these questions inquired 
about the Saudi plants in terms of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats (i.e., SWOT analysis). Several researchers 
have included only "strengths" in their manufacturing strategy 
studies; however, the researcher believes that the other dimensions 
of SWOT analysis are equally important. Threats, for example, could 
be decreased or turned into opportunities. The fifth open-ended 
question was related to the business strategy of the plant (i.e., 
what elements of your manufacturing and technology are vital to your 
plant's competitiveness). This question is similar to the one used 
by Swamidass (1986) . The researcher expects that these open-ended 
questions will serve to support or contradict the findings of the
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fixed format questions.
Both GMs and PMs were asked to rank the manufacturing areas 
(competitive priorities) from 1 to 8 according to the plant's needs 
for improvements; 1 indicates the most needed improvements and 8 
indicates the least needed improvements (see Appendix A: 
questionnaire A, section IV-C; questionnaire B, section II-B). As it 
is clear from the question, the purpose is to find out the areas that 
need the most improvement as well as those which require the least 
improvement.
General Managers were also asked to provide percentages for the 
following: aspects of total unit cost (materials, labour,
transportation, other); source of raw materials (locally & imported) ; 
allocation on Research and Development; and finally investment on 
process and equipment (Appendix A: questionnaire A, section V-D Q 1, 
2 & 3). These percentages will be used in support of other findings.
Questionnaire B
In addition to the question related to manufacturing areas, 
production managers were asked to respond to a variety of other 
questions. These questions related to: type of process; future
demand; peak capacity requirements; decreased capacity requirements; 
maintenance; and forecasting (Appendix A: questionnaire B, section
III—A Q 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and B-Q2) . All these questions were derived
from the production management literature (e.g., Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984; Fine and Hax, 1985).
151
Production managers were, also, asked to supply percentages for the 
following: capacity (growing or declining); rework products; customer 
rectification; scrap; products with new design; and rejected rate in 
production (Appendix A: questionnaire B, section III-A Q2, B-Ql). 
These percentages will be utilised in support of other findings.
4.6 STATISTICAL METHODS
In this study, different statistical techniques were used via the 
"Statistical Package for the Social Sciences" (SPSSX). Descriptive 
statistics was used throughout the dissertation such as frequency 
distribution, percentages and mean. The mean value was used 
intensively in this study for two reasons: it provides a standard
approach for comparisons between items; and it shows differences 
between items (better than the median value), which is utilised in 
ranking. The Mann-Whitney test was used to find out if highly 
significant differences exist, on the total sample level, between the 
ratings of general and production managers. For the sake of double 
accuracy, the T-test of the Parametric techniques was used to detect 
differences between general and production managers' ratings. 
Similarly, Kruskal Wallis as well as One Way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) were used to find out if highly significant differences exist 
among the ratings of the four industries by each type of managers. 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient was employed to indicate the reliability 
of the instruments in this study (see Chapter 6).
Pearson product moment correlation was used for testing the 
hypotheses. This type of correlation was used rather than "spearman
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rank correlation" because the data were weighted and it was suggested 
that Pearson product moment correction is more appropriate. 
Furthermore, using this type of correlation permits comparisons to 
take place between the findings of the present study and those of 
Swamidass' (1983) study. The T-test was also employed in the testing.
The principal components of factor analysis were used to find out the 
manufacturing strategy components as well as the focused sets of 
competitive priorities. This technique was used in several studies 
of the same nature (e.g., De Meyer and Ferdows, 1987; Roth, 1987).
Canonical correlation analysis was employed to facilitate the study 
of interrelationships among the components of manufacturing strategy 
(sets of criterion variables) and the focused sets of competitive 
priorities (sets of predictor variables) in order to find out the 
expected manufacturing strategy. This technique suits the ordinal 
level of data in the study because "canonical correlation places the 
fewest restrictions on the types of data (metric or nonmetric) on 
which it operates" (Hair et al., 1987: 188). Moreover, all data were 
weighted (i.e., constructing indices) in order to ensure meeting the 
criteria of the study subject and to improve the level of data. This 
technique, with the same level of data, was used by Roth (1987).
Along with the preceding statistical techniques, three levels of 
significance were used: 0.001, 0.05, and 0.10 (Daniel and Terrell,
1983). The first level of significance (0.001) or better was used to 
judge the differences in ratings between and among managers. This
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level is set up to be very high because the researcher is searching 
for genuine differences among respondents. The second level (0.05) 
or better was used in canonical correlation analysis. The final 
level (0.10) or better was used to judge the results of the 
hypothesis testing. This level of significance was extended to 0.10 
because the hypotheses are almost new.
4.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY
Validity and reliability are very important in Social Science 
Studies. Unlike physical studies, the social science studies deal 
with human subjects and human measurements; therefore, it is 
difficult to control human behaviour (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983). 
Validity addresses the problem of whether an instrument measures what 
it is supposed to measure (Zikmund, 1984) . Reliability, on the other 
hand, is defined as "the degree to which measures are free from error 
and therefore yield consistent results" (Peter, 1979:6). Both 
validity and reliability were taken into account in this study.
One of the related approaches for establishing validity for this 
study is called "face or content validity" (Churchill, 1979; Zikmund,
1984). This approach refers to the "subjective agreement among 
professionals that a scale logically appears to accurately reflect 
what it purports to measure" (Zikmund, 1984: 253). As referred to by 
Churchill, if the sampling of items in the instrument is appropriate 
and the items "look right" then the instrument is said to have face 
or content validity. All the items in the instruments of this study 
were perused by Dr Geoff Southern and reviewed by some members of the
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management studies department at Glasgow Business School.In addition, 
the instruments were re-examined by 17 managers (GMs, PMs, SMs) of 
the Saudi business environment to ensure their validity for the 
Saudi environment as well as to clarify their ambiguity.
On the other hand, according to the above definition, measurement 
error is the major source of unreliability in measures. Since errors 
in a study of this type are caused by: inability of respondents to
communicate; failure to remember; and reluctance to report true data 
(Bedeian, 1984). All these causes of errors were considered when the 
questionnaires were prepared. All questions were made very clear to 
avoid ambiguity. During the field work, the researcher distributed 
the questionnaires in person and assured every manager (i.e., GMs, 
PMs, & SMs) that their answers will be considered highly confidential 
besides the fact that the data will be entirely processed by the 
computer. Moreover, replication of measurements is the essence of 
reliable research (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983; Zikmund, 1984). 
Eventhough manufacturing strategy is still a new field, the 
researcher was able to replicate some instruments with some 
modifications (see section 4.5).
Furthermore, after collecting the data, the instruments were examined 
by Cronbach's alpha coefficient which is a widely accepted index to 
indicate the reliability of the instruments and they were found to be 
reliable (see Chapter 6).
Translation of the questionnaires was another factor of reliability
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in this study. Because this study was conducted in Saudi Arabia where 
Arabic is the main language, it was of paramount importance that both 
versions of the questionnaires (i.e., Arabic & English) be 
identical. Therefore, three competent linguists were asked to 
translate the English version into Arabic. Then, the Arabic 
translations of the questionnaires were exchanged between the 
linguists to be checked for accuracy.
SUMMARY
This Chapter has discussed the research methodology for the present 
study. Three types of research design (experiment, case study & 
survey) accompanied with their advantages and disadvantages were 
presented. As a consequence, the survey design was found suitable 
for a study of this type. A self administered questionnaire as a 
major tool for data collection was selected in addition to interview 
and observation. Governmental documents played also a vital role in 
supplying primary data for this research.
The survey was conducted on the Saudi manufacturing private sector 
because it lacks a study of this kind in addition to the availability 
of several industries and the similarity of plants' capabilities. 
Four industries (Chemical, Metal, Food and Paper) were selected from 
the manufacturing private sector on the basis of highest invested 
capital, highest number of employees, and highest amount of sales. 
The number of plants for each industry was determined based on the 
actual existence of the plants in the industry. The plants were then 
selected from each subindustry using disproportional stratified
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sampling according to the highest paid up capital, highest in both 
paid up capital and number of employees, and highest number of 
employees. Through the above sampling procedures, a sample of 117 
plants was achieved during a three month period (May-July, 1989): 26 
food plants, 11 paper plants, 32 Chemical plants, and 48 Metal 
plants. The achieved sample constituted 73 per cent rate of 
response.
Three types of managers from the areas of strategy, production, and 
sales were invited to participate in the study. Accordingly, three 
types of questionnaires were designed. Their major variables are as 
follows: manufacturing task, environmental uncertainty, production
manager role in strategic decision making, competitive priorities, 
performance, and manufacturing infrastructure.
157
CHAPTER FIVE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents certain characteristics of the surveyed plants. 
These cover several important areas relevant to the study of
manufacturing strategy in Saudi Arabia. Most of the data presented
were furnished by general managers of the first three pages of 
questionnaire A, and a small portion of the data was provided by
production managers of questionnaire B (see Appendix A).
These areas are plant profiles, time of new product development, 
major technological changes in product, demand on main product, 
product combinations, nature of foreign and Saudi competition and 
finally sales to Saudi and foreign markets. The analysis of these 
areas are summarised in terms of means and frequency. Some of the 
findings are compared with other findings concerning the Saudi total 
industrial sectors and, in particular, the Saudi manufacturing 
private sector. Such comparisons indicate the manufacturing situation 
in Saudi Arabia and the level of improvement. Data in these areas 
will be used in later discussion and analysis in the subsequent 
Chapters.
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5.1 PLANT PROFILES
Plants which participated in this survey were classified by 
industrial sector, ownership, size of plant in terms of number of 
employees and amount of capital, and finally number of years in 
operation. The following subsections briefly describe each one of 
them.
5.1.1 Industrial Sector
Figure 5-1 shows the proportions of participants in the survey by 
industrial sector (achieved sample). The percentages of the plants 
in the achieved sample by industrial sector are approximately the 
same as in the planned sample (see Figure 4-1) . 117 plants in total
participated in the survey. The number of plants from - the food, 
paper, chemical, and metal private industries are 26 , 11 , 32 and 48 
respectively. The next two subsections analyse these plants in terms 
of type of manufacturing processes and capacity utilisation.
5.1.1.1 Type Of Manufacturing Processes
Figure 5-2 illustrates the type of manufacturing processes for all 
the participated plants in this survey. Of all types of processes, 
the continuous has the highest percentage in terms of number of 
plants and the assembly line has the lowest percentage. As expected, 
continuous processing is used in all plants in the food industry and 
in the majority of the plants in the chemical industry. For more 
details of type of manufacturing processes by industrial sector, see 
Table 5.1.1 in Appendix B.
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Figure 5-1: Achieved Sample by Industrial Sector
5.1.1.2 Capacity Utilisation
On a scale of 100 points, general managers (GMs) were asked to 
indicate the total actual capacity utilisation in their plants in 
terms of equipment, labour and resources. The average utilisation of 
the total capacity for the total sample (i.e., food, paper, chemical 
and metal industries) is 71.3 per cent, with a standard deviation 
(SD) of 18.3 [SD measures the spread of the data from the mean 
(Porkess, 1988)]. During the field work discussions most of the 
general managers pointed out that they were working below full 
capacity. In general, they attribute the problem of underutilisation 
to the following reasons:
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Figure 5-2: Distribution of Plants by type of process
1. Small markets in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. Low demand in purchasing from both government and private 
sectors due to the completion of the Kingdom infrastructure.
3. Overcapacity of plants in some industries, and in particular 
in some subsectors, which constitutes very hard domestic 
competition.
4. Foreign competition in Saudi markets, especially unfair 
competition.
5. Difficulties in exporting.
Almost sixty seven per cent of plants surveyed have indicated that
their capacity will increase in the next two years (1990 and 1991) .
In contrast, only about nine per cent of the plants will reduce
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their capacity/ and the remaining portion of the plants will continue 
to operate with the current level of capacity for the next two years. 
This trend clearly shows that more than half of the plants in this 
survey are not satisfied with the current level of capacity.
An estimate of capacity utilisation was established in 1986 by The 
Consulting Center for Finance and Investment (1988) . In this 
estimate, the average utilisation of capacity for the private sector 
(four industries of which are the focus of this study) was found to 
be 54.2 per cent and it was about the same for the total industrial 
sectors (55 per cent) [see Figure 3-2]. However, the average 
capacity utilisation for the other sectors exceeded the highest 
level: 100.8 per cent for Petromin refineries, and 104.6 per cent for 
SABIC industries. This does not mean that Petromin refineries as 
well as SABIC companies did not consider a capacity cushion but it 
may mean that they had not recently upgraded their licensed 
capacity. The average utilisation of capacity found in the present 
survey is higher than that reported by The Consulting Center for 
Finance and Investment (1988), because these are the largest plants 
in the surveyed industries and the situation may have improved.
Some of the reasons for underutilisation of capacity reported by The 
Consulting Center for Finance and Investment (1988) are almost 
similar to those reported here.
In dealing with future demand on their products, slightly over 60 per 
cent of the plants in the total sample responded that they usually
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increase their capacity ahead of time, and almost 40 per cent 
indicated they usually increase it at the time of the demand. Plants 
included in the 40 per cent category refer their decision concerning 
increasing the capacity at the time of the demand to the existence 
of unexpected fluctuations in demand (discussions with production 
managers).
For peak capacity requirements, eighty per cent of the plants of the 
total sample tend to "hire workers" and "schedule overtime" (almost 
in equal proportion) . Slightly over ten per cent pointed out that 
they were "far from the peak level". Moreover, small percentages of 
the plants mentioned that they use "subcontracting" and "increase the 
number of shifts" for peak capacity requirements. Conversely, for 
decreased capacity requirements, about a quarter of plants of the 
total sample tend to "lay off workers", and about a quarter "give 
annual vacation for employees". Almost 22 per cent indicated that 
they were "far from the decreased level of capacity", and the rest of 
the plants mentioned that they "reduce the number of work shifts" for 
decreased capacity requirements.
Among the individual industries, the food has the highest capacity 
utilisation in terms of equipment, labour and resources, whilst the 
chemical industry has the lowest capacity. The other two industries 
utilise about the same capacity (see Table 5.1.2 in Appendix B) . 
Again, of all industries the food has the highest percentage of 
plants (84.6 per cent) that are planning to increase the capacity for 
the next two years (1990 and 1991), and the chemical industry has the
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lowest percentage (50 per cent).
5.1.2 Ownership
Ownership of plants, by capital, is either wholly Saudi or joint 
venture. The main purposes of the joint venture projects (Saudi and 
foreign partners) are to share experience with and to learn from 
foreign partners who have proven themselves in the world of 
manufacturing (see Chapter 3) .
In this survey, almost 60 per cent of the total sample of the plants 
are wholly Saudi (see Table 5-1) . The percentage of the joint 
venture plants in this survey is twice that in the Saudi 
manufacturing private sector (see section 3.8.5.1) but has no effect 
on this study because comparisons of the wholly saudi and joint 
venture plants is not the objective of this research (see section 
4.4).
Of all industries in this survey, plants in the chemical industry 
show the highest percentage of joint venture projects (62.5 per 
cent), while those in the food industry show the lowest percentage 
(26.9 per cent). The chemical industry has the highest percentage of 
joint venture projects because it requires a high level of 
expertise. As for the food industry, the Joint venture plants are 
not as plentiful as in all other industries in the private 
manufacturing sector (see Table 3-6) . For more details about the 
wholly Saudi and joint venture plants of the single industries, see 
Table 5.1.3 in Appendix B.
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Table 5-1 Ownership of plants by capital in the total sample
No. Of
Type Of Plant Plants Per c.
Wholly Saudi 70 59.8
Joint Venture 47 40.2
Total 117 100
5.1.3 Size Of Plant
Because the Ministry of Industry and Electricity did not classify 
Plants in terms of size, the researcher examined the guide of "A List 
of Licensed Factories" (Ministry of Industry and Electricity, 1986b) 
and selected certain criteria to classify the surveyed plants into 
small, medium and large sizes according to number of employees and 
capital.
5.1.3.1 Size Of Plant In Terms Of Number Of Employees
As expected, the share of large size plants in terms of number of
employees is the highest and those in the small scale are the
lowest. This is achieved on the basis of the sampling selection
criteria where large size plants in terms of number of employees
were targeted following plants with high capital (see section 4.4).
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As can be seen from Table 5-2, 55.6 per cent of the surveyed plants
are large.
Over 50 per cent of the plants of each industry are large with the 
exception of the paper industry (see Table 5.2.1 in Appendix B). Most 
of these plants operate in the following activities: dairy products, 
soft drinks, plastic products, manufacture of structural metal 
products, and manufacture of fabricated metal products.
a) Employment
The total number of employees in the surveyed plants of the four 
manufacturing industries is 18961. This figure represents 15.4 per 
cent of the total labour in all industries of the manufacturing 
private sector (see Chapter 3) . Of the total number of employees 
in this survey, only 9 per cent are Saudi (Table 5-3) . This clearly 
shows the shortage of the Saudi employees in these important 
industries. This value is higher than that reported by The Consulting 
Center for Finance and Investment (1988) which stated that the 
private manufacturing sector had 7.5 per cent of Saudi workers. The 
increase in the Saudi labour percentage could reflect the 
government's scheme for the replacement of foreigners by Saudis in 
the private manufacturing sector (saudiisation). However, this slight 
increase indicates a very slow progress in this direction bearing in 
mind that the 9 per cent represent four industries only. In the 
total industrial sectors, Saudi labour reached only 12.8 per cent, 
but it is much higher in Petromin refineries, and in SABIC: 67.1 per
cent and 58.4 per cent respectively (see Figure 3-2).
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Table 5-2 : Distribution of 
employees in the total sample
plant size according to number of
Size
No. Of 
Plants Perc.
Small 20 17.1
Medium 32 27.3
Large 65 55.6
Total 117 100
small : 49 employees or less 
medium : 5 0 - 9 9  employees 
large : 100 employees and over
Of all industries, the metal industry hires the highest number of
employees of the total employment in this survey (46.2 per cent). On
the other hand, the paper industry hires the lowest number of
employees of the total employment (5.5 per cent) (see Table 5.2.2 in 
Appendix B).
In terms of Saudi employment, none of the four manufacturing 
industries exceeds 10 per cent. The highest percentage of saudi
employees is found in the metal industry (9.6 per cent), whereas the 
lowest is found in the paper industry (5.5 per cent) (see Table 5.2.2
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Table 5-3 :Distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi employees
in the total sample
Category Cases
No. Of 
Employees Perc.
Saudi 1712 9
Non - Saudi 17249 91
Total 117 18961 100
in Appendix B) •
In all plants surveyed, the average number of employees (Saudis &
Non-Saudis) is 162. The maximum number of employees hired by a plant 
is 1448 while the minimum number is 15. The high standard deviation 
(SD =184) reflects the inclusion of all sizes of plants in this 
sample.
Since Saudi employees constitute only nine per cent of the total 
employment, their existence in most plants is negligible not 
including their positions in top and middle management levels. The 
average number of Saudi employees in all the surveyed plants is 15, 
The maximum number of Saudi employees hired by a plant is 234, and in 
some plants Saudi employees are nonexistent. In most cases, the jobs 
taken by the Saudis in these plants are in the top management and at
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the administrative level (a head of department). In this survey, 
Saudi general managers constitute almost 4 0 per cent of the total 
general managers (observations during the field work). This result 
supports previous finding of which it was found that Saudi managers 
formed 43.1 per cent of total managers at the private manufacturing 
sector in 1986, and the percentage is slightly higher in the total 
industrial sectors for the same year (44.6 per cent).
Furthermore, the Saudi percentage of the total employment of each of 
the following in 1986 was : 15.5 per cent administrative, 4.6 per 
cent professional, and 4 per cent for each of skilled and unskilled 
workers (The Consulting Center for Finance and Investment, 1988) . 
This clearly means that the private manufacturing sector is highly 
dependent on foreign labour force, especially on professional and 
skilled workers. Corresponding figures for the total industrial 
sectors are a little bit higher: 25.5 per cent administrative, 11.5 
per cent professional, 11.2 per cent skilled workers, and 5.6 
unskilled workers. This increase is due to the high percentages 
recorded at Petromin refineries and SABIC companies.
The average number of employees (Saudi and Non-Saudi) in the food and 
metal industries is above the average of the total sample (Table 
5.2.3, Appendix B) as they employ the highest number of employees.
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5.1.3.2 Size Of Plant In Terms Of Capital
As with the number of employees, the share of large plants in terms 
of capital is the highest and those in the small size are the lowest. 
Table 5-4 displays that 44.8 per cent of the surveyed plants are 
large. Again, this is accomplished on the basis of the sampling 
selection criteria where large size plants in terms of capital are 
targeted first (see section 4.4).
All the individual industries with the exception of the paper 
industry have the highest percentage of plants in the large 
size category (see Table 5.2.4, Appendix B).
By combining the two factors (i.e., number of employees and capital), 
it was found that the biggest share of the surveyed plants is large.
a) Capital
The capital paid up in the surveyed plants of the four manufacturing 
industries is estimated at $ 637076 (all figures in thousand U.S 
dollars). Of all industries, the metal industry consumes the highest 
capital (35.2 per cent), followed by the food industry (29.2 per 
cent) and the paper industry consumes the lowest capital (6.9 
per cent).
The average amount of capital paid up of all plants surveyed is 
$5492 (SD = $6645.7) . The maximum amount of capital paid up is 
$42000, and the minimum is $266. Regarding single industries, the 
average amount of the capital paid up for the food and the chemical
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Table 5-4 : Distribution of plant size according to capital in the
total sample
Size
No. Of 
Plants Perc.
Small 29 25.0
Medium 35 30.2
Large 52 44. 8
Total 116 100
small : $ 1333 or less (in thousand U.S. dollars)
medium : over $1333 - $4000
large : over $4000
industries are above the average of the total sample ($7155.2 
and 5915 respectively) . In contrast, the average amount of the
capital paid up for the paper and the metal industries are below the 
average of the total sample ($3973 and $4666.1 respectively).
The capital paid up per employee in the total sample is $ 33.6 .The 
same ratio for the food, paper, chemical and metal industries are $
38.1, $ 42.2, $ 42.8 and $ 25.6 respectively. Thus, the capital paid
up per employee is the highest in the chemical indust y and the
lowest in the metal industry.
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The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) plays a major role in 
attracting Saudis to invest in the industrial sector by providing 
financial loans (see Chapter 3). In this survey, nearly 67 per cent 
of the plants obtained loans from SIDF. Of the plants which did use 
the SIDF facility are 80.8 per cent of the food, 81.8 per cent of 
the paper, 56.3 per cent of the chemical and 62.5 per cent of the 
metal.
5.1.4 Number Of Years In Operation
Table 5-5 shows that nearly 60 per cent of the plants in this survey 
have been in operation for 10 years or less, and only 10.3 per cent 
for 21 years or over. What is interesting here is that this study 
dealt with 12 out of the 55 plants that reported having over 20 years 
of operation in the survey conducted by The Consulting Center for 
Finance and Investment (1988).
When considering individual industries the metal and the food 
industries have the highest percentage of number of operational 
plants in the category of 6 to 10 years (52 per cent and 53.9 per 
cent respectively) (see Table 5.3.1 in Appendix B).
5.2 TIME OF NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Nearly 60 per cent of all plants surveyed reported an average time of 
three years or less for new product development. Examination of Table 
5-6 reveals that 25.6 per cent of the plants introduce new products 
in a period of six months or less. This figure represents the most 
outstanding plants in Saudi Arabia in terms of effort in research and
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Table 5-5 : Distribution of plants according to number of years in
operation in the total sample
Years In No. Of Cumulative
Operation Plants Perc. Perc.
3 - 5 15 12.8 12.8
6 - 1 0 53 45.3 58.1
11 - 20 37 31.6 89.7
21 - 35 12 10.3 100
Total 117 100
development (R & D). It is worth mentioning that the majority of the 
general managers pointed out that they rely heavily on their foreign 
partners in performing this task.
In contrast, 27.4 per cent of the plants did not introduce any new 
products hitherto.
Of all industries, the metal spends the longest period to develop new 
products whereas the paper industry spends the shortest period due to 
simplicity in design (see Table 5.4.1 in Appendix B).
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Table 5-6 : Average time for product development in the total sample
Time
No. Of 
Plants Perc.
Cumulative
Perc.
6 Months Or Less 30 25.6 25.6
Over 6 Months To 1 Year 20 17.1 42.7
2 Years 7 6.0 48.7
3 Years 11 9.4 58.1
Over 3 Years 17 14.5 72.6
Did not introduce
any Product 32 27.4 100
Total 117 100
5.3 MAJOR TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES IN PRODUCT
Of all plants surveyed, 40.1 per cent reported that their competitors 
offered the recent major technological changes in their product 
during the last four years, while only 23.1 per cent said it had been 
five years or over, and just under 10 per cent reported that their 
industries lack any technological changes (see Table 5-7). These 
findings reinforce the fact that the Saudi industries are young and 
equipped with the latest technology. Surprisingly, as much as 30 per 
cent of the participants mentioned that they were unaware of the last 
technological changes offered by competitors in the industries.
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Table 5-7 : Major technological changes in product offered by 
competitors in the total sample
Last major 
Technological 
Change Occurred
No. Of 
Plants Perc.
Cumulative 
Perc.
None 9 7.7 7.7
1 Year Ago 19 16.2 23.9
2 Years Ago 13 11.1 35.0
3 Years Ago 11 9.4 44.4
4 Years Ago 4 3.4 47.8
5 Years Or Over 27 23.1 70.9
Do Not Know 34 29.1 100
Total 117 100
Table 5-7 shows that there is a slow of technology introduction in
the period of three to four years, and an escalation of its
introduction in the period of one to two years. This recent
escalation could be a reaction to economic uncertainty, and if this
is the case it validates the proposal that technology is a means of 
beating uncertainty (Woodward, 1970; Miles et al.,1974; Gerwin, 
1982) . This finding also agrees with that reported by Swamidass 
(1983) and could mean that technology is updated every two years.
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The food and metal industries experience the shortest period of 
major technological changes in product. Both industries reported an 
average period of three and a half year ' since the last major 
technological changes. The paper industry, however, experiences the 
longest period since major technological changes (see Table 5.5.1 in 
Appendix B).
5.4 DEMAND ON MAIN PRODUCT
Nearly 70 per cent of all participating plants reported that they 
anticipate a growth in demand for their main product, and almost 7 
per cent expected a decline in 1990 and 1991 (see Table 5-8).
General managers expect between 3 and 99 per cent growth in demand 
with an average of 20.3 per cent. As a result, 67 per cent of all 
the plants surveyed are planning to increase capacity in 1990 and 
1991 (see section 5.1.1.2). On the other hand, declining demand is 
expected by fewer plants and ranges from 1 to 20 per cent, with an 
average of 7.3 per cent.
Plants which predict a growing demand on their major product are 
spread in the four industries. The food industry is expected to 
experience the highest growing demand on its main product (84.6 per 
cent) followed by the paper industry (72.7 per cent) (see Table
5.6.1 in Appendix B) .
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Table 5-8 : Demand on main product in the total sample
Demand On 
Product
No. Of 
Plants Perc.
Stable 29 24.8
Growing 80 68.4
Decline 8 6.8
Total 117 100
5.5 PRODUCT COMBINATIONS
Plants surveyed in the Saudi manufacturing private sector tend to 
have few product lines, a small number of products, and a small 
number of options. On average, on the total sample level, the plants 
surveyed have three product lines, four products per line, and three 
options per product (beyond the standard) as shown in Figure 5-3. The 
minimum reported number of product line is 1 by 9 plants, and the 
maximum is "16 or more" product lines also by 9 plants. The minimum 
reported number of products is 1 by 17 plants, and the maximum is 
"16 or more" products by 32 plants. Finally, the minimum reported 
number of options is zero by 25 plants, and the maximum is "16 or 
more" options by 22 plants.
This means that the plants tend to be small in terms of operations, 
and this partly reflects the focused factory concept (Skinner, 1974;
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Figure 5-3 : Distribution of Product Combinations in the Total Sample
11111,1985). The main idea behind "focusing" is to do few tasks and to 
do them well (see section 2.4.1). If the reported data is 
representative of the actual situation, a typical plant manages on 
the average 36 product combinations.
Figure 5-4 highlights the differences in product combinations 
(product lines, number of products and number of options) based on 
the means among the four manufacturing sectors. Plants in the 
chemical industry have the highest number of product lines as opposed 
to those in the food industry. As for number of products, again the 
chemical industry offers the highest variety of products per product 
line and its followed by the metal industry, while the paper 
industry offers the lowest number of products. Options in the
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Figure 5-4 : Distribution of Product Combinations by Industrial Sector
product beyond standard are the highest in the metal industry and 
the lowest in the food industry. This is because the food industry is 
highly standardised, whereas the metal industry is largely involved 
in customised product manufacture.
5.6 NATURE OF COMPETITION
Since Saudi market is accessible to all legal foreign products (i.e., 
according to islamic law) as indicated by the industrial policy (see 
section 3.8.1.2, no. 3), foreign and Saudi competition are very
important dimensions in the study of manufacturing strategy.
5.6.1 Foreign Competition And Market Share
On a scale of one to five, foreign competition for the total sample
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rated a score of 2.86 (1 = non-existent, 5 = very high competition). 
This suggests that plants in the surveyed industries experience 
little to moderate foreign competition in the home markets indicating 
that foreign competition is not as severe as people think. However, 
it could be harsh competition for some industry and especially for 
some subsectors. This survey result appears to be consistent with 
the average market share for foreign competition of 22.4 per cent in 
1988 at the Saudi markets reported by plants of the four 
manufacturing sectors. The maximum reported market share for foreign 
competition in the Saudi market for the same year was 75 per cent 
and the minimum was zero per cent.
The foreign market share in the Saudi market for 1988 was less than 
the previous years. In 1986, the average foreign market share was 30 
per cent, and it was 25.6 per cent in 1987, a reduction between 1986 
and 1988 of almost eight per cent. This can be attributed to the 
following factors: better quality Saudi products, consumers
nationalism in buying, and government intervention to prevent 
inferior foreign products from entering the Saudi market.
Figure 5-5 shows that the chemical industry perceives moderate to 
slightly high foreign competition which is the strongest of all 
industries. Conversely, the paper industry faces none to little 
foreign competition. The foreign market share in the food and metal 
industries between 1986 and 1988 is similar to the average that for 
the total sample. In contrast, the foreign market share in the 
chemical industry is far above the average of the total sample, and
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Figure 5-5 : Foreign and Saudi Competition by Industrial Sector
it is far below the average of the total sample in the paper industry 
during the same period (see Table 5.7.1 in Appendix B).
5.6.2 Saudi Competition
On the same scale used for "foreign competition", the Saudi 
competition for the total sample rated a score of 3.51. This 
indicates that Saudi competition among plants in the four industries 
is perceived to be between moderate and high. Generally, strong 
national competition indicates that these industries are free of
monopoly. As a result, only well managed plants will stay in the 
market.
Figure 5-5 shows that Saudi competition is perceived to be highest in
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the paper industry and lowest in the chemical industry. This is 
exactly the opposite of the situation in the foreign competition.
5.7 SALES TO SAUDI AND FOREIGN MARKETS
In response to the question "sales to Saudi and foreign markets",
73.5 per cent of the plants reported that they sell their products in 
both Saudi and foreign markets, and the rest deals with Saudi 
markets only (Figure 5-6). The Figure shows that the number of 
exporting plants is nearly three times that of the non-exporting 
plants.
The amount of sales to foreign markets in the total sample on 
average is almost 8 per cent. The maximum level of sales to foreign 
markets is 40 per cent, and the minimum is 1 per cent. This 
percentage of sales to foreign markets is very small and should be 
increased as the local markets are very small and some plants operate 
at under capacity.
This survey includes a large number of exporting plants: the number 
of exporting plants constitutes 44 per cent of all exporting plants 
in 1986. In that year, the number of exporting plants was 195 in the 
private manufacturing sector, and 208 plants in the total industrial 
sectors (The Consulting Center for Finance and Investment, 1988) . 
Exporting is a new and tough activity for Saudi plants and it 
involves many obstacles. The number of plants in this avenue (i.e., 
exporting) should be increased year after year to ease plants' 
difficulties concerning small home markets and underutilisation of
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Figure 5-6 : Distribution of Exporting and Non-exporting Plants
capacity. Some of the plants that do not export say it is because:
(i) products are not exportable due to their large size such as 
polystyrene packs.
(ii) products are widely manufactured outside the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.
(iii) products are not allowed to be exported due to an agreement 
with foreign partners who have joint venture projects with 
other plants in other countries with a similar agreement 
(Discussions with general managers during the field work).
Plants which market their products both nationally and 
internationally are scattered in all sectors. Of all industries, the 
food industry has the largest percentage of number of exporting 
plants and the paper industry has the lowest percentage (see Table
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5.8.1 in Appendix B).
The metal industry shows the highest amount of sales to foreign 
markets (9.9 per cent), and the paper industry shows the lowest (5.3 
per cent) (see Table 5.8.2 in Appendix B).
The above four industries export to nearly 30 countries: including 
Gulf, Arab, European, American, Far Eastern, and African countries 
(see Table 5.8.3 in Appendix B). Exporting is predominant to Gulf and 
Arab countries: Kuwait, United Arab Emeritus, and Bahrain. This
supports the finding made by The Consulting Center for Finance and 
Investment (1988). Of all industries, the metal industry is the most 
frequent exporter, followed by the chemical industry.
In response to the question on obstacles or problems facing
exporting, general managers were given seven items to rank. Table 5-9 
displays the ranking of the seven items based on means (the lower 
the mean, the greater difficulty presented). The survey reveals that 
"high transportation cost", "lack of information about exporting 
markets", and "uncompetitive price" are the primary obstacles to 
exporting. This means that price, which is one of the manufacturing 
competitive priorities is not perceived as currently being
favourable to the Saudi manufacturers. However, superior quality, 
which is one of the competitive priorities, is perceived highly by 
the Saudi plants (the highest mean). It is worth noting that The
Consulting Center for Finance and Investment (1988) has also found
that "lack of information about exporting markets" and
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Table 5-9 : Ranking of exporting obstacles in the total sample (in 
increasing order)
Items Cases Means SD
High Transportation Costs 114 2.55 1.97
Lack Of Information 110 2.73 2.25
Uncompetitive price 113 2.88 2.39
Duties On Imported Materials 111 3.46 2.53
Insufficient Subsidy 108 3.48 2.56
Lack Of Finances 112 3.65 2.47
Superior Quality 110 3.67 2.54
"uncompetitive price" were the biggest obstacles to
exporting. However, "high transportation costs" was one of the least 
mentioned exporting obstacles in the 1988 survey.
The ranked values of exporting obstacles for individual industries 
are slightly different from the ranking of the total sample. For 
instance, all industries with the exception of the metal industry 
ranked "high transportation costs" as the most difficult problem 
(number one ). The metal industry ranked it third out of the seven 
items (see Table 5.8.4 in Appendix B) . According to the metal 
industry, the most difficult problem in exporting is "lack of 
information". This item is ranked second or third in the other 
industries. "Uncompetitive price" was ranked second or third by all
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industries, clearly indicating that production cost is high in all 
industries.
SUMMARY
This Chapter discussed the major characteristics of the surveyed 
plants; namely, plant profiles, time of new product development, 
major technological changes in product, demand on main product, 
product combinations, nature of foreign and Saudi competition, and 
finally sales to Saudi and foreign markets. The analysis in this 
Chapter is presented in terms of means and frequencies.
In the study, 117 plants of four manufacturing industries have been 
surveyed. These are 26 food plants, 11 paper plants, 32 chemical 
plants, and 48 metal industry plants. Almost 60 per cent of the 
plants are wholly Saudi owned and the remaining are joint venture 
projects. The biggest proportion of the plants were found to be large 
size in terms of capital paid up and or number of employees. The 
total number of employees in the plants surveyed is 18961, of which 
only 1712 or 9 per cent are Saudis. This clearly indicates the 
paucity of the Saudis in these manufacturing industries. The average 
number of employees in all plants surveyed (Saudis & Non Saudis) is 
162. The maximum number of employees hired by a plant is 144 8, and 
the minimum number is 15. On average, plants in the total sample 
reported 71.3 per cent utilisation of capacity. Nearly 60 per cent of 
the plants surveyed has been in operation for 10 years or less, and 
only 10.3 per cent reported 21 to 35 years of operation. This figure 
indicates the age of the Saudi manufacturing plants as it was
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supported by The Consulting Center for Finance and Investment (1988). 
Almost 60 per cent of the plants reported that it took three years or 
less to develop new products, and 27.4 per cent mentioned that they 
did not introduce any new products hitherto. Of all plants surveyed, 
4 0.1 per cent reported that their competitors inspired the recent 
major technological changes in their product during the last four 
years, and just under 10 per cent reported that their industries did 
not introduce any technological changes.
Almost 70 per cent of the plants surveyed anticipate a growing 
demand on their main product while only 6.8 per cent expect a 
declining demand for the next two years (1990 and 1991). On average, 
plants in the total sample have three product lines, four products 
per line and three options per product beyond the standard. Plants 
experience little to moderate foreign competition, and the average 
market share for foreign competition in 1988 was 22.4 per cent which 
is the lowest of the last years. On the other hand, plants 
experience moderate to high Saudi competition. 73.5 per cent of the 
plants surveyed export to foreign markets and the rest serve 
domestic markets exclusively. The plants surveyed export to nearly 
30 countries, most of them of the Arab world with an average sales of 
8 per cent. The biggest exporting obstacles plants face are "high 
transportation cost", "lack of information about exporting markets", 
and "uncompetitive price".
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CHAPTER SIX 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents preliminary analysis of the data collected in 
support of the manufacturing strategy model which was developed in 
Chapter Two. The analysis is carried out in terms of frequency and 
means and covers manufacturing task, environmental uncertainty, the 
strategic role of the production manager, ranking the manufacturing 
areas, infrastructure programmes, the importance of the competitive 
priorities and the plants'performance.
Statistical techniques were used to find out if highly significant 
differences exist in two cases of ratings: between general and
production managers'ratings of the total sample; and among the four 
industries'rating of each type of managers. In the former case, the 
Mann - Whitney test and the T-test were used (for double accuracy) . 
In the latter case, Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) were employed.
Prior to the analysis of the manufacturing strategy model, it is 
important to find out the reliability of the instruments for this 
study.
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6.1 RELIABILITY TEST OF THE INSTRUMENTS
As mentioned in Chapter 4, all the instruments were examined by 
Cronbach's alpha which is a widely accepted index to indicate the 
reliability of the instruments (Peter, 1979). The alpha coefficient 
values range between zero and one. An alpha value of one means that 
random errors are totally inexistent. This coefficient as an internal 
consistency measure "assesses the homogeneity of a set of items."
Table 6-1 presents the values of alpha coefficient for the variables 
of this study which ranged from 0.68 to 0.94. Since 0.5 is the 
acceptable level for the Cronbach's alpha index (Nunnally, 1967), all 
alpha values indicate that the study's instruments are reliable. It 
is interesting to know that if alpha values did not reach the 
acceptable level of reliability, some of the items in the instrument 
with low inter-item correlation should be dropped to improve the 
reliability of the instruments as suggested by Churchill (1979).
6.2 MANUFACTURING TASK
As stated in Chapter 2, manufacturing task is viewed as a statement 
of goals (Skinner,1985), and "a consistent set of goals for 
manufacturing" (Leong et al., 1990:114). Therefore, similarity or 
analogy of views between general and production managers on 
manufacturing task items indicate clearly the pursued manufacturing 
strategy.
Table 6-2 summarises the fourteen manufacturing task items of the 
total sample rated on a five point scale by general managers (GMs),
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Table 6-1: Internal consistency coefficients of the manufacturing
strategy variables
Variables GMs PMs SMs
Manufacturing task 0.72 0.70 -
Importance of uncertainty 0.81 - -
Predictability of uncertainty 0.82 - -
Production manager's role 0.70 0.70 0.68
Competitive priorities 0.76 - -
Manufacturing areas 0.73 0.70 -
Performance (subjective data) 0.84 -• -
Performance (objective data) 0.74 - -
Manufacturing infrastructure - 0.94 -
where a higher rating indicates high importance and a lower rating 
indicates low importance. In other words, the higher the mean, the 
better the situation except for TGI & TG12. The Table shows that 
"consistent quality", "on-time delivery" and "high performance 
design" rated the highest means in descending order. This indicates 
that general managers place high emphasis on these tasks .
In contrast, "new product introduction", "research and development 
(R&D) effort", and "introducing new production processes" rated the 
lowest means by GMs in increasing order. This indicates that general 
managers devote little attention to these tasks.
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Table 6-2: Manufacturing task items of the total sample scored by
GMs
Item Cases Mean SD
TGI Price 117 2.87 1.06
TG2 High performance design 117 4.46 0.70
TG3 Consistent quality 117 4.84 0.37
TG4 New product introduction 117 2.33 1.65
TG5 Introducing new production
processes 117 2.74 1.64
TG6 Product range 117 3.53 1.26
TG7 Wide range of product features 117 3.48 1.24
TG8 Rapid changes in product 117 3.75 1.25
TG9 Volume flexibility 117 4.30 0.85
TG10 On - time delivery 117 4.83 0.47
TG11 After Sales service 117 4.25 0.52
TG12 Customised product 117 3.30 1.48
TG13 Fast delivery time 117 4.04 0.89
TGI 4 R & D effort 117 2.39 1.31
TG : denotes Task rated by General managers
1= low importance, 5= high importance except for TGI & TG12
Table 6-3 reports the responses of production managers (PMs) of the
total sample, rating the same manufacturing task items. The task
items which showed the highest means are very identical to those
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rated by GMs (see Table 6-2). Although the means of general managers' 
ratings are higher than those of production managers' ratings, their 
responses are very similar even in the ranking of items except for 
"after sales service" and "fast delivery time". Concerning these two 
items, general managers rated "after sales service" higher than "fast 
delivery time" and production managers did the opposite. This means 
that each manager is highly concerned about his responsibilities.
Swamidass (1983), in his survey, found that "high quality" and 
"customer service" rated the highest means out of eleven 
manufacturing tasks.
On the other hand, in this study PMs of the total sample place 
similar emphasis on the same task items which were rated the lowest 
means by general managers.
To a large extent, this finding is similar to Swamidass' finding 
(1983). Swamidass found that firms offer relatively lower emphasis on 
"custom manufacture", "R & D effort", and "introduction of new 
production processes". With the exception of "custom manufacture", 
generally most plants / firms in the world rely, to a certain extent, 
on leaders in the industry or their foreign partners to perform 
these tasks - as it is the case with some of the Saudi plants. This 
could be attributed to the fact that these tasks require expertise 
and huge funding to support intensive research. As for "custom 
manufacture", some firms follow standard manufacturing to facilitate 
their production function.
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Table 6-3 : Manufacturing task items of the total sample scored
by PMs
Items Cases Mean SD
TPl Price 116 3.03 0.99
TP2 High performance design 117 4.37 0.73
TP3 Consistent quality 117 4.68 0.58
TP4 New product introduction 117 1.48 1.16
TP5 Introducing new production
processes 117 2.51 1.67
TP 6 Product range 117 3.64 1.14
TP 7 Wide range of product features 117 3.60 1.11
TP 8 Rapid changes in product 117 3.86 1.05
TP 9 Volume flexibility 117 4 .27 0.75
TP10 On - time delivery 117 4.66 0.63
TP11 After sales service 117 4.16 0.67
TP12 Customised product 117 3.22 1.47
TP13 Fast delivery time 117 4.17 0.78
TP14 R & D effort 117 1.82 1.00
TP : denotes Task rated by Production managers
1= low importance, 5= high importance except for TGI & TG12
From the above analysis it becomes clear that price was not one of 
the lowest tasks that were rated by both general and production 
managers. This means that price was not one of the priorities for
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competition in the majority of the Saudi plants during 1987 and 1988.
It was stated earlier that general managers' ratings for
manufacturing tasks are higher than those of production managers. 
Thus, it is important to find out whether these differences are 
highly significant or not.
In order to determine these differences, the Mann- Whitney test and 
the T-test were used (Daniel and Terrell, 1983; Siegel and Castellan, 
1988). According to the criterion of significant level that was
established in Chapter 4, both tests showed highly significant 
differences between GMs and PMs ratings in two tasks. These are "new 
product introduction" and "R & D effort" (see Table 6.1.1 in Appendix 
C) . This means that the difference in ratings of these two tasks
are not fortuitous as in the case of the remaining tasks. Because
both tasks are a product of R&D, the difference could indicate that 
production managers are not aware of the ongoing research which is 
initiated under the guidance of the general managers.
To find out whether highly significant differences do exist among the 
four industries that were rated by GMs as well as by PMs , Kruskal 
Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were performed 
(Daniel and Terrell, 1983; Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Both 
techniques showed a highly significant difference for both general 
and production managers among the four industrial sectors in one task 
only; "product customisation" (see Table 6.1.2 in Appendix C) . An 
examination of Tables 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 (Appendix C) , shows a big
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difference in means for product customisation between the food 
industry on one hand and the rest of the industries on the other. 
This difference can be interpreted in light of the fact that the type 
of the food industry process is highly standardised whereas the 
other processes are subject to product customisation.
The analysis indicates that in 1987 and 1988 the surveyed plants' 
goals were to achieve "consistent quality", "on-time delivery", and 
"high performance design" to the best in the industry. In other 
words, high quality, in particular, and "on-time delivery" were the 
manufacturing strategies for all the surveyed plants in 1987 and 
1988. This finding will be supported later in Chapter Nine.
6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
According to the "open system" theory, organisations are affected by 
their external environments, and organisational theorists stress that 
"organisations must adapt to their environments if they are to 
remain viable" (Duncan, 1972:313). The study of environmental 
uncertainty is the focal point for a firm which tries to adapt to its 
environment. Managers should not only be able to indicate the 
importance of the factors that effect the process of strategic 
decision making but also to display their ability in predicting them.
Table 6-4 exhibits the responses of general managers of the total 
sample rating the importance of the sixteen items which can cause 
environmental uncertainty. On the five point scale used, the higher 
the mean, the greater the importance of the item (l=not important at
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all/ 5=extremely important).
It appears from this Table, that "customers for your products", "the 
situation of the Saudi economy", and "keeping up with new 
technological requirements" are the top three important 
considerations in strategic decision making (in decreasing order). 
The last item, "keeping up with new technological requirements", 
supports the claim that the Saudi plants are using the latest 
technology in manufacturing. They are acquiring the latest technology 
because of the availability of capital either from owners of plants 
or through loans from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. In fact, 
the Ministry of Industry and Electricity encourages manufacturers 
to take advantage of technology as much as possible in order to 
overcome the shortage of Saudi labour (discussions with GMs during 
the field work).
Swamidass (1983) found that chief executives considered "actual 
users of your firm's products" the most important item in strategic 
decision making. This obviously signifies that top managers consider 
highly this item in strategic decision making.
On the other hand, "competitors for your supply of raw materials and 
parts", "the suppliers of product parts", and "the suppliers of 
equipment" are the three least important considerations in strategic 
decision making (in increasing order).
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Table 6-4; importance of environmental uncertainty items of the
total sample as perceived by GMs
Items Cases Mean SD
11 The distributors of your products 117 3.57 1.29
12 Customers for your products 117 4.53 0.61
13 The suppliers of raw materials 117 3.78 1.11
14 The suppliers of equipment 117 3.19 1.13
15 The suppliers of product parts 117 2.94 1.25
16 The supply of labour 117 3.34 1.21
17 Competitors for your supply 
of raw materials and parts 117 2.92 1.29
18 Competitors for your customers 117 3.71 1.22
19 Government regulations
controlling your industry 117 3.75 1.17
110 The public attitudes toward 
your industry 117 3.80 1.17
111 The relationship with your 
supervising ministries and 
chambers of commerce & industry 117 3.99 0.99
112 Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry 
in the production of goods 117 4.27 0.82
113 Improving and developing new products 
by implementing new technological 
advances in the industry 117 3.82 1.00
114 Your source of financial resources 116 3.87 0.95
115 The situation of the Saudi economy 117 4.33 0.81
P16 The situation of the world economy 117 3.39 1.01
l=not important at all, 5=extremely important
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All the three previous items occurred with no surprise in this study. 
As for the suppliers of parts and equipment, some general managers 
expressed dissatisfaction at the request of the Ministry of Industry 
and Electricity to determine once at the beginning of each year 
their needs of product parts and equipment so they could be exempt of 
duties (discussions with GMs during the field work process). By being 
compelled to follow this procedure, GMs think that they are not 
getting full advantage of the industrial policy (see section
3.8.1.2, no. 5b). GMs consider this situation very annoying in terms 
of time and money, because the failure of large parts and big 
equipments is difficult to predict and in addition, a consumption of 
huge capital is involved. As for "competitors for your supply of raw 
materials and parts", Swamidass (1983) also found that managers gave 
this item the least important consideration in decision making. They 
conceive that their suppliers' competitors are not important because 
they are either unknown to them or their distribution is limited to 
specific regions.
Using Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), no 
significant differences were found in the importance of uncertainty 
items in the food, paper, chemical, and metal industries (see Tables
6.2.1 and 6.2.2 in Appendix C).
Table 6-5 presents the responses of general managers of the total 
sample rating the predictability of the sixteen items which can 
create environmental uncertainty. On the five point scale used, lower 
mean indicates higher uncertainty and higher mean indicates lower
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uncertainty (l=highly unpredictable, 5=highly predictable).
The Table shows that "your source of financial resources", "customers 
for your products", and "keeping up with new technology" are the most 
predictable items (in descending order). In contrast, "the situation 
of the world economy", "competitors for your supply of raw materials 
and parts", and "government regulations controlling your industry" 
are the least predicable items (in increasing order).
Some of the findings of this study with regard to uncertainty are 
similar to Swamidass' study (1983)- Both studies found that top 
managers could easily predict their source of financial resources, 
but they have high uncertainty in predicting government regulations 
controlling their industries.
Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) failed to 
show highly significant differences among the four industries with 
regard to the predictability items (see Tables 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 in 
Appendix C).
To summarise the results on environmental uncertainty GMs in Saudi 
plants pay great attention in strategic decision making to "customers 
for your product", and "keeping up with new technological 
requirements", and they have low uncertainty in predicting them. On 
the other hand, "competitors for your supply of raw materials and 
parts" is one of the least important considerations in decision 
making, yet it is included as one of the items that has high
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Table 6-5: Predictability of environmental uncertainty items of the 
total sample as perceived by GMs
Items Cases Mean SD
PI The distributors of your products 114 3.84 1.10
P2 Customers of your products 117 4.02 0.84
P3 The suppliers of raw materials 117 3.75 1.08
P4 The suppliers of equipment 117 3.54 1.16
P5 The suppliers of product parts 115 3.44 1.14
P6 The supply of labour 117 3.61 1.24
P7 Competitors for your supply of 
raw materials and parts 116 3.23 1.07
P8 Competitors for your customer 117 3.50 1.02
P9 Government regulations
controlling your industry 117 3.31 1.22
P10 The public attitudes toward 
your industry 117 3.49 1.01
Pll The relationship with your supervising 
ministries and chambers of commerce 
& industry 117 3.68 1.04
P12 Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry 
in the production of goods 117 4.00 0.91
P13 Improving and developing new products 
by implementing new technological 
advances in the industry 117 3.80 1.01
P14 Your source of financial resources 117 4.05 0.96
P15 The situation of the Saudi economy 117 3.52 0. 94
P16 The situation of the world economy 117 3.03 1.07
l=highly unpredictable, 5=highly predictable
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uncertainty.
6.4 THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE PRODUCTION MANAGER
The literature indicates that the role played by production managers 
in the formulation of corporate strategy is passive. Writers in the 
field call for production managers to adopt a proactive role (Hayes 
and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1985) , that is to be 
active participants in strategic decision making (see section 2.4.4).
Tables 6-6, 6-7 and 6-8 summarise the respective responses of
general, production, and sales managers of the total sample to the 
statements rating the role of the production manager in strategic 
decision making. On the five point scale used, the higher the mean, 
the greater the role of the production manager in strategic decision 
making.
On the basis of the means for the first five statements displayed in 
the three Tables, compared with the perceptions of general and sales 
managers, production managers perceived a greater role for themselves 
in strategic decision making. It is understandable that production 
managers would assess themselves higher in such a comparison and this 
replicates the finding's of Swamidass (1983).
Table 6-7 shows that PMs rated RPM3 the highest mean whereas GMs and 
SMs rated it the second and the third highest mean respectively 
(Tables 6-6 & 6-8). This means that some managers in these two areas, 
strategy and sales, disagree with the statement that production
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managers know exactly the most important competitive priorities for 
the manufacturing function.
Statement 4 (RPM4) was rated the lowest mean by both general and 
sales managers (see Tables 6-6 & 6-8) . This result indicates some 
disagreements between GMs and SMs in one side and PMs in the other. 
Almost 19 per cent of general managers and 14 per cent of sales 
managers disagree with the statement that production managers are 
responsible for initiating and modifying short and long term changes 
in manufacturing strategy (RPM4). On the other hand, only 3.5 per 
cent of production managers agree with this. This means that the 
majority of the production managers see themselves responsible for 
initiating some changes in manufacturing strategy while not every 
general and sales managers confirm this.
Agreements among all types of managers (strategy, production, and 
sales) on statement 5 (RPM5) - a new variable introduced in this 
study - seem to contradict the literature. Assuming that the 
production manager is a representative of the manufacturing function, 
the claim that production manager is given less equivalent role among 
the other functional managers (Skinner, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 
1984; Hill, 1985) has improved. In this study, 72 per cent of the 
production managers rated (RPM5) between agree and strongly agree 
that they possess an equivalent role as any functional managers. To 
verify RPM5 from the other side; i.e., general and sales managers 
gave almost 7 0 per cent each to the statement "PM is given an 
equivalent role among the functional managers".
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Table 6-6: Participation of production managers in strategic
decision making scored by GMs
Items Cases Mean SD
RPMl 117 3.97 0.72
RPM2 117 4.24 0.65
RPM3 117 4.10 0.81
RPM4 117 3.50 0.95
RPM5 117 3.71 0.82
RPM6 117 4.02 0.85
1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree
KEY TO STATEMENTS
RPM1 I feel that production manager(s) (PM) has a good understanding 
of how the divisional strategy is formed.
RPM2 I feel that PM is an integral part of the strategy 
formulation process, and that his inputs are part of the 
d i v i s i o n a l  ( o r  c o r p o r a t e )  s t r a t e g y .
RPM3 I feel that PM knows exactly what the most important 
competitive priorities are for our manufacturing function 
(e.g., low c o st, f a s t  d e l i v e r y ,  e t c . ) .
RPM4 PM is responsible for initiating and modifying short & 
l o n g  t e r m  c h a n g e s  in m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s t r a t e g y .
RPM5 PM is given an equivalent role or more among the functional 
managers in the formulation of corporate strategy.
RPM6 PM is one of the members who should be allowed to attend top 
management meetings.
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Table 6-7 : Participation of production managers in strategic
decision making scored by PMs
Items Cases Mean SD
RPMl 117 4.14 0.67
RPM2 117 4.13 0.74
RPM3 117 4.50 0.58
RPM4 117 3.97 0.80
RPM5 117 3.84 0.84
1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree
KEY TO STATEMENTS
RPMl I feel that I have a good understanding of how the 
divisional strategy is formed.
RPM2 I feel that I am an integral part of the strategy 
formulation process, and that my inputs are part of the 
divisional (or corporate) strategy.
RPM3 I feel I know exactly what the most important competitive 
priorities are for our manufacturing function (e.g., low 
c o s t ,  f a s t  d e l i v e r y ,  e t c . ) .
RPM4 I am responsible for initiating and modifying short & long 
term changes in manufacturing strategy.
RPM5 I am given an equivalent role or more among the functional 
managers in the formulation of corporate strategy.
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Table 6-8 : Participation of production managers in strategic
decision making scored by SMs
Items Cases Mean SD
RPMl 116 3.92 0.73
RPM2 116 3.96 0.74
RPM3 117 3.83 0.99
RPM4 117 3.56 0.91
RPM5 117 3.63 0.85
1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree
KEY TO STATEMENTS
RPMl I feel that production manager(s) (PM) has a good understanding 
of how the divisional strategy is formed.
RPM2 I feel that PM is an integral part of the strategy 
formulation process, and that his inputs are part of the 
divisional (or corporate) strategy.
RPM3 I feel that PM knows exactly what the most important 
competitive priorities are for our manufacturing function 
(e.g., low cost, f a s t  d e l i v e r y ,  e t c . ) .
RPM4 PM is responsible for initiating and modifying short & 
long term changes in manufacturing strategy.
RPM5 PM is given an equivalent role or more among the functional 
managers in the formulation of corporate strategy.
205
In response to statement 6 (RPM6), another new variable introduced 
in this study (see Table 6-6), general managers showed slightly over 
80 per cent agree or strongly agree that production managers attend 
top management meetings. This confirms that "the missing link" 
between the corporate level and the manufacturing function, as 
reported by Skinner (1969), no longer exists.
Furthermore, general and sales managers rated RPM2, "I feel that PM 
is an integral part of the strategy formulation process, and that his 
inputs are part of the divisional (corporate) strategy", the highest 
mean (see Tables 6-6 and 6-8), implying attendance of production
managers at top management meetings. Sharma (1987) found in his
study that manufacturing management is no longer segregated and that 
manufacturing managers do participate in the strategic planning 
process.
All in all, does this mean that production managers have a good 
understanding of how the divisional strategy is formed? (RPMl). This 
study found that almost 86 per cent, 87 per cent and 82 per cent of 
GMs, PMs and SMs respectively rated statement RPMl between agree and 
strongly agree. This means that general and sales managers support 
the claim that production managers have a high level of
understanding of the formulation of the divisional strategy.
Using Kruskal Wills and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
differences were found among the ratings of the three types of
managers, on the total sample level, in two statements. These are "I
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feel that PM knows exactly what the most important competitive 
priorities are for our manufacturing function (e.g. low cost, fast 
delivery, etc.)", (RPM3), and "PM is responsible for initiating and 
modifying short & long term changes in manufacturing strategy", 
(RPM4), (see Table 6.3.1 in Appendix C) . The significant difference 
in RPM3 clearly indicates that GMs and SMs do not agree with the 
statement that PMs know the most important competitive priorities. 
This finding may be related to the difference between qualifying and 
competitive priorities criteria in the market place (Hill, 1985). 
That is, general and sales managers have greater depth of knowledge 
about the situation in the market than that of the production 
managers (see section 2.4.1). In fact, most production managers 
admitted that they are unaware of the pricing policy when asked to 
rate price in the manufacturing task items. (PMs received some help 
from other managers when rating price). This supports the 
researcher's methodology in asking only general managers to rate the 
competitive priorities (see section 6.7). As for the response to 
statement RPM4, because PMs are not the most knowledgeable about the 
competitive priorities they are not responsible for "initiating and 
modifying short & long term changes in manufacturing strategy".
Using Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance no significant 
differences were found among the four industries of each type 
ratings (see Tables 6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 6.3.4 in Appendix C).
In summary, the findings of this study indicate that production 
managers have taken a proactive role in the formulation process of
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corporate strategy. More specifically they are given an equivalent 
role among the functional managers to participate in the formulation 
process of corporate strategy. However, general managers as well as 
sales managers still believe that production managers do not fully 
understand the most competitive priorities. As a result, PMs are not 
mainly responsible for initiating and modifying short and long term 
changes in manufacturing strategy.
6.5 RANKING THE MANUFACTURING AREAS
Making improvements in competitive priorities in order to compete 
better in the market place is the underlying theme of manufacturing 
strategy.
Tables 6-9 summarises the manufacturing areas, known as the 
competitive priorities, ranked according to needs for improvements by 
both general and production managers of the total sample.
In this Table, the lower the value of the mean the greater the need 
for improvements. Both managers specify "low price", which is a 
function of cost, as their first priority for improvement. By 
comparing the two means, it becomes clear that the mean for general 
managers is lower than that of the production managers. This suggests 
that general managers are more motivated than production managers to 
reduce cost in order to compete effectively. The second priority for 
improvement is "fast delivery". General and production managers 
admit that the time between receiving the orders to manufacture 
products and filling these orders is longer than what they wish.
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Table 6-9 : Ranking manufacturing areas according to needs for 
improvements by GMs and PMs of the total sample
Areas Cases*
GMs
Mean SD
PMs
Mean SD
Low price 117 3.46 2.27 3.67 2.17
Fast delivery 117 3.68 2.09 4.37 2.22
Rapid volume changes 
Meeting delivery time
117 4.07 2.28 4.52 2.33
promises 117 4.40 2.01 4.43 2.12
New products 
Rapid design changes
117 4.54 2.32 4.65 2.47
in product 117 4.94 2.31 4.80 2.20
High performance design 117 4.98 2.05 4.67 2.08
Consistent quality 117 5.80 2.12 5.72 2.00
*: the same number of cases for both GMs & PMs 
1= the most improvements, 8= the least improvements
Their desirability to provide "faster delivery" is a result of 
pressure from their customers, as some general managers put it 
"customers place their orders today and want them to be delivered 
yesterday" {discussions with GMs during the field work).
Managers disagree on the third priority for improvement. GMs wish to 
work on "rapid volume changes in the rate of production" to cope with
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the large fluctuations in demand, whereas PMs want to improve 
"meeting delivery time promises" (which could be eased as a result of 
improvements in fast delivery).
On the other hand, managers of both levels, strategy & production, 
absolutely agree on the areas of their manufacturing facilities 
strength. They ranked "consistent quality", "high performance 
design", and "rapid design changes in the product", the highest 
means. This indicates that Saudi plants generally produce top quality 
products thanks to high technology and high standard of raw materials 
(see Chapter 9 for details).
Introducing "new products" was ranked fifth among all the eight 
priorities by both managers and was perceived as being only 
moderately important. This supports earlier findings where 
"introducing new products" and "R&D" were found of the lowest three 
manufacturing tasks during 1987 and 1988 (see section 6.2). 
Furthermore, it was found that 27.4 per cent of the plants surveyed 
did not introduce any new products yet, and 14.5 per cent of the 
plants require over three years to develop new products (see Table
5-6) .
It is important to find out if highly significant differences exist 
between general and production managers on needed improvements of 
manufacturing areas. Both tests (i.e., Mann-Whitney test and T-test) 
indicated no significant differences between these two types of 
ranking (see Table 6.4.1 in Appendix C).
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Similarly, highly significant differences were not found, using 
Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), among the 
four industries of each type of ranking (i.e., GMs & PMs) (see Tables
6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 in Appendix C).
6.6 INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMMES
As mentioned in Chapter Two, infrastructure-programmes are the means 
to implement manufacturing strategy. Therefore, devoting all 
resources to certain priorities are indications of efforts to win 
them.
Table 6-10 summarises the 57 infrastructure-programmes (activities) 
rated on a five point scale by production managers of the total 
sample. On the five point scale used, the higher the mean, the 
greater the time, effort, and resources devoted to the programme for 
the next two years (1990 and 1991), and vice versa (the lower the 
mean, the lesser the time, effort, and resources devoted to that 
programme in the mentioned period).
On the basis of the mean values, the study reveals that the top ten 
programmes that received the highest attention in terms of time, 
effort, and resources for the next two years (1990 and 1991) are (in 
decreasing order):
1. Reducing production costs. (INFR 38)
2. Reducing raw materials costs. (INFR 18)
3. Developing a better master
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production schedule. (INFR 14)
4. Improving labour productivity. (INFR 46)
5. Product standardisation. (INFR 28)
6. Worker skills diversification. (INFR 39)
7. Developing high quality suppliers. (INFR 23)
8 Development or improvement of
quality control programmes. (INFR 47)
9. Reducing manufacturing lead time. (INFR 12)
10. Developing reliable timely
suppliers. (INFR 24)
The above list shows that the top two programmes to which most 
attention is devoted for the next two years are related to cost 
reduction. This gives a good indication about Saudi industries and 
their struggle with such programmes. In addition, the fourth, fifth 
and sixth programmes are sources of cost reduction. On the other 
hand, high attention was paid to the last four programmes in the
above list as they are credible tools to improve the total quality.
The master production schedule is considered as a total plan for all
these programmes.
Conversely, the five programmes that received the least attention 
with regard to time, effort, and resources for the same period are 
(in increasing order):
1. Developing facilities abroad for assembly of major product 
lines where most of the production factors are cheap.
INFR 57
2. Developing facilities abroad for manufacturing of components
for use in Saudi assembly plants where labours are cheap.
(INFR 56)
3. Finding reliable subcontractors.(INFR 9 )
4. Removal of inspectors. (INFR 45)
5. Automatic inspection. (INFR 34)
What is interesting here is that the first three programmes in the 
above list received the lowest attention in terms of resources 
devoted. This indicates that manufacturers in Saudi Arabia seem 
pleased with performing all tasks within their plants. However, what 
is surprising is that the last two programmes in this list indicate 
that the majority of the plants are short of these two types of 
inspection system. This contradicts somehow the claim that Saudi 
plants have high technology and high quality products.
As with the previous items, it is important to find out if highly 
significant differences in responses exist among the four 
manufacturing sectors. Using Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) , none of the sector responses on the 57 
infrastructure-programmes appeared to be highly significant according 
to the criterion of significant level that was established in Chapter
4. It should be mentioned that even if the significant level was at 
(.05), two programmes only, through both tests, would indicate high 
significant differences (see Tables 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 in Appendix C).
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Table 6-10 : Infrastructure programmes of the total sample rated by
PMs
Programmes Cases Mean SD
INVENTORY
INFRl Reducing inventory costs 116 3.30 0.91
INFR2 Increasing inventory turnover 113 3.40 0.90
INFR3 Reducing raw materials 
and component inventories 115 3.29 1.04
INFR4 Reducing work-in-process 
inventories 108 2.83 1.13
INFR5 Reducing finished goods 
inventories 115 3.42 1.19
INFR6 Achieving larger production 
lots
PLANNING
116 3.58 0.95
INFR7 Hiring and lay-off system 114 2.82 0.97
INFR8 Reducing idle time 116 3.64 0.99
INFR9 Finding reliable subcontractors 108 2.14 1.18
INFRl0 Stabilising workforce numbers 114 3.50 0.99
INFRl1 Designing policies to motivate 
employees to work as a team 116 3.60 0.96
INFRl2 Reducing lead time manufacturing 116 3.70 0.97
INFRl3 Increasing warehouse space 116 3.15 1.23
INFRl4
SCHEDULING / CONTROL
Developing a better master 
production schedule 117 3.95 0.79
INFRl5 Close order progress 
control system 116 3.60 1.02
INFRl6 Frequent work centre 
rescheduling capacity 117 3.46 0.97
INFRl7 Order status reporting system 116 3.46 0.76
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Table 6-10 (continued)
Programmes Cases Mean SD
PURCHASING
INFRl8 Reducing raw material costs 116 4.03 0.87
INFRl9 Obtaining long-term 
supply contracts 115 3.24 1.19
INFR20 Reducing the number of 
purchase orders per year 115 3.14 1.11
INFR21 Obtaining quantity 
discounts from suppliers 117 3.50 1.01
INFR22 Obtaining quantity 
discounts from shippers 116 3.25 1.14
INFR23 Developing high quality 
suppliers 117 3.76 1.02
INFR24 Developing reliable 
timely suppliers 117 3.69 1.01
INFR25 Diversifying suppliers 116 3.37 1.08
INFR26 Achieving independence 
from suppliers
PROCESS AND PRODUCT DESIGN
115 3.37 1.23
INFR27 Substitution of labour 
by machines 117 3.23 1.22
INFR28 Product standardisation 117 3.86 0.88
INFR29 Product modularisation 113 3.32 1.05
INFR30 Product simplification 113 3.37 1.02
INFR31 Substitution of inexpensive 
materials or components 113 3.20 1.19
INFR32 Mechanised materials handling 117 3.18 1.19
INFR33 Automation of production lines 117 3.38 1.24
INFR34 Automatic inspection 116 2.67 1.28
INFR35 Acquiring the latest 
in production equipment 115 3.64 1.25
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Table 6-10 (continued)
Programmes Cases Mean SD
PROCESS AND PRODUCT DESIGN
INFR36 Development of new features for 
older product lines 117 3.43 1.20
LABOUR / OUALITY
INFR37 Reducing direct labour costs 117 3.77 0.89
INFR38 Reducing production costs 117 4.09 0.81
INFR39 Worker skills diversification 117 3.84 0.88
INFR40 Worker training 117 3.59 0.89
INFR41 Worker specialisation 115 3.38 0.87
INFR42 Increasing worker responsibility 
in work planning 116 3.35 1.04
INFR43 Increasing worker control 
over work pace 117 3.48 0.98
INFR44 Inspectors training 114 3.03 1.11
INFR45 Removal of inspectors 113 2.40 1.21
INFR46 Improving labour productivity 117 3.91 0.73
INFR47 Development or improvement of 
quality control programmes 117 3.71 1.03
INFR48 Acquiring a Saudi quality mark 112 3.46 1.31
INFR49 Monetary incentive system 115 2.94 1.15
INFR50 Development or improvement of 
quality circle programmes
MISCELLANEOUS
114 3.21 1.09
INFR51 Development of high 
volume products 115 3.24 1.11
INFR52 Development of products with 
high economics of scale 115 3.33 1.13
INFR53 Development of products with 
high economics of scope 114 3.40 1.18
216
Table 6-10 (continued)
Programmes Cases Mean SD
MISCELLANEOUS
INFR54 Improving co-ordination among 
engineering, manufacturing,& 
marketing
FOREIGN PRODUCTION
117 3.52 0.78
INFR55 Developing reliable foreign 
suppliers for components, where 
materials are cheap 117 2.69 1.44
INFR56 Developing facilities abroad for 
manufacture of components for use 
in Saudi assembly plants 
where labours are cheap 117 1.81 1.28
INFR57 Developing facilities abroad for 
assembly of major product lines, 
where most of the production 
factors are cheap 117 1.57 1.11
1= no effort, 5= well above average effort
6.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES
Table 6-11 presents the responses of the general managers of the 
total sample rating the importance of the eight competitive 
priorities. On the five point scale used, the higher the mean the 
greater the importance of the priority.
The Table shows that "on-time delivery" was rated the most important 
priority, followed by "consistent quality", "fast delivery" and "high 
performance design". This means that the most important priorities 
for manufacturers in Saudi Arabia for the next two years (1990 and 
1991) are quality and delivery. This endorses the earlier findings
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where both types of quality and "on-time delivery" were rated the 
highest means out of fourteen manufacturing tasks for 1987 and 1988 
(see section 6.2). The above indicates that manufacturers in Saudi 
Arabia have already won quality and "on-time delivery" and they will 
continue winning them in addition to "fast delivery priority" for 
1990 and 1991. If these priorities continue to be accomplished, then 
this will be a major support for the "Sandcone model" and the 
Japanese cumulative model (see section 2.4.1 ), both of which suggest 
that the pursuit of competitive priorities must start with quality 
then challenge both quality and delivery.
On the other hand, "new product introduction" was rated the least 
important priority for the same period. It is surprising that 
manufacturers in Saudi Arabia have continued to neglect this priority 
which is an important dimension of product flexibility (see sections
6.2 and 6.5). From discussions with most of the general managers it 
appears that their efforts with regard to strategic directions (i.e., 
diversification patterns) are to concentrate on expanding market 
share in existing markets, and entering new markets with existing 
products. This inference is supported by the above finding. In other 
words, "developing new products" is not a potential strategic 
direction for either current or new markets.
Both Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
indicated no significant differences among the four manufacturing 
sectors which were rated by general managers (see Tables 6.6.1 and
6.6.2 in Appendix C).
218
Table 6-11: The importance of the competitive priorities of the
total sample rated by GMs
Items Cases Means SD
Low price 117 3.72 1.08
High performance design 117 4.03 0.91
Consistent quality 117 4.39 0.77
Rapid design changes in
the product 117 3.80 0.99
Rapid volume changes in the rate
of the production to handle
large fluctuations in demand 117 3.97 0.83
New products introduction 117 3.47 1.06
On - time delivery 117 4.54 0.60
Fast delivery 117 4.12 0.78
1= not important at all, 5= extremely important
6.8 PERFORMANCE
The following subsections present an approach to improve 
manufacturing performance (i.e., benchmarking) as well as measures of 
performance. The latter is discussed in the form of subjective and 
objective data.
6.8.1 Benchmarking
Benchmarking is an approach for improving performance. The approach
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requires comparing the company's performance against that of the 
best companies in the industry. Benchmarking is highly related to 
manufacturing strategy, because it improves the capabilities of the 
manufacturing function with respect to cost, quality, flexibility and 
delivery (see section 2.4.6).
In response to the question "making business visits to some of the 
high performance firms / plants", 73.5 per cent, GMs pointed out, do 
make business visits to such firms or plants to gain strength in 
specific issues of manufacturing. On the contrary, 26.5 per cent of 
the plants surveyed mentioned that they had not yet carried out any 
business visit.
It is a good sign that almost three-fourth of the plants in this 
sample have contacts with other plants whether in the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia or outside the nation. Such contacts ease their 
manufacturing problems or provide an answer to their inquiries and 
give them a broad view of their position in the world of 
manufacturing. The benchmarking approach is very helpful in 
establishing competitive priorities because it indicates the kind of 
operating capabilities that make a difference in the market place 
(Hayes et al., 1988).
On the individual industries, the largest number of business visits 
to high performance firms are made by the metal industry and the 
lowest number of these visits are made by the paper industry (see 
Table 6.7.1 in Appendix C).
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The issues that these plants target in their business visits are very 
broad. These are grouped under seven categories as shown in Figure
6-1, and are directly or indirectly related to enhancing competitive 
priorities. These seven categories of benchmarking's issues exist 
approximately in all industries except for the paper industry where 
attention is mainly devoted to the first three categories only.
Since making business visits is undoubtedly costly, the same question 
(i.e., making a business visit) is rephrased to see whether general 
managers set up some manufacturing issues of high performance plants 
as their plant's objectives. The percentage of the responses to this 
question is slightly higher than that about making business visits. 
General managers who set up some of their plant's objectives to catch 
up with high performance plants totaled to 75.8 per cent. On the 
other hand, those who set up their plant's objectives according to 
their own standards totaled to 24.2 per cent. The distribution of 
plants by industrial sector concerning this question is almost 
similar to the content of Table 6.7.1 in Appendix C.
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Figure 6-1 : Targeted issues in business visits for the total 
sample (in descending order)
Category Description
1. Technology - adopting latest Technology
2. Cost - reducing production costs
3. Quality - adopting high standard quality
- introducing new products
- finding new sources for raw materials
4. Process - adopting modern production methods
5. Training - training employees
6. Marketing - adopting modern marketing methods
- making marketing agreement
- exploring new exporting outlets
7. Miscellaneous:
a) exchange information & expertise
b) better use of resources
c) new business ventures
d) new management style in manufacturing
e) implement ideas
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6.8.2 Subjective Measures
This section presents the analysis of the data with respect to 
subjective financial measures, and chances of plants survival.
6.8.2.1 Subjective Financial Measures
The subjective measures of performance were requested as a 
precautionary step if objective data of performance measures were 
denied.
Table 6-12 shows three types of subjective measures of performance 
rated by general managers of the total sample for the period running 
from 1986 to 1988. These measures are growth in return on investment 
(GROI), growth in sales (GS), and growth in return on sales (GROS).
On the three point scale used, higher score of mean denotes better 
performance. According to this scale, the mean ratings for all the 
three performance measures ranged from 2.24 to 2.46. This indicates 
that the majority of the plants surveyed are within the industry 
average or above in terms of these three performance measures. It 
also appears from this Table that growth in sales (GS) for the Saudi 
plants is the highest compared to the other performance measures 
(GROI & GROS), and growth in return on investment (GROI) is the 
lowest. There are three possible explanations for this. First, these 
industries are young by nature, So they are more concerned with 
sales. Second, these industries generate small profits or sometimes 
reach only the break-even point on sales (during the field work, some 
GMs mentioned that they are selling at a point to cover their costs
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Table 6-12 : Subjective performance measures of the total sample
scored by GMs (1986-1988)
Items Cases Mean SD
GROI 115 2.24 0.60
GS 115 2.46 0.61
GROS 115 2.32 0.64
GROI : Average Annual Rate Of Growth In Return On Investment
GS : Average Annual Rate Of Growth In Sales
GROS : Average Annual Rate Of Growth in Return On Sales
1= below industry average, 3= above industry average
only). Finally, these industries could be continuously extending 
their capabilities and buying equipment which results in more 
capital employment and effects return on investment.
Unlike the rest of the industries, the majority of the plants in the 
chemical sector have the highest growth in return on investment, and 
the lowest growth in return on sales (see Table 6.7.2, Appendix C) . 
By comparing "growth in sales" and "growth in return on sales" for 
the chemical industry with the same measures of the total sample, one 
can conclude from Table 6.7.2 that these two measures for the 
chemical industry are below the average. Since some of the products 
in this industry are durable, which means low turnover and high
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profit margin, the below average measures for the chemical industry 
could be attributed to the following three reasons. First, low local 
market share as a result of strong foreign competition as mentioned 
in Chapter 5. Second, low sales volume (no exporting). Finally, high 
cost of expertise.
6.8.2.2 Chances Of Plants Survival
Another dimension of the Saudi plants performance is the chances of 
survival. Of all participating plants, over half of them (55.2 per 
cent) anticipated higher chances of survival today (May-July, 1989) 
as compared to three years ago. This means that in 1986 some plants 
were depressed by the situation of the Saudi economy resulting from a 
sharp decline in oil prices. Plants in all industries have shown 
between a fifty and nearly sixty per cent higher chance of survival 
today as compared to three years ago (see Table 6.7.3, Appendix C) .
On the other hand, 43.1 per cent of the plants reported that there 
had been no change in the situation and that the chances of survival 
today are the same as three years ago. This figure represents those 
plants that are either not affected by the decline of oil prices, or 
are still suffering from this situation and expect it to continue. In 
discussions, some general managers said that they do not consider the 
decrease in oil prices, which affects the purchasing power of the 
public and private sectors, to be the main reason for their present 
situation. They believe that their current situation is a consequence 
of the quick development of the country's infrastructure. That is, 
during the peak of the development period (1975-1979) , most plants
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were operating at almost full capacity to cover the demand of the 
market. One general manager, for example, pointed out that during 
one year of the peak period his plant generated a net profit equal to 
three times the plant's paid up capital. Therefore, general managers 
who want the same situation to continue as at the peak of the 
development period may be included in the pessimistic 43.1 per cent. 
In contrast, those who counted themselves in the optimistic 55.2 per 
cent, realised the current situation and made the preparations for 
other channels such as expanding their market share in the Kingdom 
and exploring new exporting outlets.
Plants which expect lower chances of survival are only under two per 
cent and represent two plants only: one in the chemical industry and 
the other in metal industry. This could be attributed to their 
struggles with competition, especially foreign competition.
Indeed, it is a sign of the strength of Saudi industries that 98 
per cent of the surveyed plants expected in 1989 the same or higher 
chances of survival as compared to three years ago, bearing in mind 
that their financial performance are on the industry average or above 
for 1986-1988.
6.8.3 Objective Performance Measures
As mentioned earlier, subjective measures of performance were 
requested in case objective data for the performance measures were 
declined. In fact, using subjective performance measures has paid off 
because only about fifty plants provided objective data. The
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percentages of responses of individual industries in providing 
objective data are: 26 per cent for the food industry, 6.4 per cent 
for the paper industry, 27.6 per cent for the chemical industry, and 
40 per cent for the metal industry. This decline is due to the 
sensitivity of the data. In the researcher's opinion, at least, 
the data of return on investment and return on sales were exaggerated 
by some plants.
Table 6-13 displays the three types of objective performance measures 
of the total sample for the period 1986-1988. The three types of 
performance measures are return on investment (ROI), sales, and 
return on sales (ROS). The Table shows the basic statistics of these 
measures. The mean for ROI ranged from 9 per cent to almost 12 per 
cent during the three years (1986-1988). Sales ranged from $13.7 
million to $17.5 million and ROS ranged from 10.6 per cent to 11.4 
per cent for the same period. As with the subjective measures, the 
growth rate of return on investment was the lowest amongst the three 
measures (see section 6.7.2.1).
Both types of performance measures (subjective and objective) were 
used intensively in testing four of the six hypotheses that will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven.
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Table 6-13 : Objective performance measures of the total
sample
Indicators Cases Mean SD Min. Max.
ROI 86 45 9.09 15.2 -41.8 56.0
ROI 87 46 11.1 9.57 -23.0 33.5
ROI 88 50 11.8 9.17 -0.20 40.0
Sales 86 53 13.7 M 23.6 M 451 T 146 M
Sales 87 53 16.0 M 26.5 M 553 T 154 M
Sales 88 53 17.5 M 30.9 M 601 T 196 M
ROS 86 43 10.6 13.7 -46.2 35.0
ROS 87 47 11.0 11.7 -27.4 39.0
ROS 88 49 11.4 7.7 -0.90 33.0
M: in millions (USA dollars)
T: in thousands (USA dollars)
SUMMARY
This Chapter focused on the analysis of the manufacturing strategy 
model that was developed in Chapter Two. This analysis is mainly 
presented in the form of means. It covers manufacturing tasks, 
environmental uncertainty, the strategic role of the production 
manager, ranking the manufacturing areas, infrastructure programmes, 
the importance of the competitive priorities and finally 
plants'performance. Prior to the analysis, a reliability test was
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performed to indicate the reliability of the instruments for this 
study. The test showed that the instruments are reliable. The 
findings of all aspects of this model are presented below.
The analysis revealed that "consistent quality", "on-time delivery" 
and "high performance design" received the highest attention out of 
fourteen manufacturing tasks by both general and production managers 
during 1987 and 1988. In contrast, "new product introduction", "R & D 
effort" and "introducing new production processes" received the 
lowest attention by both types of managers for the same period. This 
means that "high quality" and "on-time delivery" were the 
manufacturing strategies for all the plants surveyed in 1987 and 
1988.
Concerning environmental uncertainty, general managers pay very high 
attention to "customers for your product", "keeping up with new 
technological requirements" and "the situation of the Saudi economy" 
and have low uncertainty in predicting the first two items. On the 
other hand, the items "competitors for your supply of raw materials 
and parts", "the suppliers of product parts", and "the suppliers of 
equipment" are the three least important considerations in strategic 
decision making, yet the first item was reported as one of the items 
that has high uncertainty.
With respect to the role of the production managers, this study found 
that PMs were given an equivalent role among the functional managers 
to participate in the formulation process of corporate strategy
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(i.e., a proactive role). However, in spite of their proactive roles, 
general managers as well as sales managers still see that production 
managers do not fully understand the most important competitive 
priorities. And as a result, they are not mainly responsible for 
initiating and modifying changes in manufacturing strategy. This is 
probably due to the fact that production managers are not fully aware 
of the changes occurring in the market as suggested by Hill(1985).
In ranking the manufacturing areas (i.e., competitive priorities) 
according to their needs for improvements, both general and 
production managers indicated that they want the highest improvement 
in "low price" and "fast delivery" and the least in "quality" (both 
types) and "rapid design changes in product". This means that 
manufacturers in Saudi Arabia have already won quality and they are 
pursuing low price strategy.
Out of 57 infrastructure programmes rated by production managers, the 
highest ten programmes that received the highest attention in terms 
of time, effort, and resources for the next two years (1990 and 
1991) are related to cost reduction, quality and suppliers. In 
contrast, the lowest five programmes that were rated by the same 
managers for the same period are related to foreign production 
facilities and automatic inspection systems.
Concerning the importance of the competitive priorities, general 
managers indicated that both types of quality and delivery are the 
most important priorities presently and for the next two years (1990
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and 1991). "New product introduction" is the least important 
competitive priority possibly because this task requires expertise 
and huge funding in order to support intensive research. It is worth 
mentioning that manufacturers in Saudi Arabia rely heavily on their 
foreign partners to develop new products.
According to general managers, the performance of the Saudi plants is 
satisfactory. The majority of GMs use benchmarking to improve the 
capability of the manufacturing function and they expect higher 
chances of survival in the industrial sector. The Plants'financial 
performance was measured using subjective and objective data and was 
found to be satisfactory.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Chapter is to test all the six hypotheses which 
were described in Chapter Two. Each hypothesis was tested five times; 
first, on the total sample, then on the individual industries (food, 
paper, chemical and metal). Testing the same hypothesis in more than 
one industry shows similarities and dissimilarities among industries 
in finding significant relationships. On the other hand, testing the 
same hypothesis on the total sample provides the effect of a larger 
sample in finding significant relationships.
The results of the hypotheses testing were compared with those of 
Swamidass (1983) whose study covered 30 U.S.A. firms from machinery 
and machine tool industries.
The variables used in testing these hypotheses are (see Figure 2-8): 
o perceived environmental uncertainty 
o Manufacturing task
o Manufacturing infrastructure
o Production manager's role in strategic decision making
o Performance
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o Uncertainty-task congruence 
o Task-infrastructure congruence
o Task congruence
To test the hypotheses, measures were developed for each of the above 
variables as seen in Appendix D. Figure 7-1 displays the statistical 
tests that were used in testing the hypotheses (Cohen and Cohen, 
1983; Daniel and Terrell, 1983).
Figure 7-1: Statistical tests for testing the hypotheses
Hypotheses Type of test Significant level
HI Correlation (pearson)
H2 Same as HI
H3 T-test .10 or
H4 Same as H3 LESS
H5 Same as HI
H6 Same as HI
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7.1 HYPOTHESIS 1
A plant's manufacturing task correlates with its 
environmental uncertainty.
The test of this hypothesis was accomplished by Pearson correlation 
between the manufacturing task measure MTM, and the environmental 
uncertainty measure WPEU. The results of testing this hypothesis on 
the total sample then on the single industries are shown in Table
7-1.
On the total sample, there is a very significant relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and manufacturing task (p =.002). The 
correlation coefficient, r, shows it is a positive relationship with 
almost moderate strength (.6 or above indicates strong association). 
A similar response was found for all individual sectors except the 
food industry. The paper industry, in particular, indicates a very 
strong association between the concerned variables in spite of the 
few number of cases (r=.8). In the food industry, the researcher 
failed to come across a relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and manufacturing task. Therefore, it can be said that 
the food industry is different from the other industries (paper, 
chemical and metal), in perceiving environmental uncertainty.
Swamidass (1983) also found a significant relationship between these 
two variables. Surprisingly, it was a negative moderate correlation 
(see Table 7-1).
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Table 7-1: Relationship between the manufacturing task measure and 
the environmental uncertainty measure.
(Hypothesis 1)
Total Sample F P C M
r = 0.2716 ■0.0240 0.8096 0.3806 0.4550
n = 117 26 11 32 48
p = 0.002* 0.454** 0.001* 0.016* 0.001*
r = -0.327
n = 27 Swamidass
p = 0.048 (1983)
F: Food Industry C: Chemical Industry
P: Paper Industry M: Metal Industry
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant.
The fact that, three out of four industries show that there is a 
significant relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
manufacturing task clearly supports this hypothesis.
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7.2 HYPOTHESIS 2
A plant's manufacturing infrastructure correlates with its 
manufacturing task.
Similar to hypothesis one, this hypothesis was tested by Pearson 
correlation. The involved measures are the manufacturing 
infrastructure measure INFRA, and the manufacturing task measure MTM.
For the total sample, it was found that there is a significant 
relationship between a plant's manufacturing infrastructure and its 
manufacturing task as seen in Table 7-2.
When testing this hypothesis on the four individual sectors, two of 
them showed significant relationships. These are the chemical and 
the food industries. It is a highly significant relationship between 
these two measures in the chemical industry (p = .004), whereas it is 
barely significant at the .10 level in the food industry. In 
contrast, the value of the correlation coefficient (r) in the paper 
industry shows almost moderate correlation but it is not significant. 
That is, the value of p is out of the allowed level of significance, 
which indicates a non-existing linear relationship between 
manufacturing infrastructure and manufacturing task in this industry. 
In examining the metal industry, one can see that there is no 
relationship between the concerned measures (r = .0) and it would be 
worthless to justify the negative sign. It is noticeable that the 
type of process employed in the industry seems to have an effect in 
this respect. Both the chemical and the food industries use
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Table 7-2: Relationship between the manufacturing infrastructure 
measure and the manufacturing task measure.
(Hypothesis 2)
Total Sample F@ P@ C@ M@
r = 0.1963 0.2595 0.2877 0.4548 -0.0586
n = 117 26 11 32 48
p = 0.017* 0.100* 0.196** 0.004* 0.346**
r = 0.21 
n = 28 
p = 0.13
Swamidass
(1983)
@: For description see Table 7-1 in this Chapter
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
"continuous process" systems in their operations (see section 
5.1.1.1).
Swamidass (1983) failed to find a significant relationship between 
the manufacturing infrastructure measure and the manufacturing task 
measure in the 28 firms in the machinery and machine tool industries.
This hypothesis is clearly supported in two industries (chemical and 
food) in addition to the overall sample.
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7.3 HYPOTHESIS 3
The higher the congruence between environmental uncertainty 
and manufacturing task, the better the performance.
To test this hypothesis, plants were partitioned into three groups 
using the binary uncertainty-task congruence measure (UTCONG), as 
explained in Appendix D. The three groups are:
1. high congruence plants: above the mean in the UTCONG measure.
2. low congruence plants: below the mean in the UTCONG measure.
3. plants without congruence: high and low in the UTCONG measure.
Then the average of performance measures for the classified plants 
were compared using the "T-test". The purpose of using this 
statistical technique is to find out whether the difference, if any, 
in average of performance measures between the two groups is 
significant or not. Significant difference means better performance.
To achieve the testing of this hypothesis correctly, one should 
understand its meaning and identify the two required groups of the 
above classification. Two tests were performed for the classified 
groups:
Test 1: Comparing the performance of plants with uncertainty-task 
congruence (i.e., groups 1 & 2) with the performance of plants 
without uncertainty-task congruence (i.e., group 3 only).
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Test 2: Comparing the performance of high congruence plants (i.e., 
group 1) with the performance of low congruence plants (i.e., 
group 2).
Both tests were performed on the total sample then on the individual 
industries using subjective and objective measures.
7.3.1 Testing Hypothesis 3 With The Subjective Performance Measures
Table 7-3 exhibits comparison of subjective performance measures 
between plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence for the 
total sample. When comparing the performance of plants with 
uncertainty-task congruence (groups 1 & 2), with the performance for 
plants without uncertainty-task congruence (group 3 only), none of 
the three subjective measures showed any significant result (test 1). 
However, within the same sample, when comparing plants with high 
uncertainty-task congruence (group 1) with plants of low 
uncertainty-task congruence (group 2) in terms of performance (test 
2), two measures in addition to the composite showed significant 
difference in favour of high uncertainty-task congruence plants 
(Table 7-4). These measures are growth in return on investment 
(GROI), growth in sales (GS), and the composite measure. All these 
measures are significant at p = .06 or less.
To elaborate on this, one can see from Table 7-4 that the average of 
performance of all the subjective measures for plants with high 
uncertainty-task congruence are higher than the those for plants with 
low uncertainty-task congruence. This difference was found to be
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Table 7-3: Comparison of Subjective Performance Measures between
Plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence in the total 
sample
(Hypothesis 3: test 1)
Performance (Means)
Measure Plants with Plants without
congruence congruence
n (1&2) n (3) Significance
Composite 65 2.37 50 2.30 0.49**
GROI 65 2.25 50 2.22 0.82**
GS 65 2.51 50 2.40 0.35**
GROS 65 2.35 50 2.28 0.55**
**: Not statistically significant 
Composite: averaging GROI, GS & GROS 
GROI: growth in return on investment
GS : growth in Sales
GROS: growth in return on Sales
statistically significant for most of the performance measures.
Both tests (1&2) in terms of subjective performance were performed on 
the individual industries to see whether the results of each test 
(i.e., significant or not) paralleled its counterpart in the total 
sample.
The results of test one (comparing the performance of plants with 
uncertainty-task congruence with the performance of plants without 
uncertainty-task congruence) were found to be statistically
240
Table 7-4: Comparison of subjective performance measures between 
plants with high and low uncertainty-task congruence in the total 
sample
(Hypothesis 3: test 2)
Measure
n
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
(1)
(Means) 
Plants with 
congruence 
n
low
(2) Significance
Composite 34 2.50 31 2.23 0.04*
GROI 34 2.38 31 2.10 0.06*
GS 34 2.65 31 2.35 0.05*
GROS 34 2.47 31 2.23 0.12**
For measures description, see Table 7-3
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
insignificant for all individual industries (Tables 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 
in Appendix D).
In contrast, as seen in Table 7-6 the results of test two (comparing 
the performance of high congruence plants with the performance of low 
congruence plants), were found to be statistically significant in 
some measures in the chemical and metal industries. The food and the 
paper industries did not show statistical significant results in 
any measure, although almost all the figures of the average 
performance of plants with high uncertainty-task congruence are 
higher than those of low uncertainty-task congruence (Table 7-5). Of 
all measures, the following ones were found to be statistically 
significant: (i) growth in sales (GS) in the chemical industry; and
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Table 7-5: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with high and low uncertainty-task congruence in the food and
paper industries
(Hypothesis 3: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means) 
Plants with 
congruence 
n
low
(2) Significance
Food
Composite 8 2.47 5 2.42 0. 87**
GROI 8 2.20 5 2.13 0.81**
GS 8 2.80 5 2.63 0.60**
GROS 8 2.40 5 2.50 0.78**
Paper
Composite 6 2.39 3 2.11 0.26**
GROI 6 2.33 3 2.00 0.18**
GS 6 2.50 3 2.33 0.70**
GROS 6 2.33 3 2.00 0.18**
For measures description, see Table 7-3
**: Not statistically significant
(ii) growth in return on investment (GROI), and growth in sales (GS) 
besides the composite measure in the metal industry. All the 
previous significant relationships were found in favour of plants 
with high uncertainty-task congruence.
The findings of tests one and two using subjective measures can be 
classified as insignificant results and significant results 
respectively. The findings of test one whether in the total sample or
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Table 7-6: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with high and low uncertainty-task congruence in the chemical
and metal industries
(Hypothesis 3: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means) 
Plants with 
congruence 
n
low
(2) Significance
Chemical
Composite 7 2.38 8 1.96 0.22**
GROI 7 2.43 8 2.13 0.34**
GS 7 2.43 8 1.75 0.10*
GROS 7 2.29 8 2.00 0.48**
Metal
Composite 16 2.48 13 2.13 0.06*
GROI 16 2.31 13 1.92 0.10*
GS 16 2.69 13 2.31 0.07*
GROS 16 2.44 13 2.15 0.23**
For measures description , see Table 7-3
*: Statistically significant 
**: Not statistically significant
in the individual sectors were statistically insignificant. On the 
other hand, some of the findings of test two were found to be 
statistically significant in the total sample and in the majority of 
the single industries. As a result, hypothesis three is supported in 
only test two in GROI, and GS besides the composite measure. The 
next section will test hypothesis three with regard to the objective 
performance measures.
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7.3.2 Testing Hypothesis 3 With The Objective Performance Measures
As reported in Chapter Six, most of the plants failed to provide the 
requested objective data. Therefore, this had an effect on the 
analysis of all industries, especially those with few cases. With the 
available objective data, the hypothesis was tested using tests one 
and two as with the subjective data.
Test one failed to find significant results in any of the objective 
measures in the total sample as seen in Table 7-7. However, within 
the same sample, test two showed significant results in two types of 
the objective measures. These are return on investment (ROI) for 
1986, and the amount of sales for 1986 & 1987 as seen in Table 7-8. 
All the significant results are in favour of plants with high 
uncertainty-task congruence.
On the individual industries test one, using objective data, failed 
to find significant results in any measure in all industries (see 
Tables 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 in Appendix D).
However, test two indicated significant results in some objective 
measures of all industries except the paper industry as can be seen 
from Tables 7-9 and 7-10. The absence of significant results of all 
objective measures in the paper sector may be due to the very small 
number of cases, between 2 and 3, reported in terms of data as 
mentioned earlier. In the remaining industries, significant results 
were scattered in all measures. Of all measures, the following were 
found to be statistically significant: (i) return on investment (ROI)
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Table 7-7: Comparison of objective performance measures between 
plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence in the total
sample
(Hypothesis 3: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence 
n (3) Significance
ROI 86 26 8.40 19 10.04 0 .70**
ROI 87 26 11.09 20 11.07 0.99**
ROI 88 28 13.30 22 9.96 0.18**
Sales 86 28 14793499 25 12579927 0.82**
Sales 87 28 18332910 25 13400000 0.71**
Sales 88 28 20173000 25 14763527 0.93**
ROS 86 24 11.42 19 9.47 0.66**
ROS 87 27 11.06 20 10.83 0.95**
ROS 88 27 12.43 22 10.06 0.29**
For measures description, see section 6 
**: Not statistically significant
.8.3 (Chapter 6) .
Table 7-8: 
plants with 
sample
Comparison of objective performance measures between 
high and low uncertainty-task congruence in the total
(Hypothesis 3: test 2)
Performance (Means)
Measure Plants with high Plants with low
congruence congruence
n (1) n (2) Significance
ROI 86 14 14.60 12 3.09 0.10*
ROI 87 15 11.75 11 10.20 0.69**
ROI 8 8 15 16.11 13 10.05 0.12**
Sales 86 16 15493000 12 13445733 0.05*
Sales 87 16 18974800 12 16097540 0.06*
Sales 88 16 19580000 12 17491000 0.45**
ROS 86 12 10.19 12 12.66 0.59**
ROS 87 15 10.45 12 11. 83 0.74**
ROS 88 15 13.58 12 11.00 0.38**
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
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for 1988, and sales for 1986 and 1987 in the food industry; (ii) 
return on investment (ROI) for 1987 and 1988, sales for 1986, and 
return on sales (ROS) for 1988 in the chemical industry; and (iii) 
return on investment (ROI) for 1986 and sales for 1987 in the metal 
industry. Again as with the subjective performance measures, all the 
preceding significant results are in favour of plants with high 
uncertainty-task congruence.
Using the objective performance measures, the findings of test one 
were found to be statistically insignificant and the findings of test 
two were found to be statistically significant. Thus, the findings 
of each test in terms of insignificant or significant results are the 
same in the subjective and objective performance measures.
In approaching this hypothesis, Swamidass (1983) divided the firms 
into two groups only, those with congruence and those without. As 
seen in Table 7-11, none of his results for the three subjective 
measures were significant. Comments on the approach of this 
hypothesis as well as hypothesis four will be mentioned in section 
7.4.3
This hypothesis is supported in all industries but the paper using 
subjective and objective performance measures.
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Table 7-9: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with high and low uncertainty-task congruence in the food and
paper industries
(Hypothesis 3: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means)
Plants with low 
congruence 
n (2) Significance
Food
ROI 86 6 16.75 2 5.84 0.70**
ROI 87 5 11.73 3 6.33 0.65**
ROI 88 5 18.54 3 5.31 0.08*
Sales 86 5 20753221 4 16411000 0.03*
Sales 87 5 22873453 4 19733425 0.04*
Sales 88 5 23087582 4 22997524 0.68**
ROS 86 6 15.90 2 6.32 0.98**
ROS 87 5 16.8 3 10.20 0.72**
ROS 88 5 10.78 3 9.63 0.87**
Paper
ROI 86 2 14.55 0 - -
ROI 87 2 11.30 0 - -
ROI 88 2 11.05 1 5.00 0.63**
Sales 86 2 9440902 0 - -
Sales 87 2 12057900 0 - -
Sales 88 2 12977000 0 - -
ROS 86 3 14.3 0 - -
ROS 87 3 14.37 0 - -
ROS 88 3 16.60 0
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
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Table 7-10: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with high and low uncertainty-task congruence in the chemical
and metal industries
(Hypothesis 3: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means)
Plants with low 
congruence 
n (2) Significance
Chemical
ROI 86 5 19.14 3 22.63 0.85**
ROI 87 5 18.48 3 7.57 0.08*
ROI 88 5 19.18 2 0.95 0.05*
Sales 86 4 11653490 2 6310222 0.04*
Sales 87 4 12257000 2 6011353 0.12**
Sales 88 4 10211343 2 7092045 0.29**
ROS 86 5 19.92 3 11.43 0.13**
ROS 87 5 19.12 3 11.43 0.13**
ROS 88 5 19.12 2 5.50 0.07*
Metal
ROI 86 7 11.55 6 -5.69 0.07*
ROI 87 8 11.28 5 11.16 0.98**
ROI 88 9 14.62 6 11.70 0.57**
Sales 86 10 13778123 6 11572483 0.53**
Sales 87 10 16335075 6 10827511 0.05*
Sales 88 10 17887410 6 13521117 0.53**
ROS 86 6 14.02 5 5.00 0.25**
ROS 87 8 12.12 5 7.90 0.27**
ROS 88 9 11.15 6 10.30 0.83**
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
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Table 7-11: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence 
(Hypothesis 3: Swamidass, 1983)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence Significance
Composite 3.82 3.80 0.98**
GROI 3.53 3.83 0.78**
GS 4.40 3.58 0.34**
GROS
n = 15
3.50
n = 12
4.00 0.61**
**: Not statistically significant
7.4 HYPOTHESIS 4
The higher the congruence between manufacturing task and 
manufacturing infrastructure, the better the performance.
The test of this hypothesis was accomplished in the same way of 
testing hypothesis three. That is, plants were divided into three 
groups using the binary task-infrastructure congruence measure 
(TICONG) as described in Appendix D. The three groups are:
1. high congruence plants: above the mean in the TICONG measure.
2. low congruence plants: below the mean in the TICONG measure.
3. plants without congruence: high and low in the TICONG measure.
Then, as with the previous hypothesis, the average of performance 
measures for the categorised plants were compared using the t-test.
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To ensure the correct testing of this hypothesis, two tests were 
performed for the categorised groups as below:
Test 1: Comparing the performance of plants with task-infrastructure 
congruence (i.e., groups 1 & 2) with the performance of plants 
without task-infrastructure congruence (i.e., group 3).
Test 2: Comparing the performance of high congruence plants (i.e., 
group 1) with the performance of low congruence plants (i.e., 
group 2).
As with hypothesis three, tests one and two were performed on the 
total sample then on the single industries using subjective and 
objective measures.
7.4.1 Testing Hypothesis 4 With The Subjective Performance Measures
Tables 7-12 and 7-13 display the results of tests one and two 
respectively on the total sample. The comparison of the performance 
of plants with task-infrastructure congruence (group 1 & 2) with that 
of plants without task-infrastructure congruence (group 3) showed 
insignificant results in all the subjective measures (test 1) . Test 
two (comparing plants with high task-infrastructure congruence (group 
1) with low task-infrastructure congruence plants (group 2) in terms 
of performance), showed, surprisingly, insignificant results.
Again, using subjective data, both tests were performed on the single 
sector level. For all single sectors, the results of test one
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Table 7-12: Comparison of subjective performance measures between 
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence in the total 
sample
(Hypothesis 4: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence 
n (3) significance
Composite 64 2.40 51 2.26 0.17**
GROI 64 2.31 51 2.14 0.12**
GS 64 2.50 51 2.41 0.44**
GROS 64 2.39 51 2.23 0.19**
For measures description, see Table 
**: Not statistically significant.
7-3
Table 7-13: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with high and low task-infrastructure congruence in the total
sample
(Hypothesis 4: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means)
Plants with low 
congruence 
n (2) significance
Composite 36 2.43 28 2.37 0.68**
GROI 36 2.36 28 2.25 0.47**
GS 36 2.53 28 2.46 0.68**
GROS 36 2.38 28 2.39 0.98**
For measures description, see Table 7-3 
**: Not statistically significant.
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(comparing the performance of plants with task-infrastructure 
congruence with that of plants without task-infrastructure 
congruence), were statistically not significant (Tables 7.2.1 and
7.2.2 in Appendix D).
As seen from Tables 7-14 and 7-15 of all individual industries, only 
the metal industry showed a significant result when performing test 
two (comparing the performance of high congruence plants with the 
performance of low congruence plants). The significant result was 
found in the measure growth in sales (GS) . The significance measure 
came in favour of plants with high task-infrastructure congruence.
While test one of hypothesis four failed to find significant results 
in the total sample as well as in the individual sectors, test two 
showed significant result in the metal industry only. Therefore, 
hypothesis four is supported in the metal industry only, using test 
two, in the GS measure.
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Table 7-14: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with high and low task-infrastructure congruence in the food
and paper industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means)
Plants with low 
congruence 
n (2) significance
Food
Composite 6 2.39 6 2.33 0.88**
GROI 6 2.17 6 2.11 0.73**
GS 6 2.67 6 2.50 0.17**
GROS 6 2.30 6 2.33 0.68**
Paper
Composite 3 2.35 3 2.29 0.57**
GROI 3 2.31 3 2.29 0.33**
GS 3 2.40 3 2.27 0.71**
GROS 3 2.35 3 2.30 0.68**
For measures description, see Table 7-3 
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7-15: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with high and low task-infrastructure congruence in the
chemical and metal industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means)
Plants with low 
congruence 
n (2) significance
Chemical
Composite 9 2.29 12 2.22 0.82**
GROI 9 2.33 12 2.25 0.81**
GS 9 2.33 12. 2.25 0.80**
GROS 9 2.22 12 2.17 0.88**
Metal
Composite 16 2.52 10 2.33 0.36**
GROI 16 2.38 10 2.20 0.50**
GS 16 2.75 10 2.40 0.09*
GROS 16 2.44 10 2.40 0.89**
For measures description, see Table 7-3 
**: Not statistically significant 
*: Statistically significant
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7.4.2 Testing Hypothesis 4 With The Objective Performance Measures
Test one in this hypothesis revealed insignificant results in all the 
objective measures of the total sample as can be seen from Table 
7-16. On the contrary, within the same sample, test two showed 
significant results in favour of plants with high task-infrastructure 
congruence in the sales measure for the two consecutive years; 1986 
and 1987 (see Table 7-17).
Again, as with the results of test one on the individual sectors with 
the subjective data, the test, using objective data, failed to come 
across significant results in any measure in all industries (Tables
7.2.3 and 7.2.4 in Appendix D).
When applying test two on the single industries only the chemical 
industry showed that the sales measure for 1987 is significant 
(Tables 7-18 and 7-19) . As with the previous sectors, the 
significance in the chemical industry came in favour of plants with 
high task-infrastructure congruence.
As with hypothesis 3, Swamidass in his work divided the firms into 
two groups only; with congruence and without. None of his results 
were significant as can be seen from Table 7-20.
Therefore, this hypothesis is supported in both the subjective and 
objective performance measures.
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Table 7-16: Comparison of objective performance measures between 
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence in the total
sample
(Hypothesis 4: test 1)
Performance (Means)
Measure Plants with Plants without
congruence congruence
n (1&2) n (3) Significance
ROI 8 6 30 7.33 15 12.6 0.18**
ROI 87 30 10.8 16 11.7 0.72**
ROI 88 32 12.8 18 10.2 0.27**
Sales 86 34 16788586 19 11500710 0.63**
Sales 87 34 19201733 19 12240331 0.61**
Sales 88 34 21922532 19 13112470 0.78**
ROS 86 28 7.5 15 16.3 0.12**
ROS 87 30 9.41 17 13.7 0.19**
ROS 88 30 11.4 19 11.3 0.98**
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6)
**: Not statistically significant
Table 7-17: 
plants with 
sample
Comparison of objective performance measures between 
high and low task-infrastructure congruence in the total
(Hypothesis 4: test 2)
Performance (Means)
Measure Plants with high Plants with low
congruence congruence
n (1) n (2) Significance
ROI 86 17 10.63 13 4.85 0.36**
ROI 87 17 12.6 13 8.37 0.25**
ROI 88 18 15.1 14 9.7 0.12**
Sales 86 20 23650441 14 7304977 0.10*
Sales 87 20 32865443 14 8071997 0.08*
Sales 88 20 32865443 14 9989587 0.16**
ROS 86 15 9.38 13 5.90 0.53**
ROS 87 16 10.4 14 8.57 0.53**
ROS 88 17 12.42 13 9.9 0.38**
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
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Table 7-18: Comparison o£ objective performance measures between
plants with high and low task-infrastructure congruence in the food
and paper industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 2)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with high 
congruence 
n (1)
(Means)
Plants with low 
congruence
n (2) Significance
Food
ROI 86 3 3.50 1 1.90 0.89**
ROI 87 4 4.50 1 0.95 0.71**
ROI 88 4 9.75 1 3.60 0.16**
Sales 86 4 18964095 1 15599733 0.19**
Sales 87 4 23619882 1 1606933 0.18**
Sales 88 4 27544390 1 1965490 0.19**
ROS 86 3 4.60 1 3.50 0.91**
ROS 87 4 4.80 1 0.40 0.64**
ROS 88 4 10.1 1 4.1 0.12**
Paper
ROI 86 1 0.50 0 - -
ROI 87 1 0.50 0 - -
ROI 88 1 1.80 2 11.50 0.38**
Sales 86 1 3681804 1 5333000 0.61**
Sales 87 1 3483999 1 6400000 0.58**
Sales 88 1 4251288 1 13329257 0.49**
ROS 86 1 1.80 - - -
ROS 87 1 2.2 1 2.0 0.58**
ROS 88 1 5.40 1 15.0 0.43**
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
**: Not statistically significant
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Table 7-19: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with high and low task-inf rastructure congruence in the
chemical and metal industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 2)
Performance (Means)
Measure Plants with high Plants with low
congruence congruence
n (1) n (2) Significance
Chemical
ROI 86 4 15.9 5 15.0 0.94**
ROI 87 4 16.7 5 8.30 0.36**
ROI 88 5 16.5 4 5.48 0.24**
Sales 86 4 9233256 4 3381952 0.13**
Sales 87 4 9806679 4 3258065 0.09*
Sales 88 4 9817358 4 4341554 0.12**
ROS 86 4 8.75 5 7.68 0.95**
ROS 87 4 14.3 5 12.5 0.90**
ROS 88 5 15.2 4 8.60 0.37**
Metal
ROI 86 7 9.68 5 -2.70 0.20**
ROI 87 7 15.3 5 10.8 0.33**
ROI 88 8 16.2 5 14.1 0.69**
Sales 86 10 31690766 6 6997825 0.31**
Sales 87 10 34867089 6 7027307 0.26**
Sales 88 10 39458765 6 8547618 0.24**
ROS 86 5 12.4 5 3.76 0.24**
ROS 87 6 11.1 5 8.38 0.44**
ROS 88 7 12.9 5 10.1 0.49**
For measures description, see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
*: Statistically significant
**: Not statistically significant
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Table 7-20: Comparison of subjective performance measures between 
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence
(Hypothesis 4: Swamidass, 1983)
Measure
Performance (Means)
Plants with Plants without 
congruence congruence significance
Composite 3.96 3.60 0.67**
GROI 3.88 3.63 0.84**
GS 4.05 3.90 0.87**
GROS 3.94 3.27 0.46**
n = 17 n == 11
**: Not statistically significant
7.4.3 An Important Approach In Testing Hypotheses 3 And 4
The reason for not finding significant results in hypotheses three 
and four in Swamidass' study is due, to a large extent, to his 
failure in understanding the meaning of the hypothesis. That is, the 
meaning of the hypothesis is "the higher . . ., the better the 
performance" and not "firms with congruence perform better than the 
ones without". Thus, this study achieved the correct testing of 
these two hypothesis, because the comparison was made between plants 
with high congruence and plants with low congruence (test 2) , which 
corresponds exactly to the meaning of these hypotheses. Swamidass 
testing of theses hypotheses is similar only to test one of this 
study in which insignificant results along all the measures were 
shown.
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7.5 HYPOTHESIS 5
The higher the top management and production management task 
congruence, the better the performance.
The test of this hypothesis was accomplished by Pearson correlation 
between the task congruence measure TCONG, which is defined as the 
difference of the average ratings between general and production 
managers on manufacturing task, and the two types of the performance 
measures (i.e., subjective and objective).
7.5.1 Testing Hypothesis 5 With The Subjective Performance Measures
The results of testing this hypothesis on the total sample then on 
the individual industries using subjective performance measures are 
shown in Table 7-21. On the total sample, a significant relationship 
was found in growth in sales (GS) in addition to the one in the 
composite index.
When testing this hypothesis on the individual industries, only the 
metal industry showed significant to highly significant relationships 
between task congruence and each of: growth in sales (GS) and the
composite index.
Thus, using subjective performance measures, the hypothesis was 
supported in the total and metal industries.
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Table 7-21: Relationship between the task congruence measure and the 
subjective performance measures in all industries
(Hypothesis 5)
Performance Measures
Industry Composite GROI GS GROS
Total r 0.1513 0.1136 0.1686 0.1135
sample n 115 115 115 115
P 0.053* 0.113 0.036* 0.114
Food r -0.1182 -0.0300 -0.1000 -0.1825
n 26 26 26 26
P 0.283 0.442 0.313 0.186
Paper r 0.1581 0.1264 0.0730 0.2447
n 11 11 11 11
P 0.321 0.356 0.416 0.234
Chemical r 0.1787 0.2168 0.0891 0.1865
n 32 32 32 32
P 0.164 0.117 0.314 0.153
Metal r 0.2654 0.1267 0.3867 0.1630
n 46 46 46 46
P 0.037* 0.201 0.004* 0.140
Swam. r 0.16 0.24 ■0.03 0.16
(1983) n 30 30 30 30
P 0.20 0.10 0.43 0.19
For measures description, see Table 7-3 
*: Statistically significant
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7.5.2 Testing Hypothesis 5 With The Objective Performance Measures
This hypothesis was highly supported using the objective performance 
measures as seen in Table 7-22. On the total sample, there were 
significant relationships between the task congruence measure and
each of: return on investment (ROI) for 1986, and sales (GS) for 1986
and 1987. On the individual industries, several significant 
relationships were found in each industry. These are: (i) return on
investment (ROI) for 1986 and 1988 in the food industry; (ii) sales 
for 1986 and 1987 and return on sales (ROS) for 1987 and 1988 in the 
paper industry; (iii) return on investment (ROI) for all years, sales 
for 1988 and return on sales (ROS) for 1986 in the chemical industry; 
and (iv) return on investment (ROI) for 1986 and 1988, sales for all
years, and return on sales (ROS) for 1986 in the metal industry.
Clearly it appears from the Table that all objective performance 
measures showed significant relationships with the task congruence.
Swamidass (1983) , however, found a barely significant relationship 
between task congruence and growth in return on investment (Table 
7-21).
The above results indicate that this hypothesis is supported in the 
subjective as well as in the objective performance measures in all 
industries.
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Table 7-22: Relationship between the task congruence measure and the 
objective performance measures in all industries
(Hypothesis 5)
Measure Total
Industries
Sample Food Paper Chemical Metal
ROI 86 r 0.3062 0.4737 . 0.4270 0.6522
n 43 11 13 19
P 0.020* 0.071* 0.073* 0.001*
ROI 87 r -0.0318 -0.3465 _ 0.5807 0.0036
n 44 12 13 19
P 0.417 0.135 0.019* 0.494
ROI 88 r 0.1706 0.3930 -0.5173 0.5188 0.2847
n 50 12 4 12 22
P 0.118 0.103* 0.241 0.042* 0.100*
Sal. 86 r 0.2377 -0.1740 0.9965 -0.2219 0.3016
n 53 13 3 12 25.
P 0.043* 0.285 0.027* 0.244 0.071*
Sal. 87 r 0.2508 -0.1724 0.9917 -0.3210 0.2723
n 53 13 3 12 25
P 0.035* 0.287 0.041* 0.155 0.094*
Sal. 88 r -0.1391 -0.1374 -0.8573 0.6115 0.2834
n 53 13 3 12 25
P 0.160 0.327 0.172 0.017* 0.085*
ROS 86 r 0.0733 -0.0470 -0.8981 0.4771 0.3673
n 43 11 3 13 16
P 0.32 0.445 0.145 0.050* 0.081*
ROS 87 r -0.0342 -0.0244 0.9212 0.4091 -0.2696
n 47 12 4 13 18
P 0.410 0.470 0.039* 0.083 0.140
ROS 88 r -0.0083 -0.2393 0.7869 0.3713 -0.0934
n 49 12 4 12 21
P 0.478 0.227 0.102* 0 .117 0.344
*: Statistically significant
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7.6 HYPOTHESIS 6
The greater the Involvement of production managers in
strategic decision making, the better the performance.
The test of this hypothesis was carried out between each one of the 
two measures: role of production manager rated by general managers 
(RPMG), and role of production manager rated by themselves (RPMP) and 
the subjective as well as the objective performance measures.
7.6.1 Testing Hypothesis 6 With The Subjective Performance Measures 
(general managers ratings)
Table 7-23 presents the results of testing this hypothesis on the 
total sample then on the single sectors using subjective performance 
measures with the RPMG measure. On the total sample, none of the 
subjective measures showed any significant relationship with the 
measure RPMG. Within the single industries two out of four showed 
significant relationships. These are the food and the metal
industries. The measure RPMG showed significant relationships with 
each of growth in sales (GS) in the food industry; and with growth 
in return on investment (GROI) in the metal industry.
Swamidass' findings strongly supported the hypothesis and showed 
significant relationships with all the subjective performance 
measures and the role of the manufacturing manager rated by chief 
executives as seen in Table 7-23.
The above findings of this study support this hypothesis using
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Table 7-23: Relationship between the involvement of production
managers in strategic decision making and the subjective performance 
measures in all industries (RPMG rating)
(Hypothesis 6)
Performance Measures
Industry Comp. GROI GS GROS
Total r 0.0206 0.0484 0.0373 -0.0287
sample n 115 115 115 115
P 0.413 0.304 0.346 0.380
Food r -0.2468 -0.0684 0.3762 -0.2179
n 26 26 26 26
P 0.112 0.370 0.029* 0.142
Paper r -0.0070 -0.1667 0.1514 -0.0224
n 11 11 11 11
P 0.424 0.409 0.296 0.383
Chemical r -0.0070 -0.1667 0.1514 -0.0224
n 32 32 32 32
P 0.485 0.181 0.204 0.452
Metal r 0.1059 0.2130 0.0721 -0.0226
n 46 46 46 46
P 0.242 0.078* 0.317 0. 441
Swam. r 0.337 0.22 0.376 0.22
(1983) n 34 34 34 34
P 0.026 0.10 0.014 0.10
For measures description, see Table 7-3 
*: Statistically significant
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subjective performance measures with the role of the production 
manager rated by general managers (RPMG) and lend more support to the 
findings reported by Swamidass (1983).
7.6.2 Testing Hypothesis 6 With The Objective Performance Measure 
(general managers ratings)
The results of testing this hypothesis on the total sample then on 
the individual industries using the objective performance measures 
with the RPMG measure are shown in Table 7-24. On the total sample, 
for all years, none of the three objective measures showed any 
significant relationship with the RPMG measure. On the other hand, 
of all industries, only the food industry showed significant 
relationships. These are between sales for all years and the RPMG 
measure. On the basis of the above significant findings one can say 
that this hypothesis, using the objective performance measures with 
the RPMG measure, found support in the food industry only.
7.6.3 Testing Hypothesis 6 With The Subjective Performance Measures 
(production managers ratings)
By using the RPMP measure, hypothesis six was re-tested with all the 
subjective performance measures as seen in Table 7-25. On the total 
sample, the measure RPMP showed a significant relationship with 
growth in return on investment (GROI), growth in return on sales 
(GROS), and on the composite index. On the individual industries all 
except the metal industry showed significant relationships. The 
measure RPMP was found to be significant with each of (i) growth 
in sales (GS), growth in return on sales (GROS), and with the
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Table 7-24: Relationship between the involvement of production
managers in strategic decision making and the objective performance 
measures in all industries (RPMG rating)
(Hypothesis 6)
Measure Total
Industries
sample Food Paper Chemical Metal
ROI 86 r -0.0074 -0.1406 -0.1179 0.1027
n 45 11 - 13 19
P 0.481 0.340 0.351 0.338
ROI 87 r 0.0091 -0.1629 0.1782 0.2010
n 46 12 - 13 19
P 0.476 0.306 0.280 0.205
ROI 88 r -0.0375 -0.2354 -0.0692 0.0439
n 50 12 - 12 22
P 0.398 0.231 0.415 0.423
Sal. 86 r 0.0311 0.3778 0.2196 -0.1080
n 53 13 - 12 25
P 0.413 0.102* 0.246 0.304
Sal. 87 r 0.0606 0.3797 0.2652 -0.0877
n 53 13 - 12 25
P 0.333 0.100* 0.202 0.338
Sal. 88 r 0.0250 0.3906 -0.1873 -0.0841
n 53 13 - 12 25
P 0.429 0.093* 0.280 0.345
ROS 86 r -0.0080 -0.2098 0.1444 0.1276 -0.0284
n 43 11 3 13 16
P 0.480 0.268 0.454 0.339 0.458
ROS 87 r -0.0229 -0.2526 -0.0378 0.0899 0.2585
n 47 12 4 13 18
P 0.439 0.214 0.481 0.385 0.150
ROS 8 8 r -0.0274 -0.3003 0.1410 -0.1604 0.1510
n 49 12 4 12 21
P 0.426 0.171 0.429 0.309 0.257
*: Statistically significant
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Table 7-25: Relationship between the involvement of production
managers in strategic decision making and the subjective performance
measures in all industries
(Hypothesis €)
(RPMP rating)
Performance Measures
Industry Comp. GROI GS GROS
Total r 0.1273 0.1158 0.0904 0.1255
sample n 115 115 115 115
P 0.088* 0.104* 0.168 0.091*
Food r 0.2790 0.1828 0.2684 0.2948
n 26 26 26 26
P 0.084* 0.186 0.092* 0.072*
Paper r 0.3881 0.5719 0.0195 0.2115
n 11 11 11 11
P 0.119 0.033* 0.477 0.266
Chemical r 0.1147 0.2913 ■0.1997 -0.1554
n 32 32 32 32
P 0.266 0.053* 0.137 0.198
Metal r 0.0705 -0.0069 ■0.0512 -0.0752
n 46 48 48 48
P 0.321 0.481 0.365 0.306
Swamidass
(1983) All measures are not significant (N/A)
*: Statistically significant
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composite index in the food industry; (ii) growth in return on 
investment (GROI) in the paper industry; and (iii) growth in return 
on investment (GROI) in the chemical industry.
Swamidass (1983) failed to find any significant results between any 
of the subjective performance measures and the role of the 
manufacturing managers rated by themselves (Table 7-25).
As a result of the above findings, this hypothesis is supported using 
the subjective performance measures with the role of the production 
managers rated by themselves.
7.6.4 Testing Hypothesis 6 With The Objective Performance Measures 
(production managers ratings)
Table 7-26 displays the results of testing hypothesis 6 on the total 
sample, then on the single sectors using the objective performance 
measures with RPMP measure. On the total sample, only the measure 
return on sales (ROS) for 1988 showed a significant relationship with 
the measure RPMP. Of all the individual industries, only the 
chemical and the metal industries showed significant relationships. 
The measure RPMP was significant with return on investment (ROI) for 
1988 and return on sales (ROS) for the same year in the chemical 
industry; and with each of return on investment (ROI) for 1986 and 
1988, sales for all years (1986-1988) and return on sales (ROS) for 
1988.
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Table 7-26: Relationship between the involvement of production
managers in strategic decision making and the objective performance 
measures in all industries (RPMP rating)
(Hypothesis 6)
Measure
Total
sample Food
Industries 
Paper Chemical Metal
ROI 86 r -0.1648 0.0331 0.3195 -0.1044 0.4256
n 45 11 7 12 15
P 0.140 0.461 0.242 0.373 0.057*
ROI 87 r 0.0850 0.0083 0.3858 -0.1531 0.2657
n 46 12 7 13 16
P 0.287 0.490 0.196 0.309 0.160
ROI 88 r 0.0069 -0.1146 0.0799 0.7024 0.4809
n 50 12 7 15 18
P 0.481 0.361 0.432 0.002* 0.022*
Sal. 86 r 0.0720 0.2225 -0.1370 0.1077 0.5762
n 53 13 7 15 18
P 0.304 0.233 0.385 0.351 0.006*
Sal. 87 r 0.0981 0.2323 -0.1950 0.0656 0.5895
n 53 13 7 15 18
P 0.242 0.222 0.338 0.408 0.005*
Sal. 88 r 0.0538 0.2412 -0.1825 0.0144 0.5591
n 53 13 7 15 18
P 0.351 0.214 0.348 0.480 0.008*
ROS 86 r -0.1603 -0.1116 0.4516 -0.3058 0.3066
n 43 11 7 13 16
P 0.152 0.372 0.155 0.155 0.124
ROS 87 r -0.1213 -0.1117 0.4077 -0.2999 0.1182
n 47 12 7 15 18
P 0.208 0.365 0.182 0.139 0.320
ROS 8 8 r 0.2006 -0.3100 -0.1530 0. 5275 0.3446
n 49 12 7 15 18
P 0.083* 0.163 0.372 0.022* 0.081*
*: Statistically significant
270
It is clear from the above findings that this hypothesis was 
supported in the chemical and metal industries using the objective 
performance measures with the RPMP measure.
The findings of hypothesis six indicate that the rating of role of 
the production managers, by themselves, in strategic decision making 
generated more significant relationships than when it was rated by 
general managers, whether in the subjective or objective performance 
measures (see Tables 7-23 to 7-26). A possible reason for that could 
be attributed to their egos in overstating their role. It was stated 
in chapter six that the ratings of production managers are higher 
than those of general managers.
The above findings indicate that this hypothesis is supported in the 
subjective and objective performance measures in both RPMG and RPMP 
measures collectively in all industries.
SUMMARY
The results of testing the six hypotheses derived from the model (see 
chapter two), showed a significant relationship in every hypothesis. 
This could be attributed to the advantage of using multiple measures 
of performance (see section 2.4.6.1). The results of the testing are 
summarised below:
Environmental uncertainty, which is an input to manufacturing 
strategy, influences manufacturing task in the paper, metal and 
chemical industrial sectors, and in the total sample.
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The evidence of correlating manufacturing infrastructure with 
manufacturing task was not conclusive in all industries. A 
relationship exists in the chemical as well as in the food industries 
in addition to the overall sample but not in the paper and metal 
sectors.
This study validates hypothesis three for the first time. It was 
found that plants with high uncertainty-task congruence appear to 
perform better than those with low uncertainty-task congruence. Using 
the subjective and objective performance measures, this hypothesis 
was supported in all industries but the paper industry, due to a 
small number of cases. Also, the hypothesis was supported on the 
total sample level.
As with the above hypothesis, this study validates hypothesis four 
for the first time. It was found that plants with high 
task-infrastructure congruence perform better than those with low 
task-infrastructure congruence. Using subjective and objective 
performance measures, this hypothesis was only supported in two 
industries; the chemical and metal industries. On the total sample, 
this hypothesis was supported with the objective measures only.
Task congruence between general and production managers on 
manufacturing tasks influences performance as evident by the 
findings. This hypothesis was highly supported in all industries with 
the objective measures, while only in the metal industry with the
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subjective data. On the total sample both subjective and objective 
measures have shown significant relationships, although it is very 
weak association in the subjective measures.
Finally, the role of the production manager in strategic decision 
making, as perceived by themselves (RPMP) and by general managers 
(RPMG), associates with performance. Both subjective and objective 
performance measures have shown significant relationships with the 
measures RPMG and RPMP collectively in all industries.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
COMPONENTS OF MANUFACTURING STRATEGY AND EXPECTED STRATEGY 
INTRODUCTION
Selecting one or more of the competitive priorities based on the 
capabilities of the manufacturing function is an extremely important 
decision. A good decision could set the firm/plant apart from its 
competitors. To implement such a decision (i.e., achieve a certain 
priority) programmes (policies) leading to this priority must be in 
place.
The aim of this chapter is to detect the manufacturing strategy for 
the next two years (1990 and 1991) for all the Saudi surveyed 
plants. This was accomplished by finding the components of the 
manufacturing strategy as well as the focused sets of competitive
priorities through the principal components of factor analysis, and
employing a canonical correlation analysis between the components of 
the manufacturing strategy and the focused sets of competitive 
priorities.
8.1 AN ANALYSIS ON THE TOTAL SAMPLE
Chapters Five, Six and Seven report on the analysis performed on
the total sample as well as on the individual industries. Few 
differences among these industries were found in some questions.
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In this Chapter, analysis was carried out on the total sample only 
(117 plants) because of the requirement of the statistical technique. 
By and large, in using statistical techniques, the sample size is a 
very important element for generating valid results. Kerlinger (1986) 
encourages researchers to use samples that are as large as possible, 
which he called "a rough-and-ready rule". The reason behind this 
arises out of the relationship between the sample size and the error. 
That is, in Kerlinger's words (p. 117) "the larger the sample, the 
smaller the error" (deviation). Therefore, the researcher is well 
advised to use a large sample (100 or above) with advanced 
statistical techniques as those used in this Chapter.
Prior to establishing analysis on the total sample, checking that the 
concerned questions have either no or few differences among 
industries is the only important step in validating the analysis at 
this stage. In other words, if major differences do exist among the 
various industries, analysis on the total sample will be invalid. 
Since the analysis in this Chapter focuses on two questions: the
infrastructure-programmes (scored by PMs), and the importance of 
competitive priorities (scored by GMs), testing differences among 
industries in these two questions is necessary. Both questions were 
tested by Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
earlier in Chapter Six to find out if highly significant differences 
do exist among industries. As mentioned in that Chapter, none of the 
items in these two questions showed a very significant difference 
among the four industries (see Table 6.5.1 and 6.6.1). Therefore, the 
analysis on the total sample is quite acceptable.
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8.2 COMPONENTS OF MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
The activities or the programmes that support competitive priorities 
can be called components of manufacturing strategy (see Figure 2-7). 
Each component consists of a set of similar programmes. In order to 
detect these components, principal components of factor analysis were 
used on only the 51 infrastructure-programmes which were rated by 
production managers.
The rest of the inf rastructure-programmes (i.e., six) were omitted 
from this analysis owing to three reasons (see Figure 8-1):
1. These programmes had already been analysed in Chapter Six, 
where the importance of every programme was noticed.
2. Some of these programmes are collectively represented by
another programme or vice versa. That is., (i) the first three 
programmes in the Figure (Infrs. 1, 18 and 37) are represented
by the programme "reducing production costs", (Infr. 38); and 
(ii) the fourth programme, (Infr. 55), is similar to 
"developing high quality suppliers", (Infr. 23), and 
"developing reliable timely suppliers", (Infr. 24).
3. The last three programmes (Infrs. 55, 56 and 57), received the
least attention from the respondents in terms of time, effort 
and resources (see Chapter Six); therefore, they are not 
directly related to the production operations of all plants 
surveyed in this study.
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Figure 8-1: Excluded programmes of the principal components analysis
Programme Description
INFR 1 Reducing inventory costs
INFR 18 Reducing raw material costs
INFR 37 Reducing direct labour costs
INFR 55 Developing reliable foreign suppliers for components,
where materials are inexpensive.
INFR 56 Developing facilities abroad for the manufacturing of 
components for use in Saudi assembly plants, where labour 
is cheap.
INFR 57 Developing facilities abroad for assembly of major
product lines, where most of the production factors are 
low.
8.2.1 Principal Components
The primary purpose of the principal components method of factor 
analysis is data reduction in order to facilitate the
interpretation process (Child, 1979; Hedderson, 1987; Hair et al., 
1987). That is, it classifies all variables into groups (factors). 
This classification is based on the association between the variable 
and the factor, later this will be called a factor loading (Hair et 
al., 1987).
To find out the results of applying principal components on the 51
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infrastructure-programmes, the following criteria were outlined:
o The number of factors to be extracted
o The significance of factor loadings
o The selection of variables for each factor
8.2.1.1 Criteria For The Number Of Factors To Be Extracted
The criteria for the number of factors to be extracted are based, to 
a large extent, on the latent roots (eigenvalues) and the total 
percentage of variance accounted (Hair, Anderson and Tatham, 1987). 
Factors whose eigenvalues are more than or equal to one are 
considered significant. Hair et al. argue that "the rationale for 
the eigenvalue criterion is that any individual factor should 
account for at least the variance of a single variable if it is 
to be retained for interpretation" (p. 247). Regarding the second 
criterion, percentage of variance, the factoring procedure comes to 
an end when the last factor accounts for a small portion of the 
variance (less than 5 per cent). Accordingly, fourteen factors with 
eigenvalue of one or more than one for each, and the last factor 
accounted for 2.1 per cent of the variance were extracted (see 
Table 8-1). The cumulative percentage of variance accounted by the 
extracted factors is 76.4. This percentage is considered highly 
satisfactory as Hair et al., explain:
In the social science, where information is often less 
precise, it is not uncommon for the analyst to consider a 
solution that accounts for 60 per cent of the total 
variance (and in some instances even less) as a satisfactory 
solution" (1987:247).
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Table 8-1: Number of factors extracted and the percentage 
of variance explained (Total sample)
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cum. %
1 13.1 26.8 26.8
2 3.58 7.30 34.1
3 3.21 6.60 40.7
4 2.30 4.70 45.4
5 2.16 4.40 49.8
6 1.98 4.00 53.8
7 1.89 3.90 57.7
8 1.75 3. 60 61.3
9 1.52 3.10 64.4
10 1.51 3.10 67.5
11 1.17 2.40 69.9
12 1.11 2.30 72.2
13 1.03 2.10 74.3
14 1.01 2.10 76.4
00 to H to Criteria For The Significance Of Factor Loadings
Before the interpretation of the factor matrix, the researcher must 
decide on which factor loadings are to be considered to represent 
variables in each factor. Many writers including Child (1979), Kim 
and Mueller (1983) and Hair et al. (1987) suggest that factor loading 
greater than +.30 are considered significant. Loadings of +.40
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are considered more important, and +.50 or higher are considered 
very significant. Thus, the higher the factor loading, the more 
significant the loading is, which in turn indicates the significance 
of the variable. In this regard, variables with higher loading 
greatly influence the name or the label for the factor (Hair et 
al., 1987). On the basis of the above criteria, the considered factor 
loadings in this study are +.40 or above. In other words, the 
cut-off point for the loadings is +.40.
8.2.1.3 Criteria For The Selection Of Variables For Each Factor
Since the first two steps determined the number of factors to be 
studied and the cut-off point, the next step defines the
interpretation procedure for the factor matrix, that is, the 
selection of variables for each factor.
Varimax rotation was employed to magnify the factor loadings in order 
to facilitate the interpretation of the identified factors.
The factor matrix illustrates factor loadings for each variable in 
each factor (previously called groups). The interpretation procedure 
is to select for each variable the highest factor loading (only one 
loading) of all the factors (Child, 1979; Hair et al., 1987). The
above procedure classified almost all the variables (50 
infrastructure -programmes) into the identified fourteen factors as 
seen in Table 8-2. A detailed principal components factor loadings 
matrix is shown in Table 8.1.1, Appendix E).
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8.2.2 Results Of The Principal Components
By matching the infrastructure-programmes of each factor in Table 8-2 
to their descriptions, Figure 8-2 was produced. The infrastructure 
-programmes of each factor in Figure 8-2 were used to construct 
strategic indices to be utilised as components of manufacturing 
strategy in a subsequent analysis. A high degree of similarities 
among the infrastructure-programmes in most factors was found. 
Comparisons were made between some factors of this study and those of 
De Meyer and Ferdows (1987) and of Roth (1987) whenever appropriate. 
The fourteen extracted factors are discussed below.
FACTOR ONE: Supplier Chain Management
Six infrastructure-programmes out of 50 loaded very significantly in 
this factor (all above .50, see Table 8-2 and Figure 8-2). These 
infrastructure-programmes are positively highly related to each other 
(factor loadings are interpreted as the correlation coefficients). 
All these infrastructure-programmes concern suppliers, starting with 
"developing high quality suppliers” and ending with "achieving 
independence from suppliers". Therefore, this factor is interpreted 
and labelled "Supplier Chain Management". Since the "suppliers 
management factor" explained the largest percentage of variance (26.8 
per cent), it is considered the most important factor for the Saudi 
industrial sectors indicating two concerns.Firstly, it indicates that 
the manufacturers in Saudi Arabia encounter some difficulties with 
suppliers as will be seen in SWOT analysis in the next chapter. 
Secondly, it means that the manufacturers attempt to achieve
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improvements in this factor as will be shown in the subsequent 
analysis.
FACTOR TWO: Automation Management
This factor is identified by the high significant loadings of six 
infrastructure-programmes which accounted for 7.3 per cent of the 
total variance. The infrastructure-programmes in this factor call for 
automation in all its types (i.e. enhancing and replacing labour). 
Thus, this factor is interpreted and labelled "Automation 
Management". It is worth mentioning that the last programme in this 
factor, "increasing worker control over work pace", has also high 
loading in factor three (see Table 8.1.1 in Appendix E).
Despite the differences in the programmes leading to automation, the 
findings of this factor are , in general, similar to the findings by 
De Meyer and Ferdows (1987) and Roth (1987) . Roth found two types of 
automation (each type loaded in a separate factor). The first type 
serves to enhance the productivity of labour such as computer-aided 
design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) . The second type 
serves to substitute labour such as robot and flexible manufacturing 
system (FMS) . The essence of enhancing and replacing labour has been 
encapsulated within one factor in this study.
Enhancing and replacing labour should be two types of automation that 
provide a basis for classifying Saudi plants. Such classification 
would indicate the capacity of plants besides other issues.
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Table 8-2: Components of manufacturing strategy factor loadings
(Total sample)
Factors Communality
Programmes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Inf r 23 0.82 .81
Inf r 25 0.82 .82
Inf r 24 0.80 .84
Infr 21 0.72 .74
Inf r 22 0.70 .74
Infr 26 0.51 .77
Infr 33 0.87 .82
Infr 34 0.77 .73
Infr 35 0.66 .75
Infr 32 0.61 .84
Infr 27 0.56 .70
Infr 43 0.49 .79
Infr 41 0.75 .79
Infr 40 0.74 .75
Infr 45 0.56 .76
Infr 36 0.51 .76
Infr 42 0.50 .69
Infr 44 0.44 .76
Infr 30 0.78 .76
Infr 29 0.77 .86
Infr 15 0.57 .79
Infr 31 0.51 .73
Infr 14 0.47 .81
Infr 51 0.79 .81
Infr 52 0.78 .83
Infr 53 0.74 .78
Infr 48 0.80 .79
Infr 50 0.70 .79
Infr 49 0.62 .76
Infr 47 0.48 .71
Infr 3 0.84 .79
Infr 5 0.79 .76
Infr 8 0.45 .72
Infr 10 0.40 .67
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Table 8-2 : (Continued)
Factors Communality
Programmes 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Infr 38 0.78 .81
Infr 39 0.60 .71
Infr 46 0.53 .78
Infr 12 0.50 .70
Infr 17 0.77 .75
Infr 16 0.46 .71
Infr 19 0.72 .68
Infr 20 0.60 .79
Infr 28 0.44 .75
Infr 11 0.80 .81
Infr 7 0.80 .82
Infr 9 0.66 .78
Infr 2 0.74 .72
Infr 54 0.56 .67
Infr 13 0.51 .67
Infr 4 0.82 .75
FACTOR THREE: Improving Workforce Skills Management
This factor includes six infrastructure-programmes which explained 
6.6 per cent of the total variance, making the cumulative percentage 
of variance slightly over 40 per cent. Programmes in this factor 
stress the necessity to continue worker specialisation and training. 
Since all these programmes indicate specific attention to the 
workforce, this factor is interpreted and labelled "Improving 
Workforce Skills Management".
Two programmes in this factor, "Development of new features for older 
product lines" and "increasing worker responsibility in work
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planning", have relatively high loadings in factors two (Automation 
Management) and four respectively.
FACTOR FOUR: Product Control Management
This factor is loaded with five infrastructure-programmes which 
accounted for 4.7 per cent of total variance. Programmes in this 
factor call for product control whether in terms of design (i.e. 
simplification and modularisation) or in terms of progress system and 
replacement of inexpensive materials which all facilitate a better 
master production schedule. Therefore, this factor is interpreted and 
labelled "Product Control Management". In the product control 
management factor, two programmes, "close order progress control 
system" and "substitution of inexpensive materials or components", 
have also high loadings in factors six and twelve respectively.
FACTOR FIVE: High Volume Products
Three infrastructure-programmes are loaded very significantly in this 
factor and accounted for 4.4 per cent of the total variance. These 
programmes deal with the issue of high volume products as a result of 
economies of scale or economies of scope. Thus, this factor is 
interpreted and called "High Volume Products".
FACTOR SIX: Quality Management
This factor is identified by four infrastructure-programmes which 
explained 4 per cent of the cumulative variance (see Figure 8-2). All 
these programmes are concerned with product quality. Therefore, 
this factor is interpreted and labelled "Quality Management". In
285
respect of "monetary incentive system", it is obvious that the Saudi 
and non-saudi managers who are in charge of the Saudi plants follow 
the approach of the firms that connect monetary incentive system 
directly to quality improvements (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987). In 
this regard, it is worth noting that both studies which were 
conducted by De Meyer and Ferdows (1987) and Roth (1987) failed to 
include such a programme in their studies. Apart from this, both 
studies included programmes concerning quality circle and quality 
control in the "quality factor". Workers' safety, which is not 
considered in this study, was found to be in the "quality factor" in 
the study conducted by De Meyer and Ferdows (1987).
FACTOR SEVEN: Inventory Management
Four infrastructure-programmes are loaded highly in this factor and 
accounted for 3.9 per cent of the total variance. These programmes 
call for reduction in raw materials, finished goods, idle time and 
workforce stabilisation. Thus, this factor is interpreted and 
labelled "Inventory Management", according to the highest two 
loadings (Hair et al.,1987).
The last two programmes in this factor, "reducing idle time" and 
"stabilising the workforce numbers", may appear less indicative of 
the inventory management. However, knowing that inventory levels 
(e.g., the first two programmes in this factor) could have a 
significant influence on profit (Krajewski and Ritzman, 1987), 
stabilising the workforce numbers and reducing idle time would 
indicate steady demand.
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Figure 8-2 : Components of Manufacturing Strategy (Total Sample)
FC 1 : Supplier Chain Management (26.8%) Infr
1. Developing high quality suppliers 23
2. Diversifying suppliers (multi sources) 25
3. Developing reliable timely suppliers 24
4. Obtaining quantity discounts from suppliers 21
5. Obtaining quantity discounts from shippers 22
6. Achieving independence from suppliers 26
FC 2 : Automation Management (7.3%)
1. Automation of production lines 33
2. Automation inspection 34
3. Acquiring the latest in production equipment 35
4. Mechanised materials handling 32
5. Substitution of labour by machines 27
6. Increasing worker control over work time 43
FC 3 : Improving Workforce Skills Management (6.6%)
1. Worker specialisation 41
2. Worker training 40
3. Removal of inspectors 45
4. Development of new features for older product
lines 36
5. Increasing worker responsibility in work
planning (job enrichment) 42
6. Inspectors training 44
FC 4 : Product Control Management (4.7%)
1. Product simplification 30
2. Product modularisation 29
3. Close order progress control system 15
4. Substitution of inexpensive materials or
components 31
5. Developing better master production schedule 14
FC 5 : High Volume Products Management (4.4%)
1. Development of high volume products 51
2. Development of products with high economies
of scale 52
3. Development of products with high economies
of scope 53
FC 6 : Quality Management (4.0%)
1. Acquiring a Saudi quality mark 48
2. Development or improvement of quality circle
programmes 50
3. Monetary incentive system 49
4. Development or improvement of quality control
programmes 47
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Figure 8-2 : (continued)
FC 7 : Inventory Management (3.9%) Infr
1. Reducing raw materials and component inventories3
2. Reducing finished goods inventories 5
3. Reducing idle time 8
4. Stabilising workforce numbers 10
FC 8 : Increasing Productivity Management (3.6%)
1. Reducing production costs 38
2. Worker skills diversification 39
3. Improving labour productivity 46
4. Reducing manufacturing lead time 12
FC 9 : Information System Management (3.1%)
1. Order status reporting system 17
2. Frequent work centre rescheduling capacity 16
FC 10 : Purchasing Control Management (3.1%)
1. Obtaining long term purchasing supply
contracts 19
2. Reducing the number of purchase orders per
year 20
3. Product standardisation 28
FC 11 : Human Resources Management (2.4%)
1. Designing policies to motivate employees 11
2. Hiring and lay-off system 7
3. Finding reliable subcontractors 9
FC 12 : Turnover Management (2.3%)
1. Increasing inventory turnover 2
FC 13 : Co-ordination Management (2.1%)
1. Improving co-ordination among engineering, 54
manufacturing and marketing
2. Increasing warehouse space 13
FC 14: Work-In-Process Management (2.1%)
1. Reducing work-In-process inventories 4
FC : factor
(%) : percent of variance explained by the factor
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It is worth noting that factor Six and Seven have almost the same 
influence because of equal amount of variance explained.
FACTOR EIGHT: Increasing Productivity Management
This factor includes four infrastructure-programmes which accounted 
for 3.6 per cent out of 76.4 per cent. These are concerned with 
lowering production costs, diversifying worker skills, improving 
labour productivity and reducing manufacturing lead time. Therefore, 
this factor is interpreted and labelled "Increasing Productivity 
Management". It is important to mention that "worker skills 
diversification", Infr.39, also has a high loading in factor three 
(Improving Workforce Skills Management).
FACTOR NINE: Information System Management
Two infrastructure-programmes included in this factor which accounted 
for 3.1 per cent of the total variance. These programmes are involved 
with reporting system and rescheduling capacity for the operation 
production function. Thus, this factor is interpreted and labelled 
"Information System Management".
FACTOR TEN: Purchasing Control Management
This factor is identified by three infrastructure -programmes which 
accounted for the same variance as the previous factor (3.1%). These 
programmes are highly concerned with purchasing in terms of obtaining 
long term contracts and having a smaller number of orders per year 
(see Table 8-2 and Figure 8-2). Thus, this factor is interpreted and 
labelled "Purchasing Control Management". The last two programmes in
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this factor, "reducing the number of purchase orders per year" and 
"product standardisation" have also high loadings in "Suppliers Chain 
Management" and "Product Control Management" respectively.
FACTOR ELEVEN: Human Resources Management
This factor is identified by three infrastructure-programmes which 
explained 2.4 per cent of the total variance. Because of the very 
high loadings of the first two infrastructure-programmes, this factor 
is interpreted and labelled "Human Resources Management".
FACTOR TWELVE: Turnover Management
Only one infrastructure-programme is loaded in this factor. It is 
accounted for 2.3 per cent of the total variance. Since this 
programme calls for increasing inventory turnover, it is named 
"Turnover Management".
FACTOR THIRTEEN: Coordination Management
This factor is identified by two infrastructure-programmes which 
accounted for 2.1 per cent of the total variance. These are 
"improving co-ordination among engineering, manufacturing and 
marketing" and "increasing warehouse space". Since the first 
programme has the highest loading, it influences the label of the 
factor (Hair et al., 1987). Thus, this factor is labelled 
"Coordination Management".
FACTOR FOURTEEN: Work-In-Process Management
This factor is identified by only one infrastructure- programme which
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accounted for 2.1 per cent of the total variance. Since this 
programme deals with "work-in-process inventories", this factor is 
simply labelled "Work-In-Process Management".
From the above analysis, it was noticed that the
infrastructure-programme "achieving larger production lots", (Infr. 
6), did not load in any of the fourteen factors. Since this programme 
is related to inventory's costs, it was expected to be loaded with 
the inventory management factor, or at least in a separate factor. 
This means that this programme is not important to manufacturers in 
Saudi Arabia; this is probably due to obtaining financial loans and 
getting a piece of land with a nominal fee from the government.
8.3 FOCUSED SETS OF COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES
Competitive priorities are expressed by the eight dimensions which 
relate to cost, quality, flexibility and delivery (see Figure 2-3) . 
In practice, it would be difficult in most cases for manufacturers to 
pursue each of the eight competitive priorities alone. For instance, 
"high performance design" and "consistent quality" are expected to be 
correlated tasks. However, the purpose of having them in this manner 
(i.e., the eight priorities) is for measurable reasons (see Chapter 
Two). Theoretically, Skinner (1978, 1985), Hayes and Wheelwright
(1984), Hill (1985) and others predicted the existence of four 
competitive priorities; namely cost, quality, flexibility and 
delivery (content of manufacturing strategy).
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Competitive priorities are achieved when components of each priority 
are in place. Thus, they are viewed as predictor (independent) 
variables in the analysis. Since they are viewed as predictor 
variables, a certain degree of multi-colinearity could be expected 
among the eight dimensions. Multi-colinearity is said to exist when 
two or more of the predictor variables are highly correlated with 
each other (Hair et al., 1987; Hedderson, 1987).
There are two courses of action available for treating 
multi-colinearity (Hedderson, 1987). The first is to integrate the 
highly correlated variables into a composite variable. The second 
course of action for treating multi-colinearity is to drop one of the 
two highly correlated variables. In this study, the first approach 
was used, simply because the second approach involves damaging the 
data by dropping one or two of the important variables.
Therefore, to get rid of multi-colinearity and to check the existence 
of theoretically derived competitive priorities, principal components 
of factor analysis were performed. Such a technique was utilised in 
this situation by several analysts such as Roth (1987), Huete and 
Roth (1987) and Roth et al. (1989).
As in the previous analysis, this analysis uses the same level of 
cut-off point, (i. e . ,+.. 4 0) , for the factor loading (for 
interpretation of the principal components, see section 8.2.1).
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The results of the principal components, when applied on the eight 
dimensions of the competitive priorities, are exhibited in Table 8-3. 
A detailed principal components factor loadings matrix is exhibited 
in Table 8.1.2 in Appendix E) . Table 8-3 shows three extracted 
factors with an eigenvalue of one or more than one for each. 
Regarding the total percentages of variance explained, the three 
factors accounted for almost 60 percent. According to Hair, Anderson 
and Tatham (1987), this percentage is considered a satisfactory 
solution (see section 8.2.1). These factors are as follows:
FACTOR ONE: Quality-Delivery Priority
It is identified by the high significant loadings of four competitive 
priorities. These are "high performance design”, ”on-time-delivery", 
"fast delivery” and "consistent quality". Since these priorities are 
concerned with quality and delivery, this factor is interpreted and 
labelled "Quality-Delivery Priority". This factor represents two of 
the theoretically predicted priorities collectively (i.e., quality 
and delivery). Placing these two types of priorities in one focused 
set support the view of Krajewski and Ritzman (1987) of grouping the 
competitive priorities: they placed "high performance design" with 
"fast delivery time" under the label "quality level", whilst the 
remaining priorities of the quality and delivery were grouped and 
labelled "quality reliability. Krajewski and Ritzman failed to 
justify such grouping. An interpretation for having both types of 
quality and delivery in one focused set of priority will be made 
later on.
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FACTOR TWO: Flexibility Priority
It is identified by the very significant loadings of the two 
competitive priorities: "product flexibility" and "volume
flexibility". Since both of these competitive priorities include 
flexibility, this factor is interpreted and labelled "Flexibility 
Priority". This factor exactly confirms its counterpart in the 
theoretically predicted priorities.
FACTOR THREE: Low Price Priority
It is identified by the high loadings of one competitive priority. It 
is the low price priority. Therefore, this factor is interpreted and 
labelled "Low Price Priority", which exactly matches its counterpart 
in the theoretically predicted priorities.
From the above analysis, it was noticed that the "new products 
introduction" priority did not load in any factor. It was expected to 
be loaded with the Flexibility priority because new product is part 
of the product flexibility or at least with the new factor of 
priority, viz "quality-delivery priority". Thus, not being loaded in 
any factor means that manufacturers in Saudi Arabia do not view "new 
product introduction" as an important competitive priority for 1990 
and 1991. "New products introduction" was rated the lowest priority 
in terms of importance on the basis of the mean (see section 6.7). 
Furthermore, this priority was not one of the important manufacturing 
tasks for the past two years (1987 and 1988) . In fact, the 
manufacturing task "new product introduction" was rated the lowest 
out of fourteen tasks on the basis of the mean by both general and
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Table 8-3 : Focused sets of competitive priorities (Total sample)
Competitive Priorities Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Communality
1. High performance design 0.77/ .61
2. On-time delivery 0.75 .58
3. Fast delivery 0.72 .63
4. Consistent quality 0.68 .63
5. Product flexibility 0.84 .72
6. Volume flexibility 0.71 .54
7. Low price 0.86 .74
Eigenvalue 2.47 1.15 1.11
% of variance 30.9 14.4 13.9
Cumulative percentage 30.9 45.3 59.2 (
production managers (see Tables 6-2 and 6-3). It was found earlier 
that 27.4 per cent of the surveyed plants have not introduced any new 
products since they began operation. 14.5 per cent of the plants 
require over three years for that activity and the rest of the plants 
(58.1 per cent) requires an average time of three years or less to 
develop new products (see Table 5-6). In spite of the fact that most 
of the plants in the 58.1 per cent category mention that they rely 
heavily on their foreign partners in introducing new products,
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this finding (i.e., new products being unloaded in any factor) 
questions the face value of this percentage figure.
For consistency in research, as suggested by Hair et al.(1987), it 
was preferred to neglect both the infrastructure-programme and the 
competitive priority which did not load in any factor. Not being 
loaded in any factor means that they are not important to the 
manufacturers in Saudi Arabia at least in the prevailing time.
In summary, the above analysis created three focused sets of 
competitive priorities according to the perspective of the general 
managers who operate in the Saudi environment. These are:
o Quality-Delivery Priority 
o Flexibility Priority 
o Low price Priority
Since this study detected three focused sets of competitive 
priorities, it is important to compare them with their counterparts 
(i.e., focused sets of competitive priorities) in Europe, North 
America and Japan to observe the components of each priority. In a 
survey conducted on these three regions in 1986, executives of 172 
European firms, 188 American firms and 168 of Japanese firms were 
asked to rate the eight competitive priorities (Roth et al., 1989). 
Through principal components of factor analysis, focused sets of 
competitive priorities were derived in these three regions. When
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comparing them in terms of region including those of Saudi Arabia, 
one could notice the following (see Figure 8-3):
Firstly, the focused sets of competitive priorities for Europe and 
North America exactly confirm the four theoretically predicted 
priorities. Secondly, those for Japan do not exactly match the four 
theoretically predicted priorities. The analysis of the Japanese 
executives responses shows three focused sets of competitive 
priorities which are equivalent to the number of focused priorities 
detected by the analysis of the Saudi data. As the Figure shows, the 
analysis of the Japanese data places both types of delivery and 
flexibility in one factor labelled "Response Flexibility". On the 
other hand, the analysis of the Saudi data, as mentioned earlier, 
places both types of quality and delivery in one factor labelled 
"Quality-Delivery". Apart from this, the rest of the focused sets of 
priorities exactly confirm the theoretically predicted priorities. 
In another study, Roth (1987) found three focused sets of competitive 
priorities. These are product focus, delivery/flexibility, and price. 
Having both types of two priorities in one focused set as shown in 
the Saudi and the Japanese data as well as in Roth's study (1987), 
does not reflect major differences as long as all the components in 
that priority are similar. The difference in the content of the 
priority set is referred to the fact that strategy is dynamic [It is 
noticeable that "Product Flexibility" is also placed in the quality 
factor in addition to it being in the flexibility factor of the 
Japanese data. Such duplication is due to Roth et al.'s failure in 
understanding the interpretation procedure of the principal
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components. That is, only the highest factor loading of product 
flexibility should be chosen (see section 8.2.1.3)].
The next section discusses the development of manufacturing strategy 
for all the Saudi surveyed plants in the coming two years.
8.4 A MANUFACTURING STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS
When manufacturers adopt a certain competitive priority, hence 
selecting a manufacturing strategy, they must devote their time, 
effort and resources to all programmes (policies) that support it. 
Therefore, the developed focused sets of competitive priorities along 
with the components of manufacturing strategy (see sections 8.3 and
8.2), play an important role in determining the manufacturing 
strategy for the Saudi surveyed plants in the next two years (1990 
and 1991). The approach adopted here to determine the strategy is 
based on the definition of manufacturing strategy where "a series of 
consistent decisions" are represented by the components of 
manufacturing strategy, and "a statement of tasks" is represented by 
the focused sets of competitive priorities (Southern and Al-Shuaibi, 
1990) . Furthermore, it is based on a framework, suggested by Cool and 
Schendel (1987), which consists of two sets of elements to determine 
strategic groups. These two elements are "devoted resources" 
(programmes) and "the business scope" (competitive priorities). This 
framework was replicated by several researchers (Roth, 1987; Roth et 
al., 1989; De Meyer, 1990).
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Since the strategic decisions are highly intercorrelated in practice, 
indices were constructed for the components of manufacturing strategy 
and for the focused sets of competitive priorities as well. As Roth 
says "it is not only necessary that each specific decision be 
congruent with the required capabilities (competitive priorities) but 
also that the entire pattern of decisions be consistent with each 
other" (Roth, 1987: 7).
8.4.1 Constructing Indices
Indices were computed by averaging the scores of all programmes 
within the factor in the case of the components of manufacturing 
strategy. For example, the score of the supplier chain management 
index was computed by adding the scores of the six programmes in that 
factor and dividing them by six (see Table 8-2 and Figure 8-2) . The 
same process was replicated for each of the remainder of the fourteen 
components of manufacturing strategy (automation management, 
improving workforce skills management, etc.). Similarly, indices were 
computed by averaging the scores of competitive priorities within the 
factor in the case of the three focused sets of competitive priority. 
In the case where there is only one competitive priority in the 
factor (as in the "low price"), or one programme in the factor (as in 
the "turnover management"), the index was constructed for that 
priority or programme only.
Since the previous analysis developed fourteen components of 
manufacturing strategy on one side and three focused sets of 
competitive priorities on the other, indices were constructed for
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each component and each focused set in order to reflect the real-life 
situation. Thus, in order to develop a manufacturing strategy 
(content) for the Saudi surveyed plants for 1990 and 1991, canonical 
correlation analysis was used. It should be noticed that research in 
manufacturing strategy content is the first missing theme in this 
research area as reported by Adam and Swamidass (1989).
8.4.2 Canonical Correlation Analysis
The objective of the canonical correlation analysis (Cohen and Cohen, 
1983; Thompson, 1984; Hair et al., 1987) is to study the 
interrelationships among sets of multiple criterion variables (i.e., 
components of manufacturing strategy) and sets of multiple predictor 
variables (i.e., focused sets of competitive priorities). It is a 
technique that has recently emerged as a result of its availability 
in computer packages, although canonical correlation analysis has 
been known in theory for approximately fifty years (Thompson, 1984). 
In particular, canonical correlation has been exercised in marketing 
researches (Alpert and Peterson, 1972). Canonical correlation is 
regarded as the general model of several multivariate techniques such 
as multiple regression which considers one criterion variable only 
and several predictor variables (Hair et al., 1987). This technique 
is utilised to a large extent as multiple correlation, because it 
displays the overall correlation among the sets of criterion and 
predictor variables (Green and Tull, 1978) .
In this particular case, canonical correlation analysis is used to 
determine the manufacturing strategy for the Saudi surveyed plants,
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i.e., which focused set of competitive priority is highly correlated 
with sets of manufacturing strategy components. To detect the 
strategy, the following criteria were outlined:
o The number of canonical functions to be extracted, 
o The number of canonical functions to be interpreted.
8 .4.2.1 Criteria For The Number Of canonical Functions To 
Be Extracted
The maximum number of canonical functions to be derived out of the 
sets of variables is equivalent to the number of sets in the smallest 
side (Thompson, 1984; Hair et al., 1987). Since the smallest side has 
three sets (i.e., indices), the number of canonical functions that 
were extracted in this study are three. In describing these 
functions, Hair et al. say that each function consists of a two of 
variates. One stands for the criterion variables and the other 
represents the predictor variables. Accordingly, six variates were 
extracted, three for the components of manufacturing strategy and the 
rest of the variates for the focused sets of competitive priorities. 
Unlike the principal components of factor analysis where the first 
factor accounts for the maximum variance, the first pair of canonical 
variates acquire the highest intercorrelation between the two 
variates, then the successive pairs of variates display lower 
relationships (Hair et al., 1987).
302
8.4.2.2 Criteria For The Number Of Canonical Functions To Be 
Interpreted
There are three criteria to be considered in interpreting the 
canonical functions. These are level of significance, size of 
correlation and the squared canonical correlation coefficient (Alpert 
and Peterson, 1972; Hair et al., 1987).
As with other statistical techniques, in this analysis the most 
important indicator for accepting a canonical function is the 
significance level. If the significance level is outside the allowed 
level, the analysis will be discounted. According to the criterion of 
significant level that was established in Chapter Four, only the 
first function out of the three functions was found to be 
statistically significant as can be seen from Table 8-4. The other 
two functions which are not significant are exhibited in Appendix E, 
Table 8.1.3, and will not be interpreted because it is meaningless to 
do so as suggested by statisticians (Daniel and Terrell, 1983; Hair 
et al., 1987).
The size of the canonical correlation plays a role in deciding which 
functions are to be interpreted (i.e., if significance exists). 
However, "no generally accepted guidelines have been established 
regarding acceptable sizes for canonical correlations" (Hair et al., 
1987: 194). Accordingly, Hair et al. (1987) suggest the use of the 
guidelines of the factor loadings'significant level (see section
8.2.1.2). Since only one function was found to be significant, the 
canonical correlation for that function was found to be highly
303
satisfactory according to the guidelines of factor loadings (see 
Table 8-4).
The squared canonical correlation coefficient exhibits the shared 
variance between the pair of variates (sets of criterion and 
predictor variables). Again, as with the size of the canonical 
correlation, no guidelines have been established for the acceptable 
level of shared variance between the pair of variates. In dealing 
with this, Hair et al. (1987) suggest that it should be left to the 
judgment of the researcher to decide whether to interpret that 
function or not. In this analysis, the shared variance between the 
pair of variates in the significant function is 32 per cent (squaring 
canonical correlation, Table 8-4). This means that 32 per cent of the 
variance in the sets of the criterion variables are explained by the 
sets of the predictor variables. This low percentage could be 
attributed to the variability in the study (fifty infrastructure- 
programmes were classified into fourteen indices). However, it is 
considered slightly high when compared with other percentages in a 
similar study (see Roth, 1987).
Since the decision was made to accept one canonical function 
according to the previous three criteria, the next task is to decide 
how to interpret it, or how to evaluate the canonical relationships. 
Evaluation is based on the type of canonical correlation coefficient 
and on its significant loading.
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From the SPSSX printout, two types of canonical correlation 
coefficients were produced: standardised and structure canonical
coefficients. Of these two, structure canonical coefficient is highly 
recommended (Thompson, 1984; Hair et al., 1987). If the variables 
within each set of the criterion or the predictor are somewhat 
intercorrelated, the likelihood of interpreting the canonical 
function through the standardised canonical coefficients is virtually 
nil (Thompson, 1984). Thompson adds that the appeal in employing 
structure coefficients is due to its "intuitive linkages" with factor 
loadings of the principal components of factor analysis. For the 
above reasons, this study uses structure canonical coefficients in 
interpreting the pair of variates for the significant function.
The coefficients of canonical structure, referred to as canonical 
loadings, are interpreted in the same manner as in the factor loading 
(Hair et al., 1987). Accordingly, each canonical loading of each 
manufacturing strategy component represents its association with the 
variate. Similarly, each canonical loading of each focused set of 
competitive priority reflects its bivariate correlation with the 
variate. Since the level of significance of the canonical loading is 
the essence in evaluating the canonical relationships, the cut-off 
point for the canonical loadings remains +.40, as in both the 
components of manufacturing strategy and the focused sets of 
competitive priorities, to ensure consistency in the analysis (see 
section 8.2.1.2).
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8.4.3 Low Price Strategy
A close examination of the canonical loadings in the competitive 
priorities indices suggests that only one competitive priority index 
qualified to be related to components of manufacturing strategy. 
Table 8-4 shows that this index is the low price priority (loadings 
less than .40 for both competitive priorities and components of 
manufacturing strategy indices are shown in Table 8.3.1, Appendix E). 
There is a very high correlation between low price priority and the 
variate of the competitive priorities indices. This means that 90.3 
per cent of the variance in the low price priority is explained by 
the competitive priorities variate.
Similarly, the criterion of loadings promoted two indices of the 
components of manufacturing strategy to associate the low price 
priority. These two indices are "suppliers chain management" and 
"inventory management". Both show high correlation with the variate 
of manufacturing strategy indices. This means that 51 per cent 
(squaring and adding .52 & .49) of the variances in these two 
indices is explained by the components of manufacturing strategy 
variate.
The above results indicate that the expected manufacturing strategy 
for the Saudi surveyed plants for the next two years (1990 and 1991) 
is a low price priority. This study finds that such a strategy could 
be achieved through programmes related to suppliers and inventory 
management in particular (see the contents of these two programmes in 
Figure 8-2).In other words, the only possible advantage for the Saudi
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Table 8-4: Relationships between focused sets of competitive
priorities and components of manufacturing strategy (Total sample)
Canonical correlation 
between pair of variates
Canonical
i*
0.57
Functions** ** 
2 3
Predictor variables 
(Competitive priorities 
indices)
Canonical loadings
Quality-Delivery
Flexibility
Low Price 0.95
Criterion variables 
(Manufacturing strategy 
indices)
Suppliers Management 0.52
Automation Management
Improving Workforce Skills Management
Product Control Management
High Volume Products
Quality Management
Inventory Management 0.49
Increasing Productivity Management
Information System Management
Purchasing Control Management
Human Resources Management
Turnover Management
Co-ordination Management
Work-in-process Management
Statistically significant at P (.025) 
Not statistically significant
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plants to win a manufacturing price strategy is through practicing 
policies on suppliers and inventory management. The literature 
supports these two factors as instruments to measure cost (Fine and 
Hax, 1985; Leong et al., 1990). It was found earlier that both 
general and production managers have set up low price as their first 
priority for improvement (see section 6.5).
Several policies could be followed in each aspect of these two major 
programmes. In supplier management, for example, manufacturers could 
develop one major policy that could probably lead them to compete on 
price by achieving independence from suppliers (i.e., backward 
integration). They could also develop various policies which require 
diversified suppliers with high quality and timely reliable in 
addition to quantity discounts as an incentive to maintain their 
relationships. Both factors are either a direct element of the 
characteristics of the environmental uncertainty (i.e., supplier 
chain management) or an indirect element of those characteristics 
(i.e. inventory management).
Because these two factors are related to environmental uncertainty, 
they are not under the control of the manufacturers in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, it could be difficult for them to achieve a price 
strategy, unless it is through backward integration. Backward 
integration indeed could be a comparative advantage for some plants 
in the chemical industry due to the existence of SABIC Companies (see 
Chapter 3).
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It was expected that some other factors would be found, such as 
employing automation, improving workforce skill and increasing 
productivity management, to win a price strategy (Krajewski and 
Ritzman, 1987; Schmenner, 1987). But it seems obvious that all 
manufacturers in Saudi Arabia believe that the suppliers-related 
problems are their major obstacle in reducing cost (this point will 
be confirmed in SWOT analysis in the next Chapter). The combination 
of possessing the latest state funded production equipment (see 
Chapter Six) and employing low cost non-Saudi labour has led 
manufacturers to concentrate on suppliers-related problems only. This 
study found that wages for all the participating plants constitute
16.3 per cent of the average of the total unit cost, while materials 
consume almost 60 per cent on average. Hence the concentration on 
supplier and materials management.
However, generally one could argue that labour productivity is 
important in cost reduction. In this regard, one should point out 
that labour productivity is considered an internal factor, whereas 
suppliers are regarded as an external factor to the plant. Thus, most 
plants, if not all, give a great deal of attention to the external 
factors first and then gradually place emphasis on internal factors 
to assume control of affecting factors. In other words, internal 
factors receive more attention when efforts on external factors are 
exhausted. This, in a way, reflects the degree of industrialisation; 
that is, plants in the U.K. or U.S.A., for example, are more 
concerned with internal factors because they have devoted a great 
amount of effort to external factors.
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By comparison, Roth (1987) found that a price strategy could be 
achieved under programmes such as human resources (e.g., worker 
planning, broader jobs and motivation), consolidation (e.g. closing 
plants, reducing manufacturing units and relocation) and under no 
expansion of capacity. One can notice in the preceding programmes the 
absence of "vendor relations factor" which is somewhat similar to the 
"suppliers factor" in this study. This could reflect the degree of 
industrialisation as mentioned earlier.
In addition to the price strategy, Roth found several programmes 
(some overlapped) under a product focus strategy, and a 
delivery/flexibility strategy. This study; however, failed to predict 
more than a price strategy.
When considering the Sandcone model (Ferdows and De Meyer, 1989) and 
the Japanese cumulative model (see Chapter 2) , why has this study 
failed to show specifically through canonical correlation analysis 
quality and delivery strategies in addition to a price strategy since 
manufacturers had already won the first two strategies ? (see 
Chapters Six and Nine) . One may argue that the scarcity of empirical 
studies of the developed countries (only one study) on the one hand 
and the non-existence of empirical studies of the developing 
countries on the other, make interpretation difficult as far as this 
study is concerned. There are three possible interpretations for the 
result of this study.
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1. It could be interpreted according to the trade-offs notion 
(i.e./ achieving one competitive priority means trading off the 
other priorities). That is, in this study, the achieved quality 
and delivery were traded off with the hope of achieving a price 
strategy. This seems to be incorrect, because it was found that 
both types of quality and delivery are the most important 
priorities for 1987 and 1988 as well as for 1990 and 1991, on 
the basis of means (see section 6.2 and 6.7).
2. It could be a different model for competitive priorities in the 
Saudi industrial environment. Although this may come true in 
the future, at the present time, one can say that the Saudi 
industrial environment is highly influenced by the western 
system (e.g., foreign expertise, production systems) Without 
the full support of the national infrastructure. Accordingly, 
the Japanese cumulative model or the Sandcone model is more 
likely to be the model for the competitive priorities in the 
Saudi environment.
3. It could be that general and production managers'struggles with 
suppliers-related problems greatly influence their thinking in 
a way that they neglect to emphasise quality and delivery in 
addition to price when responding to these questions. In fact, 
it was found that the top two programmes which received the 
most attention for the next two years, on the basis of the mean 
values, are cost-reduction related. Furthermore, quality was 
not even one of the top five programmes receiving the most
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attention for the next two years (see Chapter Six) . Out of the 
three possible interpretations, the researcher believes that 
this one is the most appropriate.
If canonical correlation were able to detect quality and delivery 
strategies in addition to the price strategy, this would have been a 
good support for the Japanese cumulative model over the Sandcone 
model.
SUMMARY
The main purpose of the analysis in this chapter was to detect the 
manufacturing strategy for all the Saudi surveyed plants in the next 
two years (1990 and 1991). In so doing, components of manufacturing 
strategy as well as focused sets of competitive priorities were 
extracted by the principal components of factor analysis.
Out of fifty one infrastructure-programmes, fourteen components of 
manufacturing strategy have been extracted. These are suppliers chain 
management, automation management, improving workforce skills 
management, product control management, high volume products 
management, quality management, inventory management, increasing 
productivity management, information system management, purchasing 
control management, human resources management, turnover management, 
co-ordination management and finally work-in-process management. The 
infrastructure-programmes within each factor were highly related to 
each other in almost all the fourteen factors.
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Out of the eight competitive priorities, three focused sets have been 
extracted. These are quality-delivery priority, flexibility priority 
and low price priority. These focused sets confirm the theoretically 
predicted priorities.
Through canonical correlation analysis, a manufacturing strategy was 
detected using the fourteen components of manufacturing strategy and 
the three focused sets of competitive priorities. It was found a low 
price strategy. The manufacturers in Saudi Arabia could achieve a 
price strategy in 1990 and 1991 via suppliers chain management and 
inventory management. Specifically, manufacturers in Saudi Arabia 
consider the suppliers-related problems as their major impediment in 
winning a price strategy as will be seen in SWOT analysis in the 
next Chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
SWOT ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
This research suggests the implementation of SWOT analysis in 
studying manufacturing strategy. Since strategy in general and 
manufacturing strategy in particular are constructed on ra.competitive 
advantage basis (i.e., strength), employing a SWOT analysis should be 
useful in the detailed investigation of the manufacturing situation.
SWOT analysis, also known as "TOWS Matrix" (Weihrich, 1982), stands 
for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (David, 1986; 
Macbeth, 1989). By using this technique in manufacturing strategy, 
strengths and weaknesses will be defined within the firm (internal 
environment) as well as opportunities and threats will be highlighted 
in the industry sector (external environment). Avoiding a problem or 
a threat in an industry could be an advantage especially when other 
competitors failed to recognise it. Such an approach will enable a 
company to adopt a proactive rather than reactive stance.
It is worth noting that the adopted definition of manufacturing 
strategy in this study was based on SWOT analysis (see section 2.1). 
Thus, the broader meaning of manufacturing strategy is adopted in
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this Chapter.
The purpose of this Chapter is to find out in detail, using SWOT 
analysis, the manufacturing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats (problems) in Saudi industries. This technique will confirm 
and enrich the previous findings. All the data in this Chapter were 
provided by the general managers.
9.1 MANUFACTURING STRENGTHS
Table 9-1 presents the manufacturing strengths for all the surveyed 
plants. Strong unanimity on the top four items of manufacturing 
strengths among general managers of each of the four industries 
(i.e., food, paper, chemical and metal) is noticed. The Table shows 
that general managers postulated "top quality" to be their first 
manufacturing strength. This confirms earlier findings where 
consistent quality and high performance design were rated the highest 
manufacturing goals by both general and production managers (see 
section 6.2). Moreover, both managers indicated that quality as a 
manufacturing area needs the least improvement which means that they 
are pleased with the level of quality (see section 6.5). GMs, also, 
rated quality as one of the most important factor of all competitive 
priorities (see section 6.7). The percentage of rework products, 
customer rectification and scrap is on average 2.33, 2.26, 3.73
respectively for the total sample. In addition, the actual defective 
or rejected rate in production is lower than what general managers 
expected; 2.04 % and 2.60 % respectively. These percentages are not 
considered high when considering the little experience of the Saudi
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nation in the World of industrialisation. The second manufacturing 
strength in the Saudi plants, as pointed out by general managers, is 
"high technology and new equipment". This, also, confirms previous 
findings (see sections 6.3 and 6.8.1). In this regard, the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund plays a vital role as a loan provider 
(see section 3.8.5.3). General managers mentioned that they spent, on 
average, 13.2 per cent of the plant's income on buying new equipment. 
It is worth mentioning that access to modern technology is a major 
manufacturing objective (see section 3.8.1.1., no. 3). The Table also 
shows that "skilled workforce" is a strength for Saudi plants. 
However, Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on foreign manpower (see 
sections 3.6 and 5.1.3.1a). The fourth item of the manufacturing 
strengths that the majority of the plants enjoy is "on-time 
delivery". This supports previous findings where "on-time delivery" 
was rated next to quality in importance.
"Low price","high capacity" and "national and international standard" 
are currently manufacturing strengths for only a small number of 
plants (see Table 9-1) . Using canonical correlation it was 
demonstrated in Chapter 8 that low price is expected to be the 
manufacturing strategy of Saudi plants during the next two years (see 
section 8.4.3). Therefore, low price is envisaged to be a 
manufacturing strength for the majority of the plants during 1990 and 
1991 (Capacity and standardisation will be discussed in section 9.3).
When this open-ended question (i.e., manufacturing strengths) was 
rephrased, the same answers were provided. General managers were
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Table 9-1: Distribution of manufacturing strengths by industrial
sector
Factors F P C M Total
1. Top quality 21* 7* 25* 34* 87*
2. Technology/equipment 18 6 15 23 62
3. Skilled workforce 14 7 15 20 56
4. On-time delivery 11 5 14 17 47
5. Low price 5 2 7 8 22
6. High capacity 3 - 3 6 12
7. National and
international standards 4 2 3 9
Missing cases 4 2 2 3 11
F : Food industry P : Paper industry
C : Chemical industry M : Metal industry
* : number of times the item was mentioned
asked: "What elements of your manufacturing and technology are vital 
to your plant's competitiveness?" In response to this question. 
General managers emphasised quality and technology as tools for 
competitive advantage.
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9.2 MANUFACTURING WEAKNESSES
Table 9-2 exhibits the perceived manufacturing weaknesses for all the 
Saudi surveyed plants. Due to sensitivity only a small number of 
general managers were willing to mention their plants' weaknesses. 
Foremost weaknesses in Saudi plants are "unstable foreign labour" and 
"foreign expertise changing continuously". Other weaknesses seem to 
be as expected, except for "communications" which is related to the 
existence of different foreign nationalities (i.e., language 
barriers).
The first and the biggest weakness which general managers confront in 
Saudi Arabia is "unstable foreign labour". It was found earlier that 
Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on foreign labour. The non-Saudi 
workforce, within the surveyed sample, constituted 91 per cent (see 
section 5.1.3.1a). Furthermore, the foreign manpower formed almost 60 
per cent of the total employment in Saudi Arabia in 1985 and it was 
projected to be nearly 50 per cent in 1990 (see Chapter 3) . 
Generally, the attraction of the foreign labour to the Saudi private 
sector is attributed to several factors. Foremost among them are :
1. Low wages
2. Availability in all areas of specialisation with the required
period of experience
3. Unstable Saudi manpower due to their interest in looking for
higher wages as well as better jobs
4. Flexibility in transformation to work in any area in Saudi
Arabia (Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1989).
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As far as the manufacturing function is concerned this high reliance 
on foreign labour causes instability in employment. During the 
research field work, a large number of general managers pointed out 
that by the time they finish training the worker and he becomes 
familiar with the work, his contract, which normally carries a two 
year duration, expires. Most likely the high turnover in foreign 
workforce is ascribed to the difficulty in adopting to the Saudi 
environment as a closed society with certain values. Moreover, 
failure in providing recreation facilities to employees has 
compounded this difficulty. It should be stressed, as pointed out by 
GMs, that the high turnover in labour is largely restricted to blue 
collar and non arab nationalities (e.g., South East Asia).
The fact that "foreign expertise changes continuously" (e.g., GMs & 
PMs), impinges on plant's performance. In a case where the plant's 
financial performance is not satisfactory, the owner or the 
management company (i.e., some plants under the supervision of 
specialised management firms) changes the manager. Such a case was 
observed by the researcher when he handed out the questionnaire to 
some general managers but at the time of collection other managers or 
acting managers had been appointed. To decrease the rate of changing 
foreign expertise, full information concerning the Saudi business and 
social environment must be provided to intended managers. 
Furthermore, the criteria for selecting new managers must be examined 
carefully especially by the owners who make the choice.
"Low productivity of labour" as a manufacturing weakness in some of
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the Saudi plants could be mainly attributed to low wages. Some
general managers mentioned indirectly that they try to offer the 
lowest wages to employees. This attitude explains why foreign labour 
is attracted to the private sector as mentioned earlier. As a result, 
only low skilled employees will be attracted to the general manager's 
offer. Using low wages to reduce costs is a traditional strategy 
(Stalk, 1988). This study found that the cost of labour is on average
16.3 per cent of the produced unit. To improve labour productivity, 
managers as well as plants' owners should not be influenced by low 
wages strategy because a small increase in wages is easily 
compensated by slight improvement in performance. Furthermore, some 
systems should be implemented to improve labour productivity.
Another weak manufacturing factor is "planning difficulties". General 
managers referred these difficulties to customer rush orders and
fluctuations of demand. As for "rush orders", it was pointed earlier 
that both types of managers (GMs & PMs) want to provide "faster 
delivery" to ease the pressure received from their customers, as some 
general managers put it, "customers place their orders today and want 
them to be delivered yesterday" (see section 6.5). Thus, improving 
"fast delivery" will ease the difficulties in planning regarding 
"rush orders". The "fluctuations of demand" as a cause of inaccuracy 
in planning was confirmed in the findings of this study. The study 
found that the difference between actual and forecasted time of 
demand on a five point scale is 2.53 (1 means no difference and 2
indicates little difference). Moreover, it was found that the
difference between actual and forecasted demand on product quantity,
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Table 9-2: Distribution of manufacturing weaknesses by industrial
sector
Factors F P C M Total
1. Unstable foreign labour 6* 2* 9* 12* 29
2. Low productivity of labour 3 2 6 10 21
3. Planning difficulties 3 1 7 8 19
4. High production costs
5. Long time design for
2 6 9 17
new products 
6. foreign expertise
2 5 7 14
changing continuously 2 - 5 6 13
7. Small plant's area 2 1 3 4 10
8. Experience 2 - 3 3 8
9. Communications 1 - 3 4 8
10. Inappropriate location 1 1 1 - 3
11. Do not exist 3 - 4 6 13
Missing cases 9 2 6 8 25
F : Food industry P : Paper industry
C : Chemical industry M : Metal industry
* : number of times the item was mentioned
on the same scale, represents 2.42. It can be said that a better 
study of the Saudi market as well as more improvement on fast 
delivery reduce planning difficulties.
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The fourth manufacturing weakness that the Saudi manufacturing 
industries face is "high production costs". Since production costs 
mainly consist of the cost of raw materials, labour and overhead 
(energy), the highest of the three in terms of cost is raw materials 
as will be seen later. This is because Saudi plants rely heavily on 
foreign labour with low wages and the country is rich in energy 
(i.e., oil). It is surprising that not many general managers have 
mentioned this manufacturing weakness, although it does exist on a 
large scale. It was reported earlier that both managers rated low 
price (as a function of cost) to be the manufacturing area that 
needs the highest improvement (see section 6.5). Furthermore, 
uncompetitive price was ranked the third obstacle which Saudi 
exporting plants encounter (see section 5.7).
The next manufacturing weakness to high production costs is "Long 
time in design for new products" (Table 9-2). This weakness was 
found on a large scale in more than one area of the analysis. 
Manufacturers in Saudi Arabia not only take a long time to produce 
new products, but also neglect new products as a potential 
competitive priority. It was found earlier that 32.5 per cent, of 
the total sample, spent a period of over 6 months to 3 years to 
develop new products, and 14.5 per cent required over 3 years for the 
same activity (see Table 5.6). Moreover, the study found that 
"introducing new product" was one of the three lowest tasks that 
received little emphasis by both general managers and production 
managers; the other two were "R&D effort" and "introducing new 
production processes" (see section 6.2). Similarly, "new products
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introduction" was rated the least important factor out of eight 
priorities for the next two years (1990 and 1991) (see section 6.7). 
This supports the finding that 27.4 per cent of the total surveyed 
sample indicated that they did not introduce any new products from 
the time of operation (see Table 5.6). It should be noted that the 
"long time in designing new products" is ascribed to the small effort 
in "research and development". Nearly three-quarters of the surveyed 
general managers mentioned that they spent, on average, only 3.87 per 
cent of the plant's income on research and development. Such a 
percentage, if not spent on a regular and short term basis, is 
considered very small. Saudi plants should give more attention to R&D 
which would result in a strengthening of new products development. 
Expertise as well as substantial funds should be allocated to support 
intensive research.
The remaining perceived weaknesses, small plant's area, inappropriate 
location, and experience, are of little consequence. Such weaknesses 
with the exception of experience are the result of inaccurate 
planning on the part of both the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity and the owners of plants. As for small plant's area, the 
second stage of plant development should be taken into consideration 
when approving the first stage. Regarding inappropriate locations, 
the Ministry should not provide certain types of plants a site in the 
industrial city (e.g., salt plants should be accommodated near the 
sea) . Concerning "short experience", it is a fact that Saudi plants 
are of recent origin (mean in years of operation is 11.6; see Table 
5.5). However, manufacturers in the Kingdom should be able to compete
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on the basis of other qualifications (e.g., technology).
9.3 MANUFACTURING PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Table 9-3 displays the manufacturing problems or threats for the 
participating plants. These problems will be first discussed briefly, 
then suggested solutions will be presented (see Figures 9-1 and 9-2).
The first and the biggest problem these plants encounter is 
"importing raw materials". This is supported in more than one area of 
the analysis. This study found that, on average for the total sample, 
63 per cent of raw materials are imported. Moreover, the cost of 
materials constituted almost 60 per cent of the total cost unit. 
Although, the share of materials of the total cost unit is usually 
the highest (De Meyer, 1986), it is further increased in the case of 
imported raw materials. Figure 9-1 shows problems associated with 
importing raw materials. The problem that is highly stressed by GMs 
is "continuous increase in raw materials prices year after year", due 
to inflation. This increase rises production costs which in turn 
result in high selling prices. Some general managers also mentioned 
that they were manipulated by distributors of raw materials.
Solutions were suggested by some general managers to problems 
associated with importing raw materials (see Figure 9-2). Some GMs 
suggested a unified purchasing policy for raw materials so as to 
impose pressures on suppliers as well as distributors. This can be 
implemented by establishing a management firm to import raw 
materials for all plants (or for each industry) at fixed times with
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fewer orders. The main advantages of such a policy are:
1. Assurance of fixed prices.
2. Attractive quantity discounts due to large purchase.
3. Standardizing materials.
4. Less effort and time expenditure on the part of the
manufacturers.
Along these lines, some general managers have also proposed the idea 
of buying materials through the government (e.g., SABIC). Other 
suggestions to overcome the raw materials' problems call for serious 
efforts to find national resources with the participation of the 
current plants under government supervision; and duty tax exemptions 
to help reduce high costs. Some general managers suggested that the 
exemption from customs duties should not only be restricted to 
primary raw materials, it should also include all other types of 
materials (see section 3.8.1.2., no. 5b).
It is important to note that good supply chains are a very 
significant factor for Saudi plants to win a price manufacturing 
strategy in the next two years (1990 and 1991) (see section 8.4.3). 
Indeed, getting discounts from suppliers on large quantity purchase 
(i.e., through a specialised firm) could help Saudi plants enjoy a 
price strategy. Due to their importance, suppliers have been called 
"the life blood" of manufacturers (Macbeth, 1989) .
The second major problem which participating Saudi plants face is
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"underutilisation of capacity". Again, this supports previous 
findings. This study found that the average utilisation of the 
actual total capacity for the total sample in terms of equipment, 
labour and resources is 71.3 per cent (see section 5.1.1.2). Figure 
9-1 presents four main causes of underutilisation of capacity 
reported by the respondents:
1. Industry wide over capacity in terms of number of plants, 
resulting in reducing market share and making the industry very 
competitive. This indicates that either the principle of 
licensing industrial projects is not effective, or the Ministry 
of Industry and Electricity has overestimated market demand 
(see section 3.8.1.2, no. 6).
2. Products which are manufactured locally are also imported, this 
leads to war-price competition. This could indicate that the 
"protective custom tariffs" on competing imports are not 
effective enough (see section 3.8.1.2, no. 5e). It should be 
noted that the trend is to reduce protectionism world wide.
3. Declining in governmental projects, due to completion of the 
Kingdom's infrastructure, causes underutilisation of capacity 
for the majority of the Saudi plants.
4. Existence of small markets owing to the small size of the 
population (see section 3.3).
The underutilisation of capacity was also found to be the major 
problem for Saudi plants in the survey conducted by The Consulting 
Center for Finance and Investment (1988). It is worth noting that
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large scale capacity was mentioned as a manufacturing strength for a 
few plants (see Table 9-1).
All suggested solutions to the underutilisation of capacity require 
the intensive participation of the Saudi government (see Figure 9-2). 
The most important suggestion calls for the introduction of the Saudi 
manufactured products as a part of the Kingdom's foreign aid 
programme (subsidy) . It has been suggested by general managers that 
half of the subsidy or at least 30 per cent should be in Saudi 
products rather than all of it in cash. For, as GMs pointed out, all 
aid receivers are third world countries needing all types of 
products manufactured in Saudi Arabia. This suggestion, if 
implemented, will decrease fluctuations in demand. The second 
solution proposed requires an actual application of the Royal decree 
to the purchase of local producers for governmental projects (Saudi 
Consulting House, 1986) . Some GMs mentioned that there is no strong 
control from the government in this area. As one general manager put 
it "foreign companies have their own ways to escape from it". If 
this is the case, there is an ineffective application of both the 
Royal decree and the guideline of the industrial policy (see section
3.8.1.2, no. 5d). The third solution calls for the government to sign 
agreements with foreign countries so Saudi firms can gain access to 
their markets with reasonable duties. This could be hard to accept 
unless such countries express real interest in dual agreements. Other 
solutions want the government through the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity to stop or reduce issuing licenses for the saturated 
industries and provide financial help for exporting purposes.
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The third problem that the manufacturers in Saudi Arabia face, as 
seen from Table 9-3, is "high dependence on foreign labour". As 
mentioned earlier in different aspects of this study, there exists a 
clear shortage of national manpower in the Kingdom (see section 9.2).
Figure 9-1 shows that the use of foreign workforce makes it difficult 
for GMs to discharge unnecessary number of foreign employees during 
low demand periods because of the long process involved in getting 
visas when demand increases again.
Solutions suggested for "high reliance on foreign labour" centred 
around decreasing the associated problems with foreign employment 
(see Figure 9-2). As unstable foreign labour is a major manufacturing 
weakness for Saudi plants (see section 9.2), general managers 
suggested a central firm(s) to be in charge of supplying employees. 
That is, establishing a firm to provide a central labour pool for all 
plants (or for each industry) as well as to make some employees 
available for short term employment, corresponding to management 
firms. The foremost advantages of such a firm include:
1. Employees will be selected to work in Saudi Arabia on the basis
of certain criteria (e.g., national traits related to ease of 
adjustment).
2. Employees will be provided for seasonal production periods.
3. Employees will be well trained.
4. Employees will be able to socialise by getting to know large
numbers of people in the labour pool (e.g., recreational
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facilities).
However, the difficulties associated with the establishment of such 
a firm involve big losses for the firm if employees are not hired 
especially during seasonal period; and difficulties in managing a 
large number of employees with variety of skills. Another solution 
for the problem of "high dependence on foreign labour" is to make 
serious efforts to train Saudis, and make greater use of government 
grants for training Saudis (see section 3.8.1.2, no. 5g) . Moreover, 
general managers as well as owners of plants should offer more 
incentives to Saudi employees to attract them to stay in the job 
(see section 9.2).
The fourth problem which the Saudi manufacturing industries encounter 
is "unfair competition" (i.e., dumping). Figure 9-1 indicates that 
one source of "unfair competition" is the import of inferior 
products. This indicates ineffective control made by the government 
to prevent harmful foreign competition (see section 3.8.1.2, no. 3). 
Another source of "unfair competition" is the provision of low 
quality products by unlicensed national plants. These low quality 
products, GMs pointed out, are offered at low prices. It should be 
noted here that the same finding was reported by The Consulting 
Center for Finance and Investment (1988).
Suggested solutions for "unfair competition", as pointed out by GMs, 
call for the government through, the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity, to prevent or reduce access for inferior products to the
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Table 9-3: Distribution of manufacturing problems by industrial
sector
Factors F P C M Total
1. Importing raw materials
2. Underutilisation of
12* 10* 14* 25* 61
capacity 
3. High dependence on
9 4 21 17 51
foreign workforce 10 3 14 20 47
4. Unfair competition 4 - 18 17 39
5. Very competitive industry 7 2 15 . 15 39
6. Difficulties in exporting 5 2 14 11 32
7. Standardisation
8. Unavailability of quick 
supply of spare
9 12 21
parts & maintenance 6 1 8 4 19
9. Marketing problems 3 1 5 7 16
10. Lack of local expertise 2 1 4 6 13
Missing cases 5 1 4 4 14
F : Food industry P : Paper industry
C : Chemical industry M : Metal industry
* : number of times the item was mentioned
Details of the above factors are displayed in Figure 9-1
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Figure 9-1: Details of problems
Raw materials: imported; remote resources; continuous increase in 
prices, high prices set by distributors, exchange rates; 
duties; not standard; and delay in delivery.
Underutilisation of capacity: over capacity industries; import the 
same manufactured products; decline in government's projects; 
and small markets.
Foreign workforce: heavily dependent on foreign labour; difficulty 
in discharging unnecessary number of workforce during low 
demand periods because of the long process involved in getting 
visas when demand increases again.
Unfair competition: import inferior products; and low quality
products from unlicensed small national plants.
Difficulties in exporting: Lack of information; and lack of
finances.
Standardisation: Lack of standardisation for some products.
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Figure 9-2: Problems and solutions
Imported raw materials: a unified purchasing policy; buying through 
the government; effort to find national substitutions; and 
free duties.
Underutilisation of capacity: introduce the products as a part of
the Kingdom's foreign aid programme; apply the Royal decree as 
regards purchasing in the framework of governmental projects; 
sign agreements with foreign countries to be allowed access to 
their markets with reasonable duties; stop or reduce the 
issuing of licenses; and exporting.
High dependence on foreign workforce: establish a firm to be in
charge of providing as well as lending employees to plants; and 
train Saudis.
Unfair competition: prevent inferior quality products; and meet
the Saudi standards.
Very competitive industry: classify plants according to quality and 
capacity; call for plants to co-operate; stop issuing 
industrial licenses; increase duties on imported products; 
decrease importing; unify duties in the Gulf countries; and 
incorporate weak plants.
Difficulties in exporting: establish governmental offices to
provide information; and establish an export bank.
Lack of standardisation: more effort is needed from SASO; and
adopt international standards.
Unavailability and long lead times for spare parts and 
maintenance: review the current policy; and establish
maintenance companies in Saudi Arabia.
Marketing problems: merge plants; and increase consumers'
awareness.
Lack of local expertise: establish a strong link between plants
and universities as well as other institutions.
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Saudi markets; and the strict imposition of Saudi standards on 
foreign products. In other words, general managers are looking for 
more protection from the government.
The most significant problem, yet not ranked high in the list (see 
Table 9-3) , is the claim that the Saudi environment is "very 
competitive". Almost every manager (GM & PM) mentioned this fact 
during the field work, and attributed this toughness to the fact that 
the Saudi industries are accessible to all foreign legal products 
(i.e., according to the Islamic law). This is because the Saudi 
government believes, as pointed out in the industrial policy, in 
strong competition as being in the best interests of consumers (see 
section 3.8.1.2., no. 3). This supports earlier findings that the 
surveyed industries experienced little to moderate foreign 
competition within the Saudi market. Furthermore, Saudi competition 
against these industries ranged between moderate and high (see 
section 5.6 and Figure 5-5). The combination of these two types of 
competition (foreign and Saudi) really makes Saudi markets tough to 
compete in.
To reduce the high level of competition in the Saudi industries, 
general managers offered several suggestions (see Figure 9-2). These 
are:
1. Classification of plants according to quality and capacity to 
ensure fair competition.
2. Calling for plants to co-operate and co-ordinate between
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themselves as it is the case in the developed countries (e.g., 
dividing regions with regard to service).
3. Stopping the issue of industrial licenses.
4. Increasing duties on imported products.
5. Decreasing imports.
6. Unifying duties within the Gulf countries (economic
co-operation among Gulf countries was encouraged in the Fourth 
Development Plan (see section 3.5)).
7. Urging weak plants to combine to form strong plants in order to
overcome problems.
The sixth of the ten specified problems which Saudi industries face 
is "difficulties in exporting". As seen from Figure 9-1, these 
difficulties are caused by a lack of information on available 
exporting outlets as well as by a lack of finance. It is worth 
indicating that the present study found "Lack of information" and 
"Lack of finance" to constitute the second and the sixth obstacles 
respectively for exporting plants (see section 5.7).
To overwhelm difficulties associated with exporting, general 
managers suggested: the establishment of governmental offices to
provide information concerning exporting outlets, besides plants own 
efforts in this area; and the establishment of an export bank to 
finance plants. It is worth noting that the establishment of an 
export bank is in its final stage (discussion with the Deputy 
Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Electricity during the field 
work). The establishment of this bank, the Deputy Minister pointed
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out, is according to the industrial policy guidelines (see section
3.8.1.2, no. 5h).
The next problem that some Saudi industries are confronting is
"standardisation" (Table 9-3). This problem exists only in the 
chemical and metal industries, and is probably because in the food 
industry the type of process is highly standardised, and in the paper 
industries it is highly customised. As shown in Figure 9-1, the 
problem stems from a lack of standardisation of some products. 
General managers revealed that a lack of industry standards leads to 
the definition of customer specific standards resulting in complex 
tasks. "Standardisation" is seen as a manufacturing strength for a 
small number of plants (see Table 9-1).
Concerning "standardisation", GMs suggested that the Saudi Arabian 
Standards Organisation (SASO) should put more effort into the
provision of standards for all the products or, at least, the
majority of them. When the provision of sufficient standards is
difficult for SASO, GMs pointed out, it should adopt international 
standards.
Unavailability and long lead times for spare parts and maintenance 
are other problems faced by the Saudi industries. It was found 
earlier that "the suppliers of product parts" and "the suppliers of 
equipment" are two of the three least important considerations in 
strategic decision making (see section 6.3). As mentioned in Chapter 
Six, this is due to request made by the Ministry of Industry and
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Electricity that plants should determine once at the beginning of 
each year their needs of these two items, so they can be exempt of 
duties. Accordingly, spare parts as well as equipment are not 
requested at the time of need causing problems for manufacturers. 
Maintenance is a highly problematic area in developing countries GMs 
attributed this to the lack of Saudis experts and to unavailability 
of large numbers of foreigners in this area. It is important to note 
that this study found that the average number of monthly hours lost 
per machine due to breakdowns is between 4 and 8 hours. Moreover, 
the average number of monthly hours spent on preventive maintenance 
per machine is between 6 and 10 hours. The small number of hours 
concerning breakdowns is ascribed to the fact that Saudi industries 
are well equipped with modern technology and new equipment.
General managers suggested reviewing the current policy with regard 
to spare parts and equipment. That is, allow manufacturers to buy 
spare parts and equipment when needed or at least more than once a 
year. As for the problem of "maintenance", general managers 
recommended a large scale establishment of maintenance companies in 
the kingdom.
Marketing problems are also among the problems that the Saudi plants 
face. Some general managers declared that lack of professionalism, 
limited resources and lack of consumer awareness are factors 
attributed to their marketing problems.
To overcome their marketing problems, general managers suggested
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merging plants so as to create professionalism in business, increase 
resources substantially, develop marketing programmes, and awaken 
consumers' awareness concerning "buying national products" with high 
quality.
Finally, what Saudi industries are faced with is a lack of local 
expertise. In this context, GMs pointed out that due to the fact that 
all Saudi plants are new in the world of industrialisation, this 
makes it difficult to seek immediate technical assistance.
They proposed the establishment of a strong collaboration between 
plants and universities as well as other institutions (e.g.,
research). Such a suggestion is highly encouraged because Saudis are 
getting higher standards in education (see section 3.4).
9.4 MANUFACTURING OPPORTUNITIES
Table 9-4 presents the manufacturing opportunities specified by the 
surveyed managers. Surprisingly, a glance at the Table, reveals that 
a large number of the respondents (as compared to the highest number 
in the Table) mentioned that no opportunities exist in Saudi
industries. Similarly, the number of missing cases is quite high. 
This type of response could mean that these general managers are not 
considering the government's incentives as opportunities.
According to many GMs, the first and foremost opportunity is
"governmental encouragement". They said that the provision of loans, 
free duties, free taxes, nominal fees for accommodation in the
337
Table 9-4: Distribution of manufacturing opportunities by industrial
sector
Factors F P C M Total
1. Governmental encouragement 8* 3* 10* 14* 35
2. Freedom to import raw 
materials & technology 6 4 9 12 31
3. Exporting 4 - 7 9 20
4. Obtaining raw materials 
from the Gulf countries __ _. 7 8 15
5. Obtaining raw materials 
from SABIC __ __ 11 3 14
6. Replacing imported products 1 - 6 5 12
7. Increasing government's 
projects _ _ 4 5 9
8. Free capital movement 1 - 3 3 7
9. No opportunities 4 2 5 7 18
Missing cases 14 4 8 8 34
F : Food industry P : Paper industry
C : Chemical industry M : Metal industry
* : number of times the item was mentioned
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industrial cities, and other incentives are incomparably the best in 
any country of the World (see section 3.8.1.2., no. 5).
Other general managers mentioned that freedom to move capital and to 
import raw materials and technology from anywhere in the world are 
great opportunities, which pave the way to joint venture projects.
Some general managers see their opportunities in exporting. 
They pointed out that owing to the small size of the Saudi markets 
and the population, the only opportunity is to seek external markets. 
The study found that 73.5 per cent of the plants surveyed trade in 
both Saudi and foreign markets (see section 5.7).
A small number of GMs, particulary in the chemical and metal 
industries, see their opportunities in obtaining some raw materials 
from SABIC or from some companies in the Gulf countries (see section 
3.8.3).
Others consider their opportunities not only replacing imported 
products which is the usual model in developing countries, but also 
expecting an increase in governmental projects.
SUMMARY
The Chapter aimed at a detailed investigation of the Saudi 
manufacturing situation. Using SWOT analysis, strengths and 
weaknesses were defined within the firm (internal environment) and 
opportunities and threats (problems) were also highlighted in the
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industry (external environment).
By means of this technique, it was found that the manufacturing 
strengths of Saudi plants centred around high quality and modern 
technology. The acquisition of modern technology was facilitated 
through loans provided by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund.
Nevertheless, Saudi plants have major weaknesses related to the 
high turnover of foreign labour (unstable) and the continuous change 
of foreign expertise (e.g., GMs). The first weakness is attributed to 
the difficulty of foreign workers to adjust to the Saudi environment 
of a closed society, whereas the second weakness is ascribed to the 
dissatisfactory plants' financial performance. High production cost 
is further another weakness for the Saudi plants eventhough a low 
wages strategy might be adopted. Such a strategy aimed at reducing 
costs is traditional.
As for the problems, the Saudi plants are highly dependent on 
imported raw materials as well as on foreign labour. To minimise
these problems, GMs suggested the establishment of a company to be
\
responsible for importing raw materials on the behalf of all plants 
(or for each industry), to assure fixed prices and to reduce effort 
and time. Similarly, they favoured setting up a firm to be in charge 
of providing and lending employees to all plants (or for each 
industry) . The foremost advantages presented by such a firm are as 
follows: selecting workers from those nationalities whose citizens 
have proved to adjust in the past to the Saudi environment;
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supplying employees for seasonal periods; providing well trained 
employees; and offering recreational facilities. In addition, the
Saudi plants are also facing underutilisation of capacity and
operating in the midst of very competitive industries. The 
underutilisation of capacity is caused mainly by over capacity 
industry in terms of plants and importing the same products which 
are manufactured locally. As concerns strong competition, it is 
related to the accessibility of Saudi markets to all foreign legal 
products (i.e., according to islamic law). Solutions suggested for 
underutilisation of capacity involve: the introduction of Saudi
products as a part of the Kingdom foreign aid programme; and the 
requirement of the actual application of the Royal decree to the 
purchase from national plants in the framework of governmental 
projects. To ease competition, GMs suggested: the classification of 
plants according to quality and capacity to ensure fair competition;
the division of regions between plants in terms of service; the
non-issuing of industrial licenses; and decreasing importing.
Apart from the problems mentioned above, the Saudi plants enjoy 
enormous opportunities provided by the government. The foremost of 
them are the provision of loans, free duties, free taxes and nominal 
fee for the accommodation in the industrial cities.
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
This final Chapter of the thesis presents a summary and a conclusion 
of the research results , and suggests some avenues for future 
research. Prior to this, the objectives of the research and the 
methodology are reviewed.
10.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the study are to develop an understanding of the 
manufacturing strategy concept and to find out the type of 
manufacturing strategies that exist among Saudi plants. More 
specifically, the study is aimed at:
1. Detecting the manufacturing strategy for the Saudi plants in
the last two years (i.e., 1987 and 1988) as well as for the
next two years ( i.e., 1990 and 1991).
2. Testing the following six hypotheses of the model of
manufacturing strategy on the Saudi manufacturing private 
sector:
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HI Environmental uncertainty correlates with manufacturing task.
H2 A plant's manufacturing infrastructure correlates with its
manufacturing task.
H3 The higher the congruence between environmental uncertainty
and manufacturing task, the better the performance.
H4 The higher the congruence between manufacturing task and
manufacturing infrastructure, the better the performance.
H5 The higher the top management and production management task
congruence, the better the performance.
H6 The greater the involvement of production managers in strategic
decision making, the better the performance.
3. Using SWOT analysis to find out strengths and weaknesses within
the plants surveyed as well as opportunities and threats in the 
environment.
10.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research took the form of a field study which analysed data drawn 
from 117 plants from the Saudi Manufacturing private sector. The 
plants were selected from the highest four industries in terms of 
invested capital, number of employees, and sales. The industries are 
food, paper, chemical and metal. The number of plants for each
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industry was determined on the basis of the actual existence of such 
plants in the industry. Plants were then chosen from each 
sub-industry using disproportional stratified sampling according to 
the following factors as priorities in decreasing order: highest
capital paid up; highest in both capital paid up and number of 
employees; and highest number of employees. The achieved sample of 
plants of each industry is: food 26, paper 11, chemical 32, and metal 
48. The achieved sample represents 73 per cent of the total number 
of plants approached.
Three managers from each plant were invited to participate in the 
study; the general manager, the production manager and the 
sales/marketing manager. Correspondingly, three types of 
questionnaire were designed (see Appendix A). The major sections in 
these types of questionnaire cover:
1. Manufacturing task.
2. Perceived environmental uncertainty.
3. Production manager's role in strategic decision making.
4. Competitive priorities.
5. Performance.
6. Manufacturing infrastructure.
Of the above variables, the questionnaire for general managers 
measured items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; the questionnaire for production 
managers measured items 1, 3, and 6; and the questionnaire for sales 
or marketing managers measured item 3 only. All data in these types
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of questionnaire are of subjective nature except for a small part in 
the performance section where objective data are used.
10.3 SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS
Prior to the analysis each of the major variables in this study was 
examined by Cronbach's alpha coefficient, a widely accepted index, to 
indicate the reliability of the instruments. More precisely, this 
index indicates the consistency of the responses. The values of alpha 
coefficient in this study were ranged between 0.68 and 0.94. These 
values were found to be above the acceptable level. A summary of the 
main findings of the work will now be provided.
10.3.1 Manufacturing Strategy For 1987 And 1988
Of fourteen manufacturing tasks rated by both general and production 
managers according to their plants' goal in 1987 and 1988, it was 
found that "consistent quality", "on-time delivery", and "high 
performance design" received the highest means (see section 6.2). 
Furthermore, using SWOT analysis, general managers postulated "top 
quality" to be their primary manufacturing strength followed by "high 
technology and new equipment" (see Table 9-1) . This evidence 
indicates that the manufacturing strategies for the plants surveyed 
during 1987 and 1988 are "high quality" and "on-time delivery".
10.3.2 The Production Manager's Role In Strategic Decision Making
The role of the production manager in strategic decision making was 
examined from several viewpoints in this study (see section 6.4). It 
was found that both general and sales managers do not agree that
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their "production manager knows exactly what are the most important 
competitive priorities for the manufacturing function". This could 
be explained in light of the difference between the qualifying and 
the competitive priorities criteria (Hill, 1985) . That is, general 
and sales managers are usually the most knowledgeable managers in the 
firm about the market place and they know what is the qualifier for 
the product to be in the market place, as well as the competitive 
priority that allows the product to win orders in the market place. 
Furthermore, both general and sales managers disagree with the 
statement that their "production manager is responsible for 
initiating and modifying short and long term changes in manufacturing 
strategy". The disagreement about this statement is because 
production manager does not know exactly the most important 
competitive priorities, hence he is not solely responsible for 
initiating and modifying changes in the manufacturing strategy.
All types of managers (strategy, production, and sales) indicated 
that "production manager is given an equivalent role among the 
functional managers in the formulation of corporate strategy". It 
was found that 72 per cent of the surveyed production managers 
pointed out that they possess an equivalent role as any functional 
managers (summation of "agree" and "strongly agree"). Moreover, 
general and sales managers gave each almost 70 per cent in support of 
the equivalent role for the production manager among other functional 
managers. These findings indicate that the claim that production 
managers are given less equivalent role among functional managers has 
improved (Skinner, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985).
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The majority of the general managers (80 per cent) are in support of 
the production manager's attendance to top management meetings as a 
representative of the manufacturing function. This finding supports 
the previous one and both prove that the "missing link" between the 
corporate level and the manufacturing function as reported by Skinner 
(1969) does not exist any more, at least in Saudi Arabia.
Both general and sales managers strongly agree that their "production 
manager is an integral part of the strategy formulation process, and 
that his inputs are part of the divisional (corporate) strategy". 
This finding implies the attendance of the production manager to top 
management meetings. The finding supports that of Sharma (1987) who 
found that production managers do participate in the strategic 
planning process.
Finally, do the above findings mean that production manager has a 
good understanding of how the divisional strategy is formed? This 
study found that both general and sales managers strongly support 
production managers in their high level of understanding to the 
formulation of the divisional strategy.
10.3.3 Manufacturing Strategy For 1990 And 1991
To detect the manufacturing strategy for the Saudi plants in the next 
two years (1990 and 1991), components of manufacturing strategy as 
well as focused sets of competitive priorities were extracted by the 
principal components of factor analysis.
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Before using factor analysis, the data of the four industries were 
tested by Kruskal Wallis and One Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to 
find out that there were no significant differences among the 
industries. Both statistical techniques revealed insignificant 
differences among the four industries (see section 8.1). Thus, the 
analysis on the total sample was valid.
Out of fifty one infrastructure-programmes, fourteen components of 
manufacturing strategy were extracted (see Figure 8-2). These are:
1. Supplier Chain Management.
2. Automation Management.
3. Improving Workforce Skills Management.
4. Product Control Management.
5. High Volume Products Management.
6. Quality Management.
7. Inventory Management.
8. Increasing Productivity Management.
9. Information System Management.
10. Purchasing Control Management.
11. Human Resources Management.
12. Turnover Management.
13. Co-ordination Management.
14. Work-In-Process Management.
The cumulative percentage of variance accounted by the 14 factors is 
76.4. According to Hair et al. (1987), this percentage is considered
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highly satisfactory. The first factor (i.e., Supplier Chain 
Management) explained the largest percentage of variance (26.8 per 
cent), and the last factor (i.e., Work-In-Process Management) 
explained only 2.10 per cent of the variance (see Table 8-1). This 
means that "Supplier Chain Management" is the most important factor 
for the Saudi plants in this study.
From the eight competitive priorities listed in Table 6-11, three 
focused sets were extracted. These are:
(i) Quality-Delivery Priority.
(ii) Flexibility Priority.
(iii) Low Price Priority.
The cumulative percentage of variance explained by the three factors 
is almost 60 per cent. This percentage is considered satisfactory 
(Hair et al., 1987). The focused sets of priorities were found to 
confirm the theoretically predicted priorities (i.e., quality, 
delivery, flexibility, and cost) with one exception; both types of 
quality and delivery were loaded in one factor in this study. Two 
types of priorities encapsulated in one factor is not uncommon and in 
two other studies, the first related to Japanese data (Roth et al., 
1989) and the other to American data (Roth, 1987), the researchers 
extracted three focused sets of competitive priorities. As reported 
in Chapter 8, the difference in the content of the set of the 
priority as long as all the components in that priority are similar 
can be referred to the fact that strategy is dynamic (see section
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8.3) .
Through canonical correlation analysis, a manufacturing strategy was 
detected using the fourteen components of manufacturing strategy and 
the three focused sets of competitive priorities. The manufacturing 
strategy was found to be that of a low price (p = .025) . The
manufacturers in Saudi Arabia could achieve a price strategy in the 
next two years (1990 and 1991) via two factors; supplier chain 
management and inventory management (see Figure 8-2). The literature 
corroborates these two factors as instruments to measure cost (Fine 
and Hax, 1985; Leong et al., 1990).
It is worth pointing out that "suppliers" constitute a major 
environmental factor which, as far as plants are concerned, 
uncontrollable. In this context, it is worth suggesting that saudi 
plants should adopt the "cooperative approach" rather than the 
"competitive approach" in their relationship with suppliers (see 
section 2.4.5.1 d) .
10.3.4 Testing Of Hypotheses
Six hypotheses of the manufacturing strategy model were tested (see 
Figures 2-2 and 2-8). Each hypothesis was tested five times; first, 
on the total sample, then on the individual industries (food, paper, 
chemical and metal). The testing was carried out, after weighting 
the instruments, via pearson product moment correlation and the 
T-test (see Appendix D) . The results showed a significant 
relationship in every hypothesis. These are summarised below:
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First, environmental uncertainty, which is an input to manufacturing 
strategy, influences manufacturing task. Significant relationships 
were found between environmental uncertainty and manufacturing task 
in the paper, chemical, and metal industries and in the overall 
sample. This implies that the manufacturing strategies of these 
plants in 1987 and 1988 reflected environmental uncertainty to a 
certain degree. This finding supports Swamidass's (1983) finding.
Second, the evidence of correlating manufacturing infrastructure with 
manufacturing task was not conclusive in all industries. A 
significant relationship was found in the food and in the chemical 
industries, and in the total sample, but not in the paper and the 
metal industries. As mentioned in Chapter 7, it seems that the type 
of process influences such a relationship. Both the food and the 
chemical sectors employ "continuous process" systems in their 
operations. Swamidass (1983) failed to find a significant 
relationship between manufacturing infrastructure and manufacturing 
task. The absence of a significant relationship in the paper and 
metal industries, in this study, is intriguing because such a 
relationship was prescribed in the manufacturing management 
literature by several authors. This finding supports the claim made 
by Hill (1985), Skinner (1985) and Wheelwright (1978) that most firms 
fail to employ a manufacturing infrastructure that suits their needs 
(i.e., corporate strategy or manufacturing task). This conclusion 
parallels the one reported by Swamidass (1983).
351
Third, the findings strongly support the need for congruence between 
environmental uncertainty and manufacturing task to achieve superior 
performance. This hypothesis is validated for the first time. 
Significant relationships were found using subjective and objective 
performance measures in all industries except the paper industry (due 
to a small number of cases). Moreover, the hypothesis was supported 
on the overall sample. Swamidass (1983) failed to find significant 
results in this hypothesis as well as in hypothesis four and this is 
may be attributed to differences in interpretation of the hypotheses 
(see section 7.4.3). The hypothesis findings lend support to the 
contingency theory (see section 2.4.3), Bedeian's (1984) findings 
(see section 2.5.3) and Skinner's (1978) writings.
Fourth, though not conclusive the findings support the need for 
congruence between manufacturing task and infrastructure to achieve 
superior performance. This hypothesis is also validated for the first 
time. Significant results were found with the sales measure in the 
metal and chemical industries using subjective and objective 
performance measures respectively. As for the overall sample, the 
hypothesis was supported with the objective performance measure only. 
It was not surprising to find in the rest of the industries that no 
conclusive influence on performance appears as a result of congruence 
between manufacturing task and manufacturing infrastructure. This is 
due to the failure of finding a significant relationship between 
manufacturing task and infrastructure in all industries surveyed 
(i.e., H2).
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Fifth, task congruence (the difference of the average ratings on 
manufacturing task) between general and production managers 
influences performance. This hypothesis was highly supported in all 
industries by the objective performance measure, but it was backed by 
the subjective performance measure in the metal sector only. The
hypothesis also was supported in the overall sample in both types of
performance measures. This finding corroborates those reported by 
Bourgeois (1980b), Yaghmour (1985), Dess (1987), and Lindman and 
Callarman (1990).
Finally, the role of the production manager in strategic decision 
making as perceived by themselves (RPMP) and by general managers 
(RPMG) associates with performance. The hypothesis has more backing
with the RPMP measure in almost all the industries with both
subjective and objective performance measures. As mentioned in
Chapter Seven, a possible reason for this could be their egos in
overstating their role. This provides more support to 
Swamidass' finding (1983) who only found that the role of the 
manufacturing manager in strategic decision making as perceived by 
chief executives correlates with performance. The findings in this
study give support to the writings of Skinner (1978) , Hayes and
Wheelwright (1984), and Hill (1985).
10.3.5 SWOT Analysis
SWOT analysis was used in this study to detect the Saudi 
manufacturing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The 
findings of this technique are not totally new. A new approach on the
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part of the manufacturers would be to understand these findings in 
light of the manufacturing strategy and to learn to overcome the 
problems as well as the weaknesses and to derive the advantages from 
the manufacturing strengths and the industry opportunities. 
Furthermore/ employing the solutions suggested in this study could 
decrease tremendously the severity of the problems.
The two major manufacturing strengths that the Saudi plants possess 
are "high quality" and "modern technology" (see section 9.1). The 
Saudi plants produce high quality products as a result of high 
quality raw materials and modern technology. Manufacturers in Saudi 
Arabia use high technology to overcome shortages of national 
manpower.
When considering weaknesses/ Saudi plants suffer' from "unstable 
foreign labour" (see section 9.2). The high turnover in foreign 
manpower may well be ascribed to the difficulty of newcomers in 
adapting to the Saudi environment as a closed society with certain 
values (i.e., islamic law) . Furthermore/ failing to offer 
recreational facilities to employees compounds this difficulty. Other 
weaknesses of the Saudi manufacturing industries are "low 
productivity labour"/ "high production costs", and "long time in 
design for new products". The low productivity of labour may be 
attributed to the use of a low wages strategy, while the other two 
weaknesses are imputed to importing raw materials and allocating 
small effort for research and development respectively.
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The Saudi industries encounter several problems (see section 9.3). 
The foremost among them are importing raw materials, underutilisation 
of capacity, high dependence on foreign workforce, unfair 
competition, and very competitive industrial environment. Solutions 
were suggested to these problems by general managers (see Figures 9-1 
and 9-2). These are as follows:
o Importing Raw Materials
Establishing a firm to import raw materials for all plants (or for 
each industry) at fixed times with fewer orders. The major 
advantages of such a firm are assurance of fixed prices, attractive 
quantity discounts, standardising materials, and less effort and time 
expenditure on the part of the manufacturers.
o Underutilisation Of Capacity
Introducing the Saudi manufactured products as a part of the 
kingdom's foreign aid programme (subsidy) to better utilise capacity. 
That is, half of the subsidy or at least 30 per cent should be in 
Saudi products rather than all of it in cash. This suggestion, if 
implemented, will decrease fluctuations in demand. A second solution 
for utilising capacity requires the application of an existing Royal
decree to the purchase of local producers for governmental projects.
Other solutions to the underutilisation of capacity require the 
government through the Ministry of Industry and Electricity to stop 
or reduce the issuing of licenses to saturated industries and 
provide financial help for exporting purposes.
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o Reliance on foreign Labour
Solutions suggested for "high reliance on foreign manpower" centred 
around decreasing the associated problems with foreign employment. 
Because unstable foreign labour is a major manufacturing weakness for 
the Saudi plants, general managers suggested the establishment of a 
firm(s) to be in charge of providing a central labour pool for all 
plants (or for each industry) . The foremost advantages presented by 
such a firm would include: employees will be selected to work in 
Saudi Arabia on the basis of certain criteria (e.g., national traits 
related to ease of adjustment); employees will be lent for seasonal 
production periods; employees will be well trained; and employees 
will be more able to socialise by getting to know large numbers of 
people through the firm. However, the disadvantages for such a firm 
are big losses if employees are not hired, and difficulties in 
managing large number of employees with an enormous range of 
specialisation. Another solution in this context, is making serious 
efforts to train Saudis using the government subsidies granted for 
this purpose (see section 3.8.1.2. No. 5g).
o Unfair Competition
General managers call for the Ministry of Industry and Electricity to 
prevent or reduce the access of inferior products to the Saudi 
markets and that foreign products should be forced to meet Saudi 
standards.
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o Competitive Industry
General managers suggested a classification of plants according to 
quality and capacity to ensure fair competition, calling on plants to 
co-operate and co-ordinate between themselves as it is the case in 
the developed countries (e.g., dividing regions in terms of service); 
and decreasing imports.
Finally, as for opportunities in the Saudi industries, the foremost 
opportunity that was mentioned by many general managers is 
"governmental encouragement" (see section 9.4). They pointed out 
that the provision of loans, free duties, free taxes, nominal fees 
for accommodation in the industrial cities and a host of other 
incentives are incomparably the best in any country of the world.
10.4 CONCLUSIONS
This study is devoted to the investigation of two models; the general 
model of manufacturing strategy and the competitive priorities model. 
In the course of the study, results concerning the general model were 
found to corroborate previous results and to generate new findings 
proven valid in the literature. On the other hand, results regarding 
the competitive priorities model are awaiting further empirical 
investigations for corroboration.
Prior to shedding some light on these results, one may wonder how a 
western concept can be applied and valid in a developing country? As 
far as this study is concerned, apart from the modifications that 
were made on the questionnaire to make it fit to the Saudi
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environment/ the consistency of the results with the western findings 
is probably due to the technological factor as well as to the western 
expertise factor. Both factors were found to dominate the Saudi 
business environment. However, the influence of the Saudi culture on 
the manufacturing sector is expected to develop in the future as a 
result of workforce replacement.
The results of the study indicate that production manager, as a 
representative of the manufacturing function, possesses an equivalent 
role to other functional managers, forms an integral part of the 
strategy process, attends top management meetings, and overall has a 
good understanding of strategy formation. This leads us to conclude 
that production manager is involved in strategic decision making and 
that he has a proactive role. However, data suggest that production 
manager's knowledge concerning external environment is limited. .This 
limitation might affect his participation in decision making.
The role of the production manager and the effect of the external 
environment are very important pillars in forming manufacturing 
strategy. The study has provided evidence that both production 
manager and the external environment influence organisation 
performance. Furthermore, congruence between aspects of manufacturing 
strategy (i.e., manufacturing task and manufacturing infrastructure) 
was found to influence the performance of the organisation.
On the other handr the study had only faint success in validating- the 
competitive priorities model. The study results have validated the
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first part of both models of competitive priorities; i.e., the 
Japanese cumulative model and the Sandcone model (Ferdows and De 
Meyer, 1989). The first part of both models requires achieving 
quality, then quality and delivery. However, the conflict between 
these two models is over the second part (price and flexibility) , 
which the findings of this study came short to support one model over 
the other. Therefore, the results of this study (i.e., price strategy 
for 1990 and 1991) concerning the second part of the model lead us 
to conclude that the prevailing model in Saudi Arabia is one of three 
models: the Trade-offs notion model, a different model entirely,
either the Japanese cumulative model or the Sandcone model. The first 
model (i.e., Trade-offs) is unlikely, because the results support the 
first part of both the Japanese and the Sandcone models. Similarly, 
the second model is unforeseeable at the present time because of the 
western influence. Therefore, the most likely model is either the 
Japanese or the Sandcone model. If so, why did this study fail to 
detect quality and delivery strategies in addition to the price 
strategy? It could be that general and production managers' struggles 
with the suppliers-related problems influence greatly their thinking 
in a way that they neglect to emphasis quality and delivery 
strategies along with price strategy when responding to these 
questions (see section 8.4.3).
If this study were able to detect quality and delivery strategies in 
addition to the price strategy, this would have been a good support 
for the Japanese cumulative model over the Sandcone model (see 
section 2.4.1) .
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The results of the present study lead us to conclude that the Saudi 
plants have won quality and delivery strategies and they may be 
winning a price strategy as well. A follow up study would indicate 
whether the Saudi plants have won a price strategy or not.
10.5 IMPLICATIONS
The following are implications of the research for managers and for 
the Saudi Ministry of Industry and Electricity.
10.5.1 Implication For Managers
The results indicate that manufacturing task is closely related to 
the external environment in which the firm operates. Furthermore, 
the better the fit between the manufacturing task of the firm and its 
external environment, the better the performance. Therefore, 
managers should incorporate environmental uncertainty factors in the 
development of manufacturing strategy.
Also, the firm's manufacturing task is closely related to its 
manufacturing infrastructure. Moreover, the better the match between 
the firm's manufacturing task and its infrastructure, the better the 
performance of the firm. Managers should note that such a match is 
an effective way of managing the "day-to-day" operations of the 
manufacturing function.
The role of the production manager in strategic decision making is 
strongly associated with performance. Managers should allow a bigger 
role for production managers in strategic decision making. One of
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the significant results of this study is that it found that 
production manager's knowledge concerning external environment is 
limited (e.g./ product price). This limitation is likely to affect 
his participation in decision making. Therefore, production managers 
should be exposed to participation in decision making related to 
external environment.
The present study indicates further the importance of the suppliers 
to the Saudi plants in achieving a price strategy. A situational 
analysis technique such as SWOT analysis is very useful in 
understanding major factors (e.g., suppliers) and offering some 
solutions. In general, this technique is very helpful in studying 
manufacturing strategy.
10.5.2 Implication For The Ministry of Industry and Electricity
The Ministry of Industry and Electricity in behalf of the Saudi 
government should re-examine the effectiveness of the industrial 
policy guidelines. The results generated by SWOT analysis indicate 
an ineffective application of the majority of the guidelines of the 
industrial policy.
10.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As pointed out in several aspects of this study, manufacturing 
strategy is still in its infancy. Therefore, the task is enormous for 
those interested in this emerging field. To keep the list short, 
suggestions for future research are limited to topics closely related 
to this study. The suggested topics are:
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1. Replicate the present study in the context of another 
developing country to compare and contrast the results with 
those of this study, especially in a country that does not have 
the wealth of saudi Arabia.
2. Detect manufacturing strategy, using a large sample consisting 
of several industries, at the industry level as well as at the 
level of the company size in order to verify the model of the 
competitive priorities. Such a study is highly recommended in 
developed and developing countries.
3. Re-test the six hypotheses in different industries in terms of 
company size.
4. Include further considerations about the corporate and the 
functional level of strategies of the firm in addition to its 
external environment in studying manufacturing strategy.
5. Extend the study to the service sector to enrich the field of 
operations management.
6. Conduct a follow up study for the four industries discussed 
in this study to find out if they achieved a price strategy.
7. Conduct a somewhat similar study in the remaining types of 
the Saudi industrial sector (i.e., SABIC and Petromin).
8. Conduct two important studies for the Saudi industries; the 
first concerning job satisfaction and the other regarding 
organisation climate. Both studies are strongly related to 
organisational performance.
362
APPENDIX
Table 4.1.1: Distribution of plants in the food industry by subsector
Subsector Description No. of plants
3111 Slaughtering of Livestock 12
3112 Dairy products 56
3113 Packing and preservation of 
Fruits/Vegetables 41
3114 Packing and preservation of Fish 2
3115 Manufacturing of Animal Fat 
and Vegetable Oil 2
3117 Bread and Bakeries 66
3118 Sugar and Refining Industry 2
3119 Cocoa Chocolate and Sugar 
Industry 16
3121 Manufacturing of other products (ICE) 60
3122 Manufacturing of Animals and Birds Feed 27
3134 Carbonated Water Industry 37
Total 321
Table 4.1.2: 
subsector
Distribution of plants in the paper industry by
Subsector Description No. of plants
3411 Paper Pulp and Paperboard 5
3412 Hardboard and Paper Boxes 21
3419 Products of Paper Pulp 23
3421 Printing and Publishing 73
Total 122
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Table 4.1.3: Distribution of plants in the chemical industry by
subsector
Subsector Description No. of plants
3511 Basic Chemical Industries 39
3512 Fertiliseries and Pesticides Industry 13
3513 Manufacturing of Compounding Materials 
Plastic 7
3521 Manufacturing of Paints, Varnish 31
3522 Manufacturing of Drugs and Medicines 3
3523 Manufacturing and Packing of Soap, 
Cleaning Materials, Perfumes 
and Cosmetics 17
3529 Other Chemical Products 10
3530 Crude Oil Refining Industry 5
3540 Various of Products Petroleum and Coal 15
3551 Manufacturing Tyres and Tubes of Rubber 4
3559 Other Rubber Products 4
3560 Plastic Products (not 
elsewhere classified) 143
Total 291
Table 4.1.4: 
subsector
Distribution of plants in the metal industry by
Subsector Description No. of plants
3710 Iron and Steel Basic Industries 4
3720 Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 4
3811 Manufacturing of Cutlery and Hand Tools 26
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Table 4.1.4: (continued)
Subsector Description No. of plants
3812 Manufacturing of Furniture and Fixtures 
Primarily of Metal 62
3813 Manufacturing of Structural Metal 
Products 252
3819 Manufacturing of Fabricated Metal 
products 52
3822 Manufacturing and Repairing 
Agricultural implements and Accessories 15
3824 Manufacturing of Machinery and 
Equipment 10
3826 Manufacturing and Repair of Cooking 
Ranges, Heaters, Washing Machines 
and Refrigerator 29
3827 Manufacturing and Repair of Air 
Conditioning and Ventilation Equipments 12
3829 Manufacturing and Repair of Machinery 
and Equipment except Electrical 6
3831 Manufacturing of Electrical Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment 28
3832 Manufacturing of Radio Sets, T.V. 
Sets and Communication 1
3839 Manufacturing of Electrical Appliances 
and Supplies 21
3841 Ship Building and Repair Industry 3
3843 Manufacturing of Motor Vehicles 
(assembly and modification) 40
3844 Manufacturing of Motor Cycles 
and Bicycles 1
3852 Manufacturing of Photographic 
and Optical Lenses 6
Total 572
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Form
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY SURVEY 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
GENERAL MANAGER
SECTION I : TYPE OF BUSINESS AND PRODUCT
Please place an X for each question or statement unless 
otherwise specified.
1. This plant is in the industry of:
_______  Foodstuffs
 _______ Paper & Printing
Chemical 
Metal
2. Type of plant with regard to capital:
_______  Wholly Saudi plant
_______  Joint venture plant
3. Total paid up capital [ Millions SR ] ______
4. Number of employees (including top management)
_______  Saudis
Non-Saudis
5. Number of years in operation
6. Please indicate the number of product lines, 
products and product options in your plant.
- Number of product lines in your plant
(a group of products processed by the 
same machine)
- Average number of products in your
main product line (products 
within the product line)
- Average number of options in the
products (alternative features 
beyond the standard)
City
ISIC (if known)
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7. The average time for vour plant to develop a new
product is:
6 months or less
_______  Over 6 months to 1 year
_______  2 years
_______  3 years
_______  Over 3 years
_______  Did not introduce new products
until now
8. The last maior technological change in product offered 
by vour competitors occurred within the last :
_______  None
_______  1 year
_______  2 years
_______  3 years
_______  4 years
_______  5 years or over
Do not know
9. Currently and for the next two years (1990 and 1991), 
estimate the percentage of the demand for your plant's 
main product(s) ?
_______  Stable
_______  % Growing
% Decline
10. In this scale, 100 points means full capacity in a
plant. On the same scale, circle the number which 
indicates your actual plant's capacity usage (equipment, 
labour,and resources).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
11. Evaluate the nature of competition to your plant's 
production from foreign competitors in the Saudi market.
Very
None Little Moderate High high
existence competition competition
_ 2 3 4 5
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12. Please estimate the percentage of the market share of
foreign competitors in your industry for the 
following years ?
_ % for 1988 of the total Saudi market
_ % for 1987 of the total Saudi market
% for 1986 of the total Saudi market
13. Please indicate the extent of the Saudi competition in
your industry.
Very
None Little Moderate High high
existence competition competition
1 2 3 4 5
14. Estimate the percentage of vour plant7s sales for 
Saudi and foreign markets ?
_ % of sales to Saudi market [ if you don't
export, please go to the next question ] 
_ % of sales to foreign market
14a) If part of your plant' sales goes to foreign markets 
please name some of the manor countries that buv your 
products.
14 b) The following could be obstacles or problems facing 
exporting. According to vour plant, rank them 1 to 7:1 is 
the most difficult, 7 is the least difficult problem
(two items can not be ranked the same number).
_______  Uncompetitive price
_______  Lack of information about exporting markets
_______  Lack of finances
_______  High transportation costs
_______  High good quality
_______  Duties on imported materials are too high
______ _ Insufficient subsidy
_______  Other (use the back of the sheet if necessary)
15. Does your plant obtain a loan from the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund ?
Yes
No
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SECTION II : MANUFACTURING TASK
A- Please rate the following items according to your 
plant's goals over the last two years (1987 and 1988).
Please circle the number that indicates your answer
Lowest in Highest in
Items the industry the industry
1. Price 1 2  3 4 5
Below
average in Among top in
the industry the industry
2. High performance design
( superior features, 1 2  3 4 5
tolerance,long life )
3. Consistent quality
( meeting the design 1 2  3 4 5
specifications )
Least Most
frequent in frequent in
the Industry the industry
4. New product introduction 1 2  3 4 5
5. Introducing new production
processes 1 2  3 4 5
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Narrowest 
range in 
the industry
Widest 
range in 
the industry
6. Product range 1 2 3 4 5
7. Wide range of product features 1 2 3 4 5
Among the 
slowest in 
the industry
Among the 
fastest in 
the industry
8. Rapid design changes in 
product according to 
customers' preferences 1 2 3 4 5
9. Rapid volume changes in 
rate of production to 
handle large fluctuations 
in demand 1 2 3 4 5
10. On - time delivery
( meeting delivery 
time promises )
Later On
Delivery V.Late Late Time Early
Below 
average in 
the industry
Among the 
best in 
the Industry
11. After sales service
Entirely 
No custom custom
production Production
12. Customised product
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Longest in 
the industry
Shortest in 
the Industry
13. Fast delivery time
( the time between 
receiving the order 
and filling it ) 1 2  3 4 5
High
effort in 
None the industry
14. Research & development 
effort
15. What elements of your manufacturing and technology are 
vital to your plant's competitiveness ?
SECTION III : ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
A- In formulating strategic plans, how important it is to 
consider each of the following factors that might 
influence the outcome of the strategic decisions that 
are made by members of top management in your plant.
Please circle one number in each level
NI means Not Important At All 
SI means Somewhat Important 
QI means Quite Important 
VI means Very Important 
El means Extremely Important
Factors NI SI QI VI El
1. The distributors of your
products 1 2  3 4 5
2. Customers of your products 1 2  3 4 5
3. The suppliers of raw materials 1 2 3 4 5
4. The suppliers of equipment 1 2  3 4 5
5. The suppliers of product parts 1
6. The supply of labour 1
7. Competitors for your supply
of raw materials and parts 1
8. Competitors for your customers 1
9. Government regulations 
controlling your industry 1
10. The public attitudes toward 
your industry 1
11. Your relationship with your 
supervising ministeries and 
chambers of commerce and 
industry 1
12. Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry in 
the production of goods 1 4 5
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Factors NI SI QI VI El
13. Improving and developing new products 
by implementing new technological
advances in the industry 1 2  3 4
14. Your source of financial
resources 1 2  3 4
15. The situation of the Saudi
economy 1 2  3 4
16. The situation of world
economy 1 2  3 4
B- How often do you feel that you are able to predict how 
each of the following factors is going to react to 
decisions made by your plant ?
Please circle one number in each level
HU means Highly unpredictable
S means Seldom
0 means Occasionally
FO means Fairly Often
HP means Highly predictable
Factors HU S O FO HP
1. The distributors of your
products 1 2  3 4 5
2. Customers of your products 1 2  3 4 5
3. The suppliers of raw materials 1 2  3 4 5
4. The suppliers of equipment 1 2  3 4 5
5. The suppliers of product parts 1 2  3 4 5
6. The supply of labour 1 2  3 4 5
7. Competitors for your supply
of raw materials and parts 1 2  3 4 5
8. Competitors for your customers 1 2  3 4 5
375
Factors HU S O FO HP
9. Government regulations 
controlling your industry
10. The public attitudes toward 
your industry
11. Your relationship with your 
supervising ministeries and 
chambers of commerce and 
industry
12. Keeping up with new 
technological requirements 
in your industry in the 
production of goods
13. Improving and developing new 
products by implementing new 
technological advances
in the industry
14. Your source of financial 
resources
15. The situation of the Saudi 
economy
16. The situation of world 
economy
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SECTION IV : THE ROLE OF THE PRODUCTION MANAGER
A- Strategic Decisions
If asked to evaluate the role of the production manager
how would you rate the following statements
Please circle one number for each level
SD means Strongly Disagree
D means Disagree
N means Neutral
A means Agree
SA means Strongly Agree
SD D N A SA
1. I feel that production manager(s) 
[PM] has a good 
understanding of how the 
divisional strategy is formed 1
2. I feel that PM is an integral 
part of the strategy formulation 
process, and that his inputs are 
part of the divisional (or 
corporate) strategy 1
3. I feel that PM knows exactly what 
the most important competitive 
priorities are for our 
manufacturing function (e.g.,
low cost, quality, delivery) 1
4. PM is responsible for initiating 
and modifying short & long term 
changes in manufacturing 
strategy
5. PM is given an equivalent role 
or more among the functional 
managers in the formulation of. 
corporate strategy
6. PM is one of the members who 
should be allowed to attend the 
top management meetings
377
•
o
NI means
SI means
QI means
VI means
El means
B- Listed below are several competitive priorities that 
could be used for competition in an industry. Please 
indicate the level of importance for each one of them 
currently and for the next two years (1990 and 1991). 
Please circle one number for each level
Not Important At All 
Somewhat Important 
Quite Important 
Very Important 
Extremely Important
NI SI QI VI El
1. Low price 1 2  3 4 5
2. High performance design ( superior
features, tolerance,long life) 1 2 3 4 5
3. Consistent Quality ( meeting
the design specifications ) 1 2  3 4 5
4. Rapid design changes in the 
product according to customers'
preferences 1 2 . 3  4 5
5. Rapid volume changes in the 
rate of production to handle
large fluctuations in demand 1 2  3 4 5
6. New products introduction 1 2  3 4 5
7. On-time delivery ( meeting
delivery time promises ) 1 2  3 4 5
8. Fast delivery time ( the time 
between receiving the order and
filling it ) 1 2  3 4 5
C- Rank the following manufacturing areas ( 1 to 8 )
according to your needs for improvements; 1 is the most 
improvements, 8 is the least improvements ( two items can 
not be ranked the same ).
Rapid volume changes 
High performance design 
New products introduction 
Rapid design changes in the product 
Meeting delivery time promises 
Low price
Consistent Quality
Fast delivery time ( the time between 
receiving the order and filling it)
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D)
1. What are the manufacturing strengths in your plant ?
a)
b)
c)
d)
2. What are the manufacturing weaknesses in your plant ?
a)
b)
c)
d)
SECTION V : PERFORMANCE
Please place an X for your chosen answer for the 
following questions
A: Benchmarking
1. Does a team of your plant make business visits to some 
of the high-performance firms/plants in order to improve 
specific issues in manufacturing ?
Yes _______
No   Go To Question 2
a) Specifically, what are the issues that your plant 
targets in such a visit ?
2. Does your plant make some manufacturing issues of high 
performance plant as your plant's objectives (e.g.,
certain level of cost).
Yes
No
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B: Subjective Measures
Please circle one number for each of the 
questions
Below
Industry Industry*
Average Average
1. Average annual rate of 
growth in return on total 
investments during 1986-1988
(ROI = Net profit /
Total Assets) 1
2. Average annual rate of 
growth in sales during 
1986-1988 1
3. Average annual rate of 
growth in return on sales 
during 1986-1988 ( ROS =
Net profit / sales ) 1
* Slightly above the break even point
Lower No
chances change
4. Describe the chance in the 
chances of your plant's 
survival today as compared 
to three years ago. 1 2
2
following
Above
Industry
Average
3
3
3
Higher
chances
c /l. What do you think are the major problems 
(threats) facing your industry ?
In your opinion, how could these problems be solved ?
2. What are the opportunities in your industry that could 
make you in a better position in manufacturing 
nationally & internationally ?
D /l. If 100 SR is the total unit cost of the Maior 
product in your plant, estimate the share of each one of 
the following from the total cost.
% Materials
% Labour
% Transportation
% Other
2. Estimate the percentage of the source of the raw 
materials ?
______ % Locally
______  % Imported
3. Please provide the following percentages:
% of plant's income spent on Research &
Development .....
% of plant's income reinvested in
process & equipment .....
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A. Would you please provide the following figures in Saudi 
Riyals (SR) for the last three years (1986-1988) .
1986 1987 1988
Net Profit
Ratio of =
Total Assets
Sales
Net Profit
Ratio of = ______________
Sales
THANK YOU VERY MUCH
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Form
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY SURVEY 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
PRODUCTION MANAGER
SECTION I : MANUFACTURING TASK
A- Please rate the following items according to your
Please circle the number that indicates your answer
Lowest in Highest in
Items the industry the industry
1. Price 1 2 3 4 5
Below
average in Among top in
the industry the industry
2. High performance design
( superior features, 
tolerance,long life )
3. Consistent quality
( meeting the design 
specifications )
Least
frequent in 
the Industry
Most
frequent in 
the industry
4. New product introduction
5. Introducing new production 
processes
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Narrowest 
range in 
the industry
Widest 
range in 
the industry
6. Product range 1 2 3 4 5
7. Wide range of product features 1 2 3 4 5
Among the Among the
slowest in fastest in
the industry the industry
Rapid design changes in 
product according to 
customers' preferences 4 5
9. Rapid volume changes in 
rate of production to 
handle large fluctuations 
in demand 4 5
10. On - time delivery
( meeting delivery 
time promises )
11. After sales service
Later On
Delivery V.Late Late Time Early
1 2 3 4 5
Below Among the
average in best in
the industry the Industry
1 2  3 4 5
Entirely
No custom custom
production Production
12. Customised product
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Longest in 
the industry
Shortest in 
the Industry
13. Fast delivery time
( the time between 
receiving the order 
and filling it ) 1 2 3 4 5
High
effort in 
None the industry
14. Research & development 
effort
SECTION II : MANUFACTURING FUNCTION
A- Strategic Decisions
If you were asked to evaluate vour relationship to the 
divisional and group offices and vour personal knowledge 
of how they make certain decisions, how would you rate the 
following statements ?
Please circle one number for each level
SD means Strongly Disagree
D means Disagree
N means Neutral
A means Agree
SA means Strongly Agree
SD D N A SA
1. I feel that I have a good 
understanding of how the
divisional strategy is formed 1 2 . .3' 4 5
2. I feel that I am an integral 
part of the strategy formulation 
process, and that my inputs
are part of the divisional
(corporate) strategy 1 2  3 4 5
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SD D N A SA
3. I feel I know exactly what are 
the most important competitive 
priorities are for my 
manufacturing function (e.g., 
low cost, quality, delivery)
4 . 1  am responsible for initiating 
and modifying short & long term 
changes in manufacturing 
strategy
5 . 1  am given an equivalent role 
or more among the functional 
managers in the formulation of 
corporate strategy
B- Rank the following manufacturing areas ( 1 to 8 )
according to vour needs for improvements; 1 is the 
most improvements, 8 is the least improvements ( two
items can not be ranked the same).
Rapid volume changes 
High performance design 
New products introduction 
Rapid design changes in the product 
Meeting delivery time promises 
Low price
Consistent Quality
Fast delivery time ( the time between 
receiving the order and filling it)
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SECTION III : STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS
Please place an X for each question or statement unless 
otherwise specified.
A- Structure Decisions
1. Please use the following definitions to select one or 
more of these types that come closests to your plant's 
process.
a) Job shop : products are produced in small batches. Job 
shop m e e t s  the u ni q u e  o r d e r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of 
c u s t o m e r s  s u ch  as C o m m e r c i a l  p r i n t i n g  firms 
and machine tool shops.
b) Large batch : similar to job shop products but in 
large batches and less varieties. Examples of items 
produced with this process are heavy equipment and 
electronic devices.
c) Assembly line : products are passed through the same 
sequence of operations and have the nature of 
standardisation. A product processed by this type is 
cars.
d) Continuous process: basic materials are passed 
through successive operations and processed into one or 
more products such as petrochemical and food. Outputs of 
this process are highly standardised.
2. The capacity for your plant   Stable
for the next two years %    Growing
could be described as: % Decline
3. To deal with future demand on____your products, the
increase in capacity will be added :
______  Ahead of time
At the time of demand
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4. For peak capacity requirements, does your plant use
one or more of the following:
______  Hire workers
______  Schedule overtime
______  Increase the number of work shifts
______  Subcontracting
______  Far from the peak level
5. For decreased capacity requirements, does your plant 
use on or more of the following.
______  Lay-off workers
______  Schedule undertime
______  Reduce the number of work shifts
______  Annual vacation for employees
Far from the decreased level
6. Listed below are items related to maintenance, please 
answer each item as it relates to the machines in your 
plant.
36 or
0 1-3 4-5 6-10 11-16 17-25 26-35 more
Average number of 
hours per machine 
per month lost due
to breakdowns n [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Average number of 
hours per machine 
per month spent on 
preventive
maintenance [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
B- Infrastructure Decisions
1. Please provide the following percentages:
- Defective or rejected rate in production
%  Expected ; %   Actual
_ % of rework products ( or Jobs )
% of customer rectification 
% of scrap
% of products incorporating 
new design
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2. Listed below are items related to forecasting. Please 
indicate the degree of difference between the actual 
and forecasted demand in terms of product quantity 
and the time of demand.
No
Difference
Some- Very
Little What Large Large 
Difference Difference
Difference between actual 
and forecasted demand on
product quantity 1 2  3 4 5
Difference between actual 
and forecasted time of
demand 1 2 3 4 5
3. Please rate the extent of time. effort, and resources 
devoted to the following activities or causes currently 
(i.e., towards the end of 1989) and for the next two 
years (1990 and 1991 ) , in comparison with the effort 
devoted to all other activities in the list.
IT IS RECOMMENDED TO GLANCE THROUGH THE LIST OF 
ACTIVITIES BEFORE BEGINNING TO RESPOND TO THIS PART.
Please circle one number of each level
Example: if you spent somewhat above average time,
effort, and resources on reducing inventory costs, then 
please circle " 4 " against item (1) ,. in-the list.
Well
Above
None Average Average
a) Inventory
1. Reducing inventory costs 1 2  3 4 5
2. Increasing inventory 
turnover ( cost of goods
sold /average inventory) 1 2  3 4 5
3. Reducing raw materials
and component inventories 1 2  3 4 5
4. Reducing work-in-process
inventories 1 2  3 4 5
PLEASE GO TO THE NEXT PAGE
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Well
Above
None Average Average
a) Inventory (contd.)
5. Reducing finished goods
inventories 1 2  3 4 5
6. Achieving larger
production lots 1 2  3 4 5
b) Planning
7. Hiring and lay-off system 1 2  3 4
8. Reducing idle time 1 2  3 4
9. Finding reliable
subcontractors 1 2  3 4 5
10. Stabilising workforce
numbers 1 2  3 4 5
11. Designing policies to 
motivate employees to
work as a team 1 2  3 4 5
12. Reducing lead time
manufacturing 1 2  3 4 5
13. Increasing warehouse
space 1 2  3 4 5
c) Scheduling / Control
14. Developing better master
production schedule 1 2  3 4 5
15. Close order progress
control system 1 2  3 4 5
16. Frequent work centre
rescheduling capacity 1 2  3 4 5
17. Order status reporting
system 1 2 3 4 5
d) Purchasing
18. Reducing raw material
cost 1 2  3 4 5
19. Obtaining long-term supply
contracts 1 2  3 4 5
20. Reducing the number of
purchase orders per year 1 2  3 4 5
21. Obtaining quantity
discounts from suppliers 1 2  3 4 5
22. Obtaining quantity
discounts from shippers 1 2  3 4 5
PLEASE GO TO THE NEXT PAGE
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in 
lo
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
None
d) Purchasing (contd.)
23. Developing high quality 
suppliers
24. Developing reliable 
timely suppliers
25. Diversifying suppliers
26. Achieving independence 
from suppliers
e) Process and Product Design
27. Substitution of labour
by machines 1
28. Product standardisation 1
29. Product modularisation 1
30. Product simplification 1
31. Substitution of inexpensive 
materials or components 1
32. Mechanised materials 
handling 1
33. Automation of production 
lines 1
34. Automatic inspection 1
35. Acquiring the latest in 
production equipment 1
36. Development of new features 
for older product lines 1
f) Labour / Quality
Reducing direct labour 
costs 1
Reducing production costs 1 
Worker skills
diversification 1
Worker training 1
Worker specialisation 1
Increasing worker 
responsibility 
in work planning 1
Increasing worker control 
over work pace 1
Inspectors training 1
Removal of Inspectors 1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Average
Well
Above
Average
PLEASE GO TO THE NEXT PAGE
392
Well
Above
None Average Average
f) Labour / Quality (contd.)
46. Improving labour
productivity 1 2  3 4
47. Development or improvement 
of quality control
programmes 1 2  3 4
48. Acquiring a Saudi quality
mark 1 2  3 4
49. Monetary incentive system 1 2  3 4
50. Development or improvement 
of quality circle
programmes 1 2  3 4
g) Miscellaneous
51. Development of high
volume products 1 2  3 4
52. Development of products with
high economies of scale 1 2  3 4
53. Development of products with
high economics of scope 1 2  3 4
54. Improving co-ordination among 
engineering, manufacturing
and marketing 1 2  3 4
h) Foreign production
55. Developing reliable foreign 
suppliers for components,
where materials are cheap 1 2  3 4
56. Developing facilities abroad 
for manufacture of components 
for use in Saudi assembly 
plants where labour is
cheap 1 2  3 4
57. Developing facilities for 
assembly of major product 
lines abroad where most of 
the production factors are
cheap 1 2  3 4
Thank you very much
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UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
Form
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY SURVEY 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
SALES/MARKETING MANAGER
SECTION I : MANUFACTURING FUNCTION
A - Strategic Decisions
If you or any functional manager were asked to 
evaluate the production manager in your plant, how would 
you rate the following statements.
Please circle one number for each level
SD means Strongly Disagree
D means Disagree
N means Neutral
A means Agree
SA means Strongly Agree
SD D N A SA
1. I feel that production manager(s)
[PM] has a good 
understanding of how the
divisional strategy is formed 1 2
2. I feel that PM is an integral part 
of the strategy formulation 
process, and that his inputs are 
part of the divisional (or 
corporate) strategy 1 2
3. I feel that PM knows exactly what 
the most important competitive 
priorities are for our manufacturing 
function (e.g., low cost, quality, 
delivery, etc.) 1 2
4. PM is responsible for initiating and 
modifying short & long term changes
in manufacturing strategy 1 2
5. PM is given an equivalent role or 
more among the functional managers 
in the formulation of
corporate strategy 1 2
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APPENDIX
Table 5.1.1 : Distribution of type of manufacturing processes
by industrial sector
Sector F P C M
Type No. Of Plants
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Job Shop _ 11 2 6
(100) (6.30) (12.5)
Large Batch - - 6 25
(18.7) (52.1)
Assembly Line - - 4 13
(12.5) (27.1)
Continuous 26 - 20 4
Processes
(100) - (62.5) (8.30)
Total 26 11 32 48
(100) (100) (100) (100)
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
Table 5.1.2 : Distribution of total actual 
industrial sector
capacity usage by
Industry Mean SD
Food 74.8 17.0
Paper 71.8 14.7
Chemical 67.5 21.2
Metal 71.7 17.6
Total 71.3 18.3
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Table 5.1.3 : Distribution o£ type of ownership of plants by
industrial sector
Sector F P C M
Type Of Plant No. Of Plants
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Wholly Saudi 19 8 12 31
(73.1) (72.7) (37.5) (64.6)
Joint Venture 7 3 20 17
(26.9) (27.3) (62.5) (35.4)
Total 26 11 32 48
(100) (100) (100) (100)
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
Table 5.2.1 : Distribution of plant size according to number of 
employees by industrial sector
Sector F P C M
Size Of Plant No. Of Plants
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Small 6 1 6 7
(23.1) (9) (18.3) (14.6)
Medium 5 5 8 14
(19.2) (45.5) (25) (29.1)
Large 15 5 18 27
(57.7) (45.5) (56.3) (56.3)
Total 26 11 32 48
(100) (100) (100) (100)
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
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Table 5.2.2 : Distribution of Saudi and non-Saudi employees
by industrial sector
Sector F P C M
Category No. Of Employees
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Saudi 410 57 401 844
(8.4) (5.5) (9.4) (9.6)
Non - Saudi 4468 978 3885 7918
(91.6) (94.5) (90.6) (90.4)
Total 4878 1035 4286 8762
(100) (100) (100) (100)
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
Table 5.2.3 : Distribution of the 
sector
total employees by industrial
Sector Mean S.D Min Max.
Food 187.6 187.8 30 819
Paper 94.1 40.2 33 155
Chemical 133.9 93.9 17 395
Metal 182.5 237.0 15 1448
Total 162.0 184.0 15 1448
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Table 5.2.4 : Distribution of plant size according to capital by
industrial sector
Sector F P C M
Size Of Plant No. Of Plants
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Small 3 2 11 14
(11.5) (18.2) (34.4) (29.2)
Medium 6 5 8 16
(23.1) (45.4) (25) (33.3)
Large 17 4 13 18
(65.4) (36.4) (40.6) (37.5)
Total 26 11 32 48
(100) (100) (100) (100)
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
Table 5.3.1 : Distribution of plants according to number of
years in operation by industrial sector
Sector F P C M
Years No. Of Plants
(%) (%) (%) (%)
3 - 5 5 3 2 5
(19.2) (27.3) (6.2) (10.4)
6 - 1 0 14 3 11 25
(53.9) (27.3) (34.4) (52)
11 - 20 4 3 15 15
(15.4) (27.3) (46.9) (31.3)
21 - 35 3 2 4 3
(11.5) (18.1) (12.5) (6.3)
Total 26 11 32 48
(100) (100) (100) (100)
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
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Table 5.4.1 : Distribution of average time of new products
development by industrial sector
Industry Mean SD
Food 2.35 1.13
Paper 1.91 1.47
Chemical 2.13 0.93
Metal 3.02 0.86
Table 5.5.1 : Distribution of last major technological changes in
product by industrial sector
Industry Mean (in years) SD
Food 3.42 1.16
Paper 4.73 0.85
Chemical 3.97 1.09
Metal 3.44 1.19
401
Table 5.6.1 : Distribution of demand on main product by industrial
sector
Industry
No.
G
(%)
Of
D
(%)
Plants
S
(%)
As % Of 
G
Each
D
Industry
S
Food 22
(27.5)
- 4
(13.8)
84.6 - 15.4
Paper 8
(10)
— 3
(10.3)
72.7 - 27.3
Chemical 22
(27.5)
1
(12.5)
9
(31)
68.8 3.1 28.1
Metal 28
(35)
7
(87.5)
13
(44.9)
58.3 14.6 27.1
Total 80
(100)
8
(100)
29
(100)
G : Growing demand on main product 
D : Declining demand on main product 
S : Stable demand on main product
Table 5.7.1 : Distribution of perceived foreign competition and
market share by industrial sector
Market Share %
Sector Mean 1988 1987 1986
Food 3.08 21.6 24.1 27.0
Paper 1.73 6.2 8.5 14.3
Chemical 3.19 28.5 31.6 35.8
Metal 2.79 22.4 26.3 31.1
Total 2.86 22.4 25.6 30.0
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Table 5.8.1 : Distribution of exporting and non-exporting
plants by industrial sector
No. Of Plants
exporting non-exporting
Sector (%) (%)
Food 22 4
(84.6) (15.4)
Paper 7 4
(63.6) (36.4)
Chemical 23 9
(71.9) (28.1)
Metal 34 14
(70.8) (29.2)
Total 86 31
(73.5) (26.5)
Table 5.8.2 : Distribution of sales to foreign markets by
industrial sector ( percentage)
Sector Mean Min. Max.
Food 6.7 3 29
Paper 5.3 1 16
Chemical 5.9 1 30
Metal 9.9 1 40
Total 7. 65 1 40
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Table 5.8.3 : Distribution of countries importing from Saudi
Arabia by industrial sector
Sector
Name Of Country
F P C M
Total
Gulf Countries 7 1 11 17 36*
Kuwait 11 3 6 9 29
U.A.E 6 4 9 9 28
Bahrain 9 3 8 6 26
N . Yemen - 2 5 9 16
Iraq 1 1 6 7 15
Jordan 3 - 5 6 14
Qatar 3 1 4 4 12
Aman 3 1 2 3 9
Sudan - 1 - 7 8
U.S.A 1 1 1 1 4
Somalia 2 - - 2 4
U.K. 2 - - 1 3
Syria 1 - - 2 3
Arabian Countries 2 - 1 - 3
Egypt 1 - - 1 2
Japan - - 1 1 2
Lebanon 2 - - - 2
Far East Countries - - 1 1 2
India - - - 2 2
African countries - - 1 1 2
Pakistan - - - 2 2
Yugoslavia - - 1 - 1
France - - 1 - 1
Cyprus 1 - - - 1
Morocco 1 - - - 1
Ethiopia - - - 1 1
China - - - 1 1
Senegal. - - - - 1 1
European Countries - - 1 - 1
Tunisia - - - 1 1
S. Yemen - - - 1 1
Gabon - - 1 - 1
Germany 1 1
Total 57 18 65 96 236
* means number of plants mentioning the name of a country.
N = 116
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Table 5.8.4 : Distribution of exporting obstacles by industrial
sector
Sector
Items
F P
Means
C M
High Transportation 
Costs 2.65 1.50 2.56 2.72
Lack Of Information 3.44 2.40 2.88 2.28
Uncompetitive price 3.58 2.20 2.91 2.60
Duties On Imported 
Materials 4.08 2.50 3.66 3.18
Insufficient Subsidy 4.16 2.40 3.19 3.56
Lack Of Finances 4.84 2.90 3.88 3.00
Superior Quality 4.00 2.90 3.75 3.61
F : food industry C : chemical industry
P : paper industry M : metal industry
405
APPENDIX
Table 6.1.1: Significant levels (P value) for the manufacturing task
items in the total sample**
Items M-W T-test
1. Price 0.15 0.23
2. High performance design 0.28 0.32
3. Consistent quality 0.06 0.07
4. New product introduction 0.00* 0.00*
5. Introducing new production 
processes 0.32 0.29
6. Product range 0.64 0.48
7. Wide range of product features 0.54 0.44
8. Rapid changes in product 0.79 0.46
9. Volume flexibility 0.51 0.81
10. On-time delivery 0.50 0.54
11. After sales service 0.50 0.28
12. Customised product 0.65 0.69
13. Fast delivery time 0.32 0.24
14. R & D effort 0.00* 0.00*
* Highly significant
** Using the Mann-Whitney test (M-W) and the T-test
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Table 6.1.2: Significant levels (P value) for the manufacturing 
task items in the individual industries** (GMs £ PMs ratings)
Items
GMs 
K-W ANOVA
PMS
K-W ANOVA
1. Price 0.94 0.91 0.72 0.70
2. High performance design 0.72 0.64 0.42 0.41
3. Consistent quality 0.90 0.90 0.16 0.07
4. New product introduction 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.03
5. Introducing new 
production processes 0.24 0.21 0.06 0.07
6. Product range 0.46 0.36 0.14 0.13
7. Wide range of product 
features 0.37 0.28 0.11 0.08
8. Rapid changes in product 0.05 0.04 0.43 0.24
9. Volume flexibility 0.87 0.96 0.24 0.28
10. On-time delivery 0.10 0.14 0.78 0.52
11. After sales service 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13
12. Customised product 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
13. Fast delivery time 0.18 0.36 0.14 0.11
14. R & D effort 0.53 0.58 0.22 0.23
* Highly significant
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA)
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Table 6.1.3: Distribution of the manufacturing task items by
industrial sector scored by GMs
Items F
Means 
P C M
1. Price 2.89 3.09 2.84 2.83
2. High performance design 4.31 4.46 4.50 4.52
3. Consistent quality 4.89 4.82 4.81 4.83
4. New product introduction 1.96 1.64 2.75 2.40
5. Introducing new 
production processes 3.31 2.46 2.75 2.50
6. Product range 3.23 3.64 3.81 3.48
7. Wide range of product 
features 3.19 3.46 3.81 3.42
8. Rapid changes in product 3.19 4.18 3.72 3.98
9. Volume flexibility 4.23 4.36 4.34 4.29
10. On-time delivery 5.00 4.64 4.84 4.79
11. After sales service 4.08 4.00 4.34 4.33
12. Customised product 1.92 4.18 3.19 3.92
13. Fast delivery time 4.31 4.09 3.97 3.94
14. R & D effort 2.58 2.00 2.50 2.29
F : food industry P : paper industry
C : chemical industry M : metal industry
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Table 6.1.4: Distribution of the manufacturing task items by
industrial sector scored by PMs
Items F*
Means
p *  c * M*
/
1. Price 3.04 2.82 3.19 2.98
2. High performance design 4.27 4.09 4.47 4.42
3. Consistent quality 4.46 4.55 4.72 4.81
4. New product introduction 1.65 1.09 1.91 1.19
5. Introducing new 
production processes 2.85 1.73 2.94 2.23
6. Product range 3.31 3.46 4.00 3.63
7. Wide range of product 
features 3.31 3.36 4.00 3.54
8. Rapid changes in product 3.50 4.09 3.97 3.94
9. Volume flexibility 4.04 4.18 4.34 4.38
10. On-time delivery 4.65 4.46 4.78 4.67
11. After sales service 4.19 4.09 4.38 4.02
12. Product custom 1.69 3.73 3.28 3.90
13. Fast delivery time 4.46 4.18 _ 4.19 4.00
14. R & D effort 1.96 1.36 2.00 1.73
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
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Table 6.2.1: Significant levels for the importance of
environmental uncertainty items in the individual industries**
Items K-W ANOVA
11 The distributors of your products 0.31 0.16
12 Customers of your products 0.25 0.20
13 The suppliers of raw materials 0.92 0.95
14 The suppliers of equipment 0.12 0.11
15 The suppliers of product parts 0.37 0.35
16 The supply of labour 0.99 0.97
17 Competitors for your supply 
of raw materials and parts 0.03 0.02
18 Competitors for your customers 0.26 0.15
19 Government regulations 
controlling your industry 0.14 0.06
110 The public attitudes toward 
your industry 0.53 0.35
111 The relationship with your 
supervising ministries and 
chambers of commerce & industry 0.47 0.45
112 Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry in 
the production of goods 0.70 0.62
113 Improving and developing new 
products by implementing 
new technological advances 
in the industry 0.27 0.45
114 Your source of financial resources 0.87 0.83
115 The situation of the Saudi economy 0.05 0.04
P16 The situation of world economy 0.56 0.65
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)
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Table 6.2.2: Distribution of the importance of the
environmental uncertainty items by industrial sector
scored by GMs
Items F*
Means
p *  c * M*
11 The distributors of your products 4.00 3.18 3.66 3.38
12 Customers of your products 4.58 4.55 4.69 4.40
13 The suppliers of raw materials 3.73 3.64 3.78 3.83
14 The suppliers of equipment 3.39 3.18 3.47 2.90
15 The suppliers of product parts 3.15 2.36 3.03 2.92
16 The supply of labour 3.36 3.36 3.25 3.38
17 Competitors for your supply 
of raw materials and parts 2.96 1.91 3.28 2.88
18 Competitors for your customers 3.81 2.91 3.81 3.77
19 Government regulations 
controlling your industry 3.81 2.91 3.69 3.96
110 The public attitudes toward 
your industry 4.08 3.46 3.91 3.67
111 The relationship with your 
supervising ministries and 
chambers of commerce & industry 4.08 3.55 3.97 4.06
112 Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry in 
the production of goods 4.31 4.18 4.41 4.17
113 Improving and developing new 
products by implementing new 
technological advances in 
the industry 3.77 3.73 4.06 3.71
114 Your source of financial resources 3.81 4.09 3.81 3.90
115 The situation of the Saudi economy 4.00 4.09 4.41 4.52
P16 The situation of world economy 3.23 3.27 3.34 3.52
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
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Table 6.2.3: Significant levels for the predictability of
environmental uncertainty items in the individual industries**
Items K-W ANOVA
11 The distributors of your products 0.07 0.11
12 Customers of your products 0.05 0.05
13 The suppliers of raw materials 0.54 0.43
14 The suppliers of equipment 0.64 0.71
15 The suppliers of product parts 0.31 0.31
16 The supply of labour 0.68 0.59
17 Competitors for your supply 
of raw materials and parts 0.81 0.63
18 Competitors for your customers 0.17 0.26
19 Government regulations 
controlling your industry 0.75 0.77
110 The public attitudes toward 
your industry 0.10 0.17
111 The relationship with your 
supervising ministries and 
chambers of commerce & industry 0.93 0.96
112 Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry in 
the production of goods 0.29 0.56
113 Improving and developing new 
products by implementing new 
technological advances in the 
industry 0.58 0.60
114 Your source of financial resources 0.45 0.38
115 The situation of the saudi economy 0.99 0.98
P16 The situation of world economy 0.15 0.28
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA)
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Table 6.2.4: Distribution of the predictability of the
environmental uncertainty items by industrial sector scored by GMs
Items p *
Means 
P* c * M*
PI The distributors of your products 4.31 3.73 3.70 3.70
P2 Customers of your products 4.35 4.27 3.81 3.92
P3 The suppliers of raw materials 4.00 3.46 3.81 3.65
P4 The suppliers of equipment 3.77 3.55 3.47 3.46
P5 The suppliers of product parts 3.73 3.36 3.16 3.47
P6 The supply of labour 3.69 3.91 3.38 3.65
P7 Competitors for your supply 
of raw materials and parts 3.27 3.18 3.03 3.35
P8 Competitors for your customers 3.85 3.55 3.41 3.38
P9 Government regulations 
controlling your industry 3.31 3.00 3.25 3.42
P10 The public attitudes toward 
your industry 3.85 3.64 3.34 3.35
Pll The relationship with your 
supervising ministries and 
chambers of commerce & industry 3.65 3.55 3.66 3.73
P12 Keeping up with new technological 
requirements in your industry in 
the production of goods 4.08 4.18 3.81 4.04
P13 Improving and developing new 
new products by implementing new 
technological advances in the 
industry 3.81 3.91 3.59 3.90
P14 Your source of financial resources 4.15 4.46 3.91 4.00
P15 The situation of the saudi economy 3.46 3.55 3.56 3.52
P16 The situation of world economy 3.23 3.09 2.72 3.10
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
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Table 6.3.1: Significant levels for the items evaluating the 
role of the production managers in strategic decision making in 
the total sample**
Items K-W ANOVA
RPM1 0.08 0.06
RPM2 0.28 0.22
RPM3 0 .00* 0 .00*
RPM4 0.00* 0.00*
RPM5 0.22 0.24
For description of items, see Table 6-6 in Chapter 6 
* Highly significant
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA)
Table 6.3.2: Participation of production managers in strategic 
decision making by industrial sector scored by GMs, and the 
significant levels**
Items F*
Means 
P* C* M* K-W ANOVA
RPMl 4.04 4.18 3.98 3.88 " 0.65 0.57
RPM2 4.35 4.09 4.25 4.21 ' 0.56 0.71
RPM3 4.31 4.09 3.84 4.17 0.34 0.16
RPM4 3.69 3.73 3.53 3.31 0.29 0.31
RPM5 3.85 3.91 3.66 3.63 0.53 0.57
RPM6 4.27 4.27 3.91 3.90 0.31 0.19
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
For description of items, see Table 6-6 in Chapter 6
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA)
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Table 6.3.3: Participation of production managers in strategic 
decision making by industrial sector scored by PMs, and the 
significant levels**
Items F*
Means 
P* C* M* K-W ANOVA
RPM1 4.31 4.09 4.06 4.10 0.50 0.53
RPM2 4.27 3.91 3.88 4.27 0.12 0.06
RPM3 4.46 4.36 4.38 4.65 0.16 0.16
RPM4 3.92 3.73 4.09 3.96 0.48 0.60
RPM5 4.15 4.00 3.53 3.83 0.04 0.04
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
For description of items, see Table 6-7 in Chapter 6 
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA)
Table 6.3.4: Participation of production managers in strategic 
decision making by industrial sector scored by SMs, and the 
significant levels**
Items F*
Means 
P* C* M* K-W ANOVA
RPM1 3.89 4.18 4.03 3.79 0.22 0.29
RPM2 4.08 3.91 4.03 3.85 0.28 0.58
RPM3 4.04 3.64 3.63 3.90 0.56 0.37
RPM4 3.65 3.09 3.44 3.69 0.23 0.20
RPM5 3.69 3.64 3.88 3.44 0.07 0.15
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
For description of items, see Table 6-8 in Chapter 6
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA)
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Table 6.4.1: Significant levels for the manufacturing areas in the
total sample**
Items M-W T-test
Rapid volume changes 0.13 0.13
High performance design 0.25 0.24
New products introduction 0.66 0.72
Rapid design changes in the product 0.59 0.64
Meeting delivery time promises 0.98 0.92
Low price 0.39 0.48
Consistent quality 0.55 0.75
Fast delivery time 0.02 0.02
** Using the Mann-Whitney test (M-W) and the T-test
Table 6.4.2: Significant levels for the 
individual industries**
manufacturing areas in the 
(GMs ratings)
Items K-W ANOVA
Rapid volume changes 0.78 0.76
High performance design 0.92 0.95
' New products introduction 0.71 0.71
Rapid design changes in the product 0.05 0.05
Meeting delivery time promises 0.29 0.37
Low price 0.95 0.95
Consistent quality 0.11 0.05
Fast delivery time 0.32 0.24
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA)
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Table 6.4.3: Manufacturing areas according to needs for
improvements by industrial sector scored by GMs
Items F*
Means 
P* c* M*
Rapid volume changes 3.92 4.00 3.81 4.33
High performance design 4.77 5.00 5.06 5.04
New products introduction 4.39 4.91 4.22 4.75
Rapid design changes in the 
product 5.23 5.73 5.47 4.25
Meeting delivery time promises 4.35 3.55 4.78 4.38
Low price 3.39 3.82 3.37 3.48
Consistent quality 5.96 5.09 5.13 6.33
Fast delivery time 3.85 3.91 4.16 3.22
* For description see Table 6.1. 3 in this Appendix
Table 6.4.4: Significant levels 
individual industries**
for the manufacturing areas in the 
(PMs ratings)
Items K-W ANOVA
Rapid volume changes 0.65 0.63
High performance design 0.43 0.49
New products introduction 0.69 0.69
Rapid design changes in the product 0.47 0.49
Meeting delivery time promises 0.79 0.85
Low price 0.71 0.85
Consistent quality 0.58 0.75
Fast delivery time 0.08 0.08
** Using Kruskal Wallis 
Variance (ANOVA)
(K-W) and One Way Analysis of
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Table 6.4.5: Manufacturing areas according to needs for
improvementa by industrial sector scored by PMs
Items F*
Means 
P* C* M*
Rapid volume changes 4.15 4.00 4.66 4.75
High performance design 4.85 5.46 4.38 4.58
New products introduction 4.46 5.46 4.72 4.52
Rapid design changes in the 
product 5.31 4.82 4.88 4.48
Meeting delivery time promises 4.65 4.18 4.22 4.50
Low price 3.89 4.00 3.47 3.60
Consistent quality 5.85 5.18 5.59 5.85
Fast delivery time 4.73 4.00 5.03 3.81
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
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Table 6.5.1: Significant levels for the infrastructure programmes
in the individual industries** (PMs ratings)
Programmes K-W ANOVA
INFRl Reducing inventory costs 0.30 0.14
INFR2 Increasing inventory turnover 0.37 0.33
INFR3 Reducing raw materials 
and component inventories 0.06 0.04
INFR4 Reducing work-in-process 
inventories 0.55 0.52
INFR5 Reducing finished goods 
inventories 0.66 0.64
INFR6 Achieving larger production lots0.37 0.36
INFR7 Hiring and lay-off system 0.62 0.62
INFR8 Reducing idle time 0.13 0.14
INFR9 Finding reliable subcontractors 0.56 0.60
INFRl0 Stabilising workforce numbers 0.28 0.25
INFRl1 Designing policies to motivate 
employees to work as a team 0.31 0.36
INFRl2 Reducing lead time manufacturing 0.04 0.02
INFRl3 Increasing warehouse space 0.17 0.18
INFRl4 Developing a better master 
production schedule 0.44 0.56
INFRl5 Close order progress 
control system 0.86 0.71
INFRl6 Frequent work centre 
rescheduling capacity 0.38 0.26
INFRl7 Order status reporting system 0.34 0.48
INFRl8 Reducing raw material costs 0.95 0. 95
INFRl9 Obtaining long-term 
supply contracts 0.71 0.75
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Table 6.5.1 (continued)
Programmes M-W T-test
INFR20 Reducing the number of 
purchase orders per year 0.09 0.08
INFR21 Obtaining quantity 
discounts from suppliers 0.40 0.20
INFR22 Obtaining quantity 
discounts from shippers 0.14 0.08
INFR23 Developing high quality 
suppliers 0.38 0.29
INFR24 Developing reliable 
timely suppliers 0.28 0.14
INFR25 Diversifying suppliers 0.11 0.07
INFR26 Achieving independence 
from suppliers 0.70 0.67
INFR27 Substitution of labour 
by machines 0.51 0.53
INFR28 Product standardisation 0.18 0.12
INFR29 Product modularisation 0.11 0.12
INFR30 Product simplification 0.76 0.74
INFR31 Substitution of inexpensive 
materials or components 0.48 0.23
INFR32 Mechanised materials handling 0.74 0.70
INFR33 Automation of production lines 0.41 0.37
INFR34 Automatic inspection 0.08 0.08
INFR35 Acquiring the latest 
in production equipment 0.84 0.87
INFR36 Development of new features 
for older product lines 0.15 0.16
INFR37 Reducing direct labour costs 0.72 0.85
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Table 6.5.1 (continued)
Programmes K-W ANOVA
INFR38 Reducing production costs 0.52 0.66
INFR39 Worker skills diversification 0.35 0.47
INFR40 Worker training 0.32 0.44
INFR41 Worker specialisation 0.27 0.18
INFR42 Increasing worker responsibility 
in work planning 0.37 0.36
INFR43 Increasing worker control 
over work pace 0.73 0.66
INFR44 Inspectors training 0.13 0.11
INFR45 Removal of inspectors 0.07 0.03
INFR46 Improving labour productivity 0.36 0.39
INFR47 Development or improvement 
of quality control programmes 0.06 0.03
INFR48 Acquiring a Saudi quality mark 0.07 0.06
INFR49 Monetary incentive system 0.12 0.10
INFR50 Development or improvement of 
quality circle programmes 0.40 0.47
INFR51 Development of high 
volume products 0.43 0.53
INFR52 Development of products with 
high economics of scale 0.56 0.63
INFR53 Development of products with 
high economics of scope 0.79 0.78
INFR54 Improving co-ordination 
among engineering/ 
manufacturing,& marketing 0.69 0.73
INFR55 Developing reliable foreign 
suppliers for components, where 
materials are cheap 0.04 0.04
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Table 6.5.1 (continued)
Programmes K-W ANOVA
INFR56 Developing facilities abroad for 
manufacture of components for use 
in Saudi assembly plants 
where labours are cheap 0.80 0.84
INFR57 Developing facilities abroad for 
assembly of major product lines, 
where most of the production 
factors are cheap 0.79 0.75
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K-W) and One Way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA)
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Table 6.5.2: Distribution of infrastructure programmes by
industrial sector scored by PMs
Programmes F*
Means 
P* C* M*
INFRl Reducing inventory costs 3.35 2.80 3.53 3.23
INFR2 Increasing inventory 
turnover 3.40 2.90 3.43 3.48
INFR3 Reducing raw materials 
and component inventories 3.39 2.33 3.34 3.38
INFR4 Reducing work-in-process 
inventories 2.68 2.38 2.97 2.89
INFR5 Reducing finished goods 
inventories 3.36 3.00 3.48 3.50
INFR6 Achieving larger 
production lots 3.81 3.82 3.48 3.46
INFR7 Hiring and lay-off system 3.00 2.91 2.67 2.79
INFR8 Reducing idle time 3.89 3.18 3.45 3.73
INFR9 Finding reliable 
subcontractors 2.22 1.73 2.07 2.24
INFRl0 Stabilising workforce 
numbers 3.65 3.00 3.37 3.63
INFRl1 Designing policies to 
motivate employees to 
work as a team 3.85 3.27 3.52 3.60
INFRl2 Reducing lead time 
manufacturing 3.96 3.09 3.94 3.54
INFRl3 Increasing warehouse 
space 3.54 2.73 3.23 2.98
INFRl4 Developing a better master 
production schedule 4.04 3. 64 3.97 3.96
INFRl5 Close order progress 
control system 3.69 3.82 3.61 3.48
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Table 6.5.2 (continued)
Programmes F *
Means
p *  c * M*
INFRl6 Frequent work centre 
rescheduling capacity 3.73 3.46 3.53 3.27
INFRl7 Order status reporting 
system 3.62 3.27 3.52 3.38
INFRl8 Reducing raw material 
costs 4.12 4.00 4.00 4.00
INFRl9 Obtaining long-term 
supply contracts 3.32 3.00 3.39 3.17
INFR20 Reducing the number of 
purchase orders per year 3.42 3.50 3.25 2.83
INFR21 Obtaining quantity 
discounts from suppliers 3.69 3.27 3.72 3.31
INFR22 Obtaining quantity 
discounts from shippers 3.50 3.09 3.55 2.96
INFR23 Developing high quality 
suppliers 3.85 3.73 4.00 3.56
INFR24 Developing reliable 
timely suppliers 3.89 3.46 3.94 3.48
INFR25 Diversifying suppliers 3.54 3.00 3.71 3.15
INFR26 Achieving independence 
from suppliers 3.48 3.18 3.55 3.25
INFR27 Substitution of labour 
by machines 3.31 3.55 3.34 3.04
INFR28 Product standardisation 4.08 3.64 4.03 3.67
INFR29 Product modularisation 3.67 2.80 3.39 3.21
INFR30 Product simplification 3.57 3.18 3.32 3.35
INFR31 Substitution of 
inexpensive materials 
or components 2.92 2.70 3.39 3.31
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Table €.5.2 (continued)
Programmes F*
Means 
P* C* M*
INFR32 Mechanised materials 
handling 3.35 3.09 3.28 3.04
INFR33 Automation of production 
lines 3.62 3.73 3.38 3.17
INFR34 Automatic inspection 3.19 2.82 2.61 2.40
INFR35 Acquiring the latest 
in production equipment 3.68 3.73 3.74 3.52
INFR36 Development of new features 
for older product lines 3.81 2.91 3.47 3.31
INFR37 Reducing direct labour 
costs 3.73 3.64 3.72 3.85
INFR38 Reducing production costs 4.15 3.82 4.16 4.08
INFR39 Worker skills 
diversification 4.00 3.55 3.91 3.77
INFR40 Worker training 3.62 3.18 3.69 3.60
INFR41 Worker specialisation 3.58 3.09 3.17 3.48
INFR42 Increasing worker responsibility 
in work planning 3.65 3.46 3.23 3.25
INFR43 Increasing worker control 
over work pace 3.58 3.73 3.34 3.46
INFR44 Inspectors training 3.46 2.55 2.97 2.96
INFR45 Removal of inspectors 3.00 2.10 2.10 2.33
INFR46 Improving labour 
productivity 4.08 3.64 3.91 3.88
INFR47 Development or improvement 
of quality control 
programmes 4.08 3.27 4.03 3.56
INFR48 Acquiring a Saudi quality 
mark 3.78 2. 60 3.71 3.31
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Table 6.5.2 : (continued)
Programmes F*
Means
P* c* M*
INFR49 Monetary incentive system 3.31 2.36 3.03 2.81
INFR50 Development or improvement 
of quality circle 
programmes 3.52 3.00 3.19 3.13
INFR51 Development of high
volume products 3.24 3.09 3.48 3.13
INFR52 Development of products 
with high economics of 
scale 3.42 3.46 3.47 3.17
INFR53 Development of products 
with high economics of 
scope 3.29 3.27 3.58 3.35
INFR54 Improving co-ordination 
among engineering, 
manufacturing,& marketing 3.62 3.36 3.44 3.56
INFR55 Developing reliable foreign 
suppliers for components, 
where materials are cheap 2.23 2.00 2.78 3.04
INFR56 Developing facilities abroad 
for manufacture of components 
for use in Saudi assembly plants 
where labours are cheap 1.62 1.82 1.84 1.90
INFR57 Developing facilities abroad 
for assembly of major product 
lines, where most of the 
production factors are 
cheap 1.50 1.73 1.72 1.48
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
427
Table 6.6.1: Significant levels for the competitive priorities
in the individual industries** (GMs ratings)
Items K-W ANOVA
1. Low price 0.38 0.46
2. High performance design 0.21 0.12
3. Consistent quality 0.14 0.11
4. Rapid design changes in product 0.78 0.82
5. Rapid volume changes 0.24 0.09
6. New products introduction 0.04 0.06
7. On-time delivery 0.74 0.82
8. Fast delivery time 0.31 0.39
** Using Kruskal Wallis (K- 
Variance (ANOVA)
W) and One Way Analysis of
Table 6.6.2: Distribution of 
priorities by industrial sector
the .importance of the competitive
Programmes F*
Means
P* C* M*
1. Low price 3.81 3.27 3.66 3.81
2. High performance design 4.23 3.64 4.22 3.90
3. Consistent quality 4.35 4.46 4.66 4.23
4. Rapid design changes in 
product 3.65 3.73 3.88 3.85
5. Rapid volume changes 4.04 3.36 4.03 4. 04
6. New products introduction 3.54 3.09 3.84 3.27
7. On-time delivery 4.58 4.64 4.56 4.48
8. Fast delivery time 4.27 4.09 4.22 3.98
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
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Table 6.7.1 : Distribution of business visits by industrial
sector
Performing business visits F* P* c * M*
Yes 1 9 6 2 2 3 9
No 7 5 1 0 9
Total 2 6 1 1 3 2 4 8
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
Table 6.7.2: Distribution of subjective performance measures by 
industrial sector (1986-1988)
Items F* P
Means
*  c * M*
GROI 2.31 2.18 2.25 2.20
GS 2.69 2 .46 2.22 2.50
GROS 2.54 2 .27 2.16 2.33
3ROI: Average Annual of growth in return on investment 
GS :Average Annual rate of growth in sales 
GROS :Average Annual rate of growth in return on sales 
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
iTable 6.7.3: Distribution of plants1 
[industrial sector (1986-1988)
chances of survival by
Chances F*
No. of plants 
P* C*
(Frequency)
M* Total
Lower chances - - 1 1 2
No change 11 5 15 19 50
Higher chances 15 6 16 27 64
Total 26 11 32 47 116
* For description see Table 6.1.3 in this Appendix
429
APPENDIX
DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES
The following sections describe the used procedures to develop 
measures for testing the hypotheses.
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
The variable environmental uncertainty was measured by a 
16-item instrument on a five point scale in two questions; A and B
(see Appendix A, questionnaire A) . Both questions were rated by
general manager of each plant. In question A, general managers 
were asked to rate the importance of the 16-item, and in question B
they were asked to show their ability in predicting the same items.
To derive the plant's perceived environmental uncertainty measure, 
the score of each item in the "predictability" question (B) was 
multiplied by the outcome of dividing the average importance score 
of that item by the sum of the average scores for all the items 
included in the "importance" question (A) as expressed in the 
next two following equations. This approach was used by Swamidass 
(1983) , and it is more simplified than the one employed by 
Duncan (1972). Duncan's approach says that the perceived 
uncertainty score for each item is the sum of the predictability 
and the adequacy of information scores weighted by the
importance assigned to the item.
n
WPEU = £ (Pj) (Wj)
j =1
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where,
WPEU: the weighted measure for environmental uncertainty, 
n : the number of items included in the "predictability” question 
(16 items).
Pj : the predictability score for the j-th item.
Wj : the weight for the j-th item (see next equation).
j : the item number
Ij
Wj - ________________
n
5 Ij 
j = 1
where,
Wj: the weight for the j-th item (expressed above as the outcome), 
n : the number of items included in the "importance" question (16 
items) .
Ij: the average importance score for the j-th item, 
j : item number.
Manufacturing Task
The variable manufacturing task was measured via a 14-item instrument 
on a five point scale by both general and production managers 
(see Appendix A, questionnaires A and B) . The plant's manufacturing 
task measure (MTM) was obtained by averaging the ratings of 
both general and production managers on the 14 items. This is
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expressed in the following equation:
(GT1 + ...+ GT14) + (PT1+...+PT14)
MTM = ________________________________ •
28
where,
MTM: the manufacturing task measure.
GT1 to GT14 : manufacturing task items rated by general managers
(see Table 6-2).
PT1 to PT14 : manufacturing task items rated by production
managers (see Table 6-3).
Manufacturing Infrastructure
This variable, manufacturing infrastructure, was measured via a 
57-item instrument on a five point scale by production managers 
(see Appendix A, questionnaire B) . The plant's manufacturing 
infrastructure measure (INFRA) was computed by averaging the ratings 
of production managers on the 57 items. This is expressed in 
the following equation:
n
S INFRj 
j-1
INFRA =
57
where,
INFRA: the manufacturing infrastructure measure.
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n : the number of items included in the measure (57 items).
INFRj: the infrastructure score for the j-th items, 
j : the item number.
The role of the Production Manager
The variable production manager's role was measured via a 5-item 
instrument on a five point scale by both general and production 
managers (see Appendix A, questionnaires A and B). The ratings by 
both managers yielded two independent instruments for the role of
the production manager in strategic decision making. The grand
average for each instrument was achieved by averaging the rating of 
each type of manager on the 5 items. This is expressed by the 
following equations:
n
2 RPMj
j=l
RPMG = _______________
5
n
2 RPMj
j=l
RPMP= _______________
5
Where,
RPMG: the production manager's role measure (general managers
ratings).
RPMP: the production manager's role measure (production managers
ratings).
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n : the number of items included in the measure (5 items).
RPMj: the score of the instrument for the j-th item, 
j : item number.
Performance
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, plant's performance was
measured via two instruments by general managers; objective and 
subjective measures.
A composite measure was derived by averaging the three subjective 
measures; growth in return on investment (GROI), growth in 
sales (GS), and growth in return on sales (GROS) as shown below:
GROI + GS + GROS
The composite measure = ______________________
3
Uncertainty-task Congruence
Uncertainty-task measure (UTCONG) was developed as a binary 
variable. This binary variable was assigned the following values:
o zero: If plants exhibited high congruence,
o one : If plants exhibited low congruence,
o two : If plants exhibited no congruence.
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According to the above assigned values, plants were
partitioned into three groups:
Group 1: plants above average in both perceived environmental
uncertainty and manufacturing task variables, i.e., high
congruence.
Group 2: plants below average in both perceived environmental
uncertainty and manufacturing task variables, i.e., low 
congruence.
Group 3: plants above average in perceived environmental
uncertainty and below average in manufacturing task variables 
and vice versa, i.e., without congruence.
Task-Infrastructure Congruence
The task-infrastructure measure (TICONG) was developed as a binary 
variable. Similar to the previous binary variable UTCONG, after 
assigning the values 0, 1, 2, plants were divided into three groups
as shown below:
Group 1: plants above average in both manufacturing task and
infrastructure variables, i.e., high congruence.
Group 2: plants below average in both manufacturing task and
infrastructure variables, i.e., low congruence.
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Group 3: plants below average in manufacturing task and above average 
in infrastructure variables or vice versa, i.e., without 
congruence.
Task Congruence
The task congruence measure (TCONG) was computed as the difference of 
the average ratings between general and production managers on 
manufacturing task, as shown below:
( GT1+...+GT14) (PT1+ ...+ PT14)
TCONG = __________________ - ____________________
14 14
where,
TCONG: the task congruence measure
GT1 to GT14: the rated manufacturing task items by general managers. 
PT1 to PT14: the rated manufacturing task items by production
managers.
Since TCONG measures the difference and not the congruence between 
top management and production management, the smaller the value of 
TCONG, the greater the task congruence. Also, since TCONG is 
computed by taking the difference of the grand average between 
general and production managers on manufacturing task, and generally 
the ratings of general managers are higher than the ones by 
production managers in this aspect (see Chapter Six), the value of 
TCONG should be positive.
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Table 7.1.1: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence in the food and
paper industries
(Hypotheses 3: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence 
n (3) significance
Food
Composite 13 2.44 13 2.59 0.44**
GROI 13 2.15 13 2.46 0.15**
GS 13 2.69 13 2.75 0.57**
GROS 13 2.46 13 2.62 0.51**
Paper
Composite’ 9 2.30 2 2.33 0.96**
GROI 9 2.22 2 2.00 0.86**
GS 9 2.44 2 2.50 0.93**
GROS 9 2.22 2 2.50 0.67**
**: Not statistically significant 
Composite: averaging GROI, GS & GROS 
GS : growth in sales
GROI: growth in return on investment
GROS: growth in return on sales
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Table 7.1.2: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence in the chemical
and metal industries
(Hypotheses 3: test 1)
Measure
Performance (Means) 
Plants with Plants without 
congruence congruence 
n (1&2) n (3) significance
Chemical
Composite 15 2.16 17 2.25 0.66**
GROI 15 2.27 17 2.24 0.89**
GS 15 2.07 17 2.35 0.27**
GROS 15 2.13 17 2.18 0.87**
Metal
Composite 29 2.32 17 2.37 0.74**
GROI 29 2.14 17 2.29 0.40**
GS 29 2.52 17 2.47 0.77**
GROS 29 2.31 17 2.35 0.84**
For measures description see Table 7.1.1 in this Appendix. 
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7.1.3: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence in the food and
paper industries
(Hypotheses 3: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plant without 
congruence 
n (3) significance
Food
ROI 86 8 12.0 3 -3.46 0.17**
ROI 87 8 12.5 4 -3.25 0.19**
ROI 88 8 13.6 4 6.68 0.14**
Sales 86 9 19810972 4 13247532 0.49**
Sales 87 9 23521760 4 16990411 0.58**
Sales 88 9 24975072 4 21873514 0.64**
ROS 86 8 13.9 3 -0.20 0.17**
ROS 87 8 14.2 4 -2.80 0.15**
ROS 88 8 11.7 4 6.73 0.19**
Paper
ROI 86 2 14.6 0 - -
ROI 87 2 11.3 0 - -
ROI 88 3 9.03 1 18.0 0.25**
Sales 86 2 9440902 1 5333000 0.60**
Sales 87 2 12057900 1 6400000 0.64**
Sales 88 2 1297700 1 10549000 0.92**
ROS 86 3 14.3 0 - -
ROS 87 3 14.4 1 2.0 0.25**
ROS 88 3 16.6 1 15.0 0.84**
For measures description see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7.1.4: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with and without uncertainty-task congruence in the chemical
and metal industries
(Hypotheses 3: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence 
n (3) significance
Chemical
ROI 86 8 20.5 5 5.24 0.13**
ROI 87 8 14.4 5 10.7 0.52**
ROI 88 7 13.9 5 5.34 0.19**
Sales 86 6 13722430 6 8935297 0.51**
Sales 87 6 12972774 6 9733035 0.43**
Sales 88 6 8929719 6 6732652 0.37**
ROS 86 8 16.7 5 -1.52 0.21**
ROS 87 8 17.7 5 7. 84 0.36**
ROS 88 7 15.2 5 6.38 0.11**
Metal
ROI 86 13 12.5 6 2.26 0.57**
ROI 87 13 11.2 6 14.3 0.30**
ROI 88 15 13.5 7 12.1 0.65**
Sales 86 16 14395973 9 6878179 0.33**
Sales 87 16 15470500 9 8408201 0.33**
Sales 88 16 18690533 9 13577344 0.36**
ROS 86 11 9.92 5 13.1 0.46**
ROS 87 13 9.50 5 12.7 0.46**
ROS 88 15 10.6 6 12.3 0.62**
For measures description see section 6.8.3 (Chapter 6).
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7.2.1: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence in the food
and paper industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence 
n (3) Significance
Food
Composite 12 2.36 14 2.64 0.17**
GROI 12 2.17 14 2.43 0.23**
GS 12 2.58 14 2.79 0.37**
GROS 12 2.33 14 2.71 0.13**
Paper
Composite 6 2.33 5 2.27 0.83**
GROI 6 2.33 5 2.00 0.40**
GS 6 2.33 5 2.60 0.43**
GROS 6 2.33 5 2.20 0.65**
For measures description see Table 7.1.1 in this Appendix.
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7.2.2: Comparison of subjective performance measures between
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence in the
chemical and metal industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 1)
Measure
Performance 
Plants with 
congruence 
n (1&2)
(Means)
Plants without 
congruence 
n (3) Significance
Chemical
Composite 21 2.25 11 2.12 0.52**
GROI 21 2.28 11 2.18 0.60** .
GS 21 2.29 11 2.09 0.47**
GROS 21 2.19 11 2.09 0.71**
Metal
Composite 26 2.45 20 2.20 0.13**
GROI 26 2.31 20 2.05 0.16**
GS 26 2.62 20 2.35 0.11**
GROS 26 2.40 20 2.20 0.23**
For measures description see Table 7.1.1 in this Appendix.
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7.2.3: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence in the food
and paper industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 1)
Performance (Means)
Measure Plants with Plants without
congruence congruence
n (1&2) n (3) Significance
Food
ROI 86 4 2.30 7 10.9 0.35**
ROI 87 5 1.66 7 11.2 0.24**
ROI 88 5 8.50 7 13.2 0.28**
Sales 86 5 102677366 8 26462550 0.53**
Sales 87 5 12611244 8 28922531 0.51**
Sales 88 5 14750330 8 34389278 0.48**
ROS 86 4 4.33 7 13.3 0.29**
ROS 87 5 1.28 7 13.7 0.16**
ROS 88 5 8.86 7 10.8 0.58**
Par>er
ROI 86 1 0.50 1 28.6 0.15**
ROI 87 1 0.50 1 22.1 0.19**
ROI 88 3 8.27 1 20.3 0.13**
Sales 86 2 4507402 1 11687000 0.14**
Sales 87 2 4941999 1 13957980 0.16**
Sales 88 2 8792144 1 16620940 0.23**
ROS 86 1 1.80 2 20.6 0.27**
ROS 87 2 2.1 2 20.6 0.29**
ROS 88 2 10.2 2 22.2 0.35**
For measures description see Table 6.8.3 (Chapter 6) 
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 7.2.4: Comparison of objective performance measures between
plants with and without task-infrastructure congruence in the
chemical and metal industries
(Hypothesis 4: test 1)
Performance (Means) 
Measure Plants with Plants without
congruence congruence
n (1&2) n (3) Significance
Chemical
ROI 86 9 15.4 4 12.8 0.74**
ROI 87 9 12.0 4 15.0 0.54**
ROI 88 9 11.6 3 6.7 0.38**
Sales 86 8 6307604 4 17893660 0.22**
Sales 87 8 6532372 4 22577615 0.29**
Sales 88 8 7079456 4 9334645 0.30**
ROS 86 9 8.16 4 13.2 0.56**
ROS 87 9 13.5 4 14.9 0.85**
ROS 88 9 12.3 3 9.40 0.68**
Metal
ROI 86 12 2.45 7 10.7 0.21**
ROI 87 12 13.4 7 10.1 0.33**
ROI 88 13 15.4 9 9.7 0.19**
Sales 86 16 19388544 9 6292939 0.28**
Sales 87 16 20941902 9 8820024 0.35**
Sales 88 16 24044210 9 14339759 0.36**
ROS 86 10 8.08 6 15.6 0.29**
ROS 87 11 9.61 7 11.7 0.45**
ROS 88 12 11.3 9 10.9 0.89**
For measures description see Table 6.8.3 (Chapter 6) 
**: Not statistically significant.
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Table 8.1.1: A detailed principal components factor loadings matrix
for the infrastructure programmes (Total sample)
Inf r FC1 FC2 FC3 FC4 FC5 F C 6 F C 7
2 .05 .03 . 01 .11 -.01 .09 .34
3 .01 -.05 .12 -.01 .15 .04 .84
4 .16 -.01 .10 -.01 -.02 -.02 .16
5 .01 .03 -.03 .01 -.23 .09 .79
6 .38 .30 .19 .15 .23 -.14 .20
7 .23 .15 .07 .04 -.03 .05 .23
8 .24 .39 .09 -.08 -.08 .09 .45
9 .07 -.18 -.06 .14 .06 .02 -.12
10 .29 .04 .20 .16 .09 .11 .40
11 .01 .07 .15 .11 .14 .20 .08
12 .12 .32 .02 .05 -.09 .01 -.14
13 .18 .28 .14 .22 .07 .19 .10
14 .10 .24 .26 .47 .29 .36 .29
15 .01 .16 .30 .57 .09 .44 -.12
16 .15 .24 .17 .19 -.02 .33 -.11
17 .15 .08 .12 .22 .02 .05 .13
19 .21 .09 .04 .12 .25 .08 -.05
20 .40 .24 .25 .03 .22 .10 -.02
21 .72 -.02 .13 .19 .01 -.06 -.10
22 .70 .08 .11 .18 -.05
COo1 -.07
23 .82 .11 .02 .02 .18 .11 .07
24 .80 -.01 -.18 .09 .21 .13 .11
25 .82 .04 .12 -.03 .01 .21 .06
26 .51 .19 .37 .26 -.10 .16 .08
27 .25 .56 .31 .26 .20 -.02 -.08
28 .16 .30 .03 .41 -.03 .26 .20
29 .27 .22 .05 .77 .12 .11 .02
30 .05 .07 .00 .78 .12 -.03 -.02
31 .31 .19 .08 .51 .14 -.11 .06
32 .40 .61 -.07 .05 .26 .03 -.01
33 .03 .87 .03 .08 .13 .04 .10
34 .03 .77 .12 .12 .06 .25 -.11
35 -.02 .66 .18 .20 .28 .11 .10
36 .06 .48 .51 .20 .35 .11 .16
38 .21 .14 .15 .16 .11 .20 .02
39 .12 .12 .45 .12 .10 .09 .17
40 .17 .01 .74 .03 .21 .11 .09
41 -.07 .22 .75 .10 -.06 .10 .12
42 -.01 .33 .50 .45 .22 .05 -.01
43 -.06 .49 .43 .05 -.12 .12 -.14
44 .28 .05 .44 -.11 .34 .25 .10
45 .12 . 04 .56 -.02 .17 .22 -.27
46 .23 .06 .34 .20 .22 .25 .18
47 .09 .05 .23 .30 .21 .48 .08
48 .22 .18 -.04 .01 .08 .80 .12
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Table 8.1.1: (continued)
Inf r FC8 FC9 FC10 FCll FC12 FC13 FC14
2 .04 .02 .04 .01 .74 -.16 .07
3 -. 01 -.07 -.05 .09 .14 .04 .05
4 .07 -.01 -.05 -.03 .03 -.04 .82
5 .11 .21 .04 -.02 .04 .05 .12
6 -.01 .31 -.33 .11 -.27 -.10 .09
7 .04 -.01 -.08 .80 -.01 -.02 -.19
8 .21 -.09 -.41 .22 .11 .01 -.05
9 -.07 .26 .10 .66 .01 .28 .32
10 .04 .16 -.33 .37 .21 -.01 .13
11 .22 .33 .15 .80 .03 .32 .11
12 .50 -.10 .16 .22 .12 .00 .13
13 -.28 .04 .12 .11 -.12 .51 .05
14 -.02 .32 -.16 .06 .03 -.05 -.16
15 .13 .16 .17 .03 -.20 -.05 .10
16 .04 .46 .27 -.02 -.16 .34 -.15
17 .14 .77 .01 .16 .01 -.06 .06
19 -.00 .04 .72 -.02 .07 -.03 -.10
20 .14 .00 .60 -.03 -.06 .16 .20
21 .30 -.17 -.06 .08 -.17 -.07 .02
22 .29 -.08 .20 .07 -.10 -.20 -.06
23 -.01 .19 -.05 .12 .06 .06 .10
24 .00 .21 .14 .00 .12 -.03 .11
25 .01 .09 .16 .09 .16 .08 .00
26 -.13 .12 .26 .15 -.06 -.31 .03
27 .06 .19 .18 .05 .18 -.08 .04
28 .21 .19 .44 .24 .06 -.13 -.04
29 .10 -.10 .26 .07 -.04 .17 .03
30 .11 .27 -.02 .10 .15 .12 .01
31 .15 .15 -.11 - -.12 .41 .04 -.24
32 .15 .37 .05 .04 .12 .19 -.14
33 .12 .08 .03 -.02 -.03 .05 .06
34 -.14 .01 -.02 -.01 .00 -.01 -.09
35 .25 -.05 .19 .11 -.06 .17 -.03
36 .16 .16 .06 -.11 .02 .00 -.05
38 .78 .11 .05 .00 .11 .06 .08
39 .60 .06 .14 .01 -.01 -.11 .15
40 .24 .20 -.01 .06 -.00 -.07 .07
41 .18 .07 .01 -.07 .02 .28 .12
42 .04 -.23 -.05 .05 .06 .04 .12
43 .04 -.29 .06 .11 .36 .21 .19
44 .12 .38 .07 -.05 .21 .19 -.19
45 -.04 -.07 .28 .36 .01 .07 -.22
46 .53 .20 -.21 -.03 .12 .02 -.21
47 .28 .34 .16 -.15 .03 . 14 -.08
48 .09 .10 .13 -.01 .07 -.02 .06
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Table 8.1.1: (continued)
Inf r FC1 FC2 FC3 FC4 FC5 FC6 FC7
49 .01 .05 .16 .01 .12 .62 -.10
50 .04 .15 .40
00o .17 .70 .19
51 .13 .27 .04
o1 .79 .16 .00
52 .08 .23 .25 .19
00 .18 .10
53 .09 .06 .08 .30 .74 .01 .00
54 .11 .12 .26 .22 .05 .08 .14
Table 8.1.1: (continued)
Inf r FC8 FC9 FC10 FC11 FC12 FC13 FC14
49 .26 -.09 -.03 .14 .46 .10 -.07
50 .03 -.02 -.02 .13 -.07 .13 -.04
51 .07 -.06 .17 .04 -.11 -.13 -.05
52 .11 .06 .04 .04 -.03 .02 .07
53 .05 .13 .15
00o1 .17 .22 -.03
54 .29 .06 -.16 .27 -.10 .56 -.19
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Table 8.1.2: A detailed principal components factor loadings matrix
for the competitive priorities (Total sample)
Competitive Priorities Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1. High performance design 0.77 0.12 0.07
2. On-time delivery 0.75 0.11 -0.04
3. Fast delivery 0.72
00oo1 0.32
4. Consistent quality 0.68 0.19 -0.36
5. Product flexibility 0.04 0.84 -0.02
6. Volume flexibility 0.14 0.71 0.10
7. Low price -0.06 0.03 0.86
Eigenvalue 2.47 1.15 1.11
% of variance 30.9 14.4 13.9
Cumulative percentage 30.9 45.3 59.2
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Table 8.1.3 : Relationships between focused sets of competitive
priorities and components of manufacturing strategy
(Total sample)
Canonical correlation 
between pair of variates 
(significance)
Canonical Functions * ** ** 
1 2  3
0.57
(.025) (.166) (.330)
Predictor variables 
(Competitive priorities 
indices)
Canonical loadings
Quality-Delivery 0.08 -0.97 -0.22
Flexibility 0.30 0.06 -0.95
Low Price
Criterion variables 
(Manufacturing strategy 
indices)
0.95 -0.02 0.30
Suppliers Management 0.52 -0.19 -0.48
Automation Management 
Improving Workforce Skills
-0.14 0.04 -0.40
Management -0.09 -0.40 -0.38
Product Control Management 0.10 -0.27 -0.62
High Volume Products -0.20 0.01 -0.33
Quality Management 0.19 -0.54 -0.27
Inventory Management 
Increasing Productivity
0.49 -0.10 -0.39
Management 0.23 -0.33 -0.48
Information System Management -0.01 -0.57
O'!
00o1
Purchasing Control Management 0.20
00CNo1 -0.04
Human Resources Management 0.19 0.13 -0.39
Turnover Management 0.02 -0.16 i o M 00
Co-ordination Management 0.35 0.18 -0.37
Work-in-process Management -0.14 0.02 -0.55
Statistically significant 
Not statistically significant
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